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Preface 
 
It is a common concept that company meetings and voting on 
them resemble the Parliament activities. This resemblance is well 
recognized in the legal curriculums and the voluminous company 
literature. The logical consequences for such resemblance is that 
an equality in members rights must be granted to all members of 
the company, also majority powers must be absolute and without 
limits. Such resemblance may be adequate in the old forms of 
companies, but it may be not precise in the modern company 
forms since that the modern company is authorized by law to issue 
the preference shares. As their name implies preference shares 
confer on holders' preference over the ordinary shares in respect 
of many rights in the company. 
The equality between the shareholders in a company is well 
known presumption in the English Companies Law references. 
Professor Gower mentioned this presumption in his great 
Company Law reference "The Principles of Modern Company 
Law" This presumption remains exist unless there is a provision to 
the contrary in the memorandum or articles of association of the 
company. Whenever there is a provision to the contrary, the 
presumption of the equality between the shareholders will defeat 
then the preferentiality between the shareholders takes place. The 
question which may arise is whether the preferentiality may 
extents to reach a discrimination limit. Many of the Company Law 
writers explained this question and concluded that preferentiality 
will not reach a discrimination limit. They justified the issuing of 
preference shares by that it is for the benefit of the company as a 
whole since that the issuing of preference shares is one of the 
important means to capitalize and recapitalize the company. We 
add that many of the shareholders' rights are not effected by such 
issuing since these rights, by their nature, are not preferable and 
all holders of these rights must be treated equally, the examples 
for these rights is the right of a shareholder to prevent the ultra 
vires act, or the right of a shareholder not to have his obligations to 
the company increased without his consent. 
Another feature of resemblance between the company and the 
Parliament is the majority powers in both. Again, this feature 
seems not precise in that majority powers in the company are not 
absolute powers and there are many limits imposed by the law on 
the company. These limits clearly appear in the relief of minority 
shareholders in many events, for example in winding up the 
company on the just and equitable ground, the intervention of the 
11 
 
court in the event of unfair prejudicial conduct of the company and 
in the personal and derivative actions. 
This dissertation discusses the features and justifications of 
the preferentiality between the shareholders in one company when 
it is allowed by the company memorandum and articles of 
association. Also this dissertation explains rights on which such 
preferentiality is applicable and rights on which preferentiality 
inapplicable. Lastly, this dissertation explains the methods of the 
relief of the minority shareholders and the balance of powers 
between minority and majority shareholders.    
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Abstract 
 
Sudan is a wide vast country, rich in many kinds of natural 
resources. It has been nick named "world food basket". Many 
mineral and oil discoveries were successful. In order to exploit 
these resources, economical instruments must be set to contain 
and utilize these diverse resources. Companies come at first to 
exploit resources for they are the most suitable tool to condense 
enormous capital and human resources under one management. 
The law has intervened to arrange the affairs of the company 
as a legal entity. The innovation of the notion of the legal entity 
considered as one of the greatest discoveries during mankind 
heritage. 
To encourage people in country like Sudan to form 
companies, it is necessary to spread company culture and to 
highlight its economic benefits for both state and individual, thus 
the researcher was keen in the first chapter of this dissertation to 
point out the legal and etymological definition of the company in 
the Sudanese Act and the English Act (from which the Sudanese 
Act was derived). To make use from the experience of other 
countries the researcher was keen to cast light on the American 
Law in this respect because U.S. A is considered as an 
outstanding example in this field. Equally well the researcher was 
keen to manifest the development for companies to show that 
company did not emerge by accident, but it was resulted from a 
long patient experience. This chapter compared between the 
company and other types of frame works like partnership and 
then concludes that the company is advantageous over 
partnership for many considerations detailed in this chapter. It 
was necessary to show the concept of the company as a 
separate legal entity. Also in this chapter the researcher has 
manifested different roles of the company in our life legally, 
economically and socially. Despite the fact that the share has its 
own legal nature in the law, the researcher has shown in this 
chapter its economical nature so as to show that the two natures 
of the share are co – related. By virtue of the membership of a 
company, a shareholder is entitled to the rights in such company, 
so, this chapter includes; definition of membership, the way to 
become a member and persons who can be members. 
The second chapter which constitutes the main body of this 
dissertation is based on the fact that the common concept that 
the capital of the company is divided into equal shares qualifying 
holders to equal rights. It is obvious that the law in both Sudan 
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and England has authorized the company to prefer some types of 
over the ordinary shares, thus it was necessary in this chapter to 
justify this preferentiality. The researcher has explained the legal 
nature of the share. Moreover, the researcher has presented the 
different types of shares and explained the difference in their 
nature whether preference or ordinary. The researcher has 
detailed that all types of company shares are subject to the same 
obligations whilst preferentiality between different types of shares 
lies only in the rights of the shareholder in the company. 
Shareholder rights are much more than the three famous rights 
(the right to attend company meetings and vote, the right to 
dividends and the right to return of capital after winding up the 
company). After vestigial research in the English and Common 
Law the researcher conclude in this chapter that shareholder's 
rights are more than 20 rights. For the purposes of this 
dissertation, the researcher found that preferentiality is applicable 
by the nature of some of these rights, so, it can be classified as 
conditioned equal rights. By the nature of the remaining group, 
preferentiality is inapplicable, so, they can be classified as 
inherent equal rights. 
In chapter (3), and under the light of the title of this 
dissertation, the researcher shifted to throw light to the need for 
making a balance between the two groups of the company 
(majority and minority). So long as it is not practical to equate 
between the two groups; then, there must be some sort of 
rational balance in exercising of different powers in the company. 
Chapter (3) also appears that most of the memorandum and 
articles of companies in the recent years confer to the board of 
directors, who are in fact the representatives of the majority, 
almost absolute powers. So some relief for the sake of the 
minority have been created, such like the intervention of the court 
whenever unfair prejudicial conduct against the majority is 
practiced. Another relief for the sake of the minority is the 
intervention of the court to wind up the company on the just and 
equitable ground. These two mentioned types of relief's are 
statutory relief. Other types of relief's are provided by the 
Common Law by the way of the derivative action and the 
personal action. Other statutory relief is practiced by the 
Department of Trade and Industry in England (in Sudan 
shareholders benefit from the umbrella of protection spread by 
the Companies Registrar Office). 
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  اﻟﺨﻼﺻﺔ
ﺳـﻠﺔ ﻏـﺬﺍﺀ )ﻃﻠﻖ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ  ﺃ ﺍﻟﺴﻮﺩﺍﻥ ﺑﻠﺪ ﺷﺎﺳﻊ ﻭﻏﲏ ﲟﺨﺘﻠﻒ ﺃﻧﻮﺍﻉ ﺍﻟﺜﺮﻭﺍﺕ ﺣﱵ ﺃﻧﻪ ﻗﺪ 
ﻼﻝ ﻫﺬﻩ ﺘﻐﺳﻹ. ﻭﻗﺪ ﰎ ﺑﻨﺠﺎﺡ ﺍﻟﻜﺸﻒ ﺑﺒﺎﻃﻨﻪ ﻋﻦ ﻛﺜﲑ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﺜﺮﻭﺍﺕ ﺍﳌﻌﺪﻧﻴﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﺒﺘﺮﻭﻟﻴﺔ  ، (ﺍﻟﻌﺎﱂ
ﻌﺪﺩﺓ ﻞ ﺗﻠﻚ ﺍﻟﺜﺮﻭﺍﺕ ﺍﳌﺘ ﺘﻐﺗﺴ ﺩﻭﺍﺕ ﺍﻟﱵ ﺑﻮﺍﺳﺘﻄﻬﺎ ﳚﺎﺩ ﺍﻷ ﺇﻣﺜﻞ ﻓﻤﻦ ﺍﳌﻬﻢ ﻼﻝ ﺍﻷ ﻐﺳﺘﻹﺍﻟﺜﺮﻭﺍﺕ ﺍ 
ﻣﺜـﻞ ﺎ ﺍﻟﻮﻋـﺎﺀ ﺍﻷ ﺃﺳﺘﻘﻼﻝ ﺗﻠﻚ ﺍﻟﺜﺮﻭﺍﺕ ﺫﻟﻚ ﺇﺗﱪﺯ ﺍﻟﺸﺮﻛﺎﺕ ﰲ ﺻﺪﺍﺭﺓ ﻭﺳﺎﺋﻞ . ﺷﻜﺎﻝﺍﻷ
   . ﲢﺖ ﺇﺩﺍﺭﺓ ﻭﺍﺣﺪﺓﻣﻮﺍﻝ ﺿﺨﻤﺔ ﻭ ﻛﻮﺍﺩﺭ ﺑﺸﺮﻳﺔ ﻣﺆﻫﻠﺔﺃﻟﺘﺠﻤﻴﻊ ﺭﺅﺱ 
ﻋﺘﺒﺎﺭﻳﺔ ﻟﻠـﺸﺮﻛﺔ ، ﺇﺑﺘﺪﺍﻉ ﺷﺨﺼﻴﺔ ﺇﻣﺮ ﺍﱃ ﻧﺘﻬﻰ ﺍﻷ ﺇﻣﻮﺭ ﺍﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ ﻭ ﺃﻢ ﺗﺪﺧﻞ ﺍﻟﻘﺎﻧﻮﻥ ﻭﻧﻈﹼ 
  .ﻧﺴﺎﱏ ﻛﺘﺸﺎﻓﺎﺕ ﺧﻼﻝ ﺍﻟﺘﺎﺭﻳﺦ ﺍﻹﻫﻢ ﺍﻹﺃﺭﻳﺔ ﻳﻌﺘﱪ ﻣﻦ ﻋﺘﺒﺎﻹﺑﺘﺪﺍﻉ ﺍﻟﺸﺨﺼﻴﺔ ﺍﺇﻥ ﺃﻭﻣﻌﻠﻮﻡ 
ﻧﻪ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﻮﺍﺟـﺐ ﻧـﺸﺮ ﺛﻘﺎﻓـﺔ ﺃﻟﺘﺤﻔﻴﺰ ﺍﻟﻨﺎﺱ ﰱ ﺑﻠﺪ ﻛﺎﻟﺴﻮﺩﺍﻥ ﻟﺘﻜﻮﻳﻦ ﺍﻟﺸﺮﻛﺎﺕ ﻳﺒﺪﻭ 
ﻥ ﺃﻟﺬﺍ ﳒـﺪ . ﻓﺮﺍﺩ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺣﺪ ﺳﻮﺍﺀ ﻗﺘﺼﺎﺩﻳﺔ ﻟﻠﺪﻭﻝ ﻭﺍﻷ ﻹﻇﻬﺎﺭ ﻓﻮﺍﺋﺪﻫﺎ ﺍ ﺈﺍﻟﺸﺮﻛﺎﺕ ﻭﺫﻟﻚ ﻳﺘﻢ ﺑ 
ﺑﺮﺍﺯ ﺍﳌﻌﲎ ﺍﻟﻠﻐـﻮﻯ ﻭﺍﻟﻘـﺎﻧﻮﱏ ﺇﻠﻰ ﻃﺮﻭﺣﺔ ﻋ ﻭﻝ ﻣﻦ ﻫﺬﻩ ﺍﻷ ﻗﺪ ﺣﺮﺹ ﰱ ﺍﻟﺒﺎﺏ ﺍﻷ " ﺍﻟﺒﺎﺣﺚ"
        ﺧﺮﻯ ﻓﻘﺪ ﻛـﺎﻥ ﺳﺘﻔﺎﺩﺓ ﻣﻦ ﲡﺎﺭﺏ ﺍﻟﺪﻭﻝ ﺍﻷ ﻭﻟﻺ، ﳒﻠﻴﺰﻯﻟﻠﺸﺮﻛﺔ ﰱ ﺍﻟﻘﺎﻧﻮﻧﻴﻨﻦ ﺍﻟﺴﻮﺩﺍﱏ ﻭﺍﻹ 
ﺫﻟﻚ ، ﻟﻘﺎﺀ ﺍﻟﻀﻮﺀ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻗﺎﻧﻮﻥ ﺍﻟﻮﻻﻳﺎﺕ ﺍﳌﺘﺤﺪﻩ ﻓﻴﻤﺎ ﻳﺘﻌﻠﻖ ﺬﻩ ﺍﳌﻌﲎ ﺇﺣﺮﻳﺼﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ " ﺍﻟﺒﺎﺣﺚ" 
ﻭﻝ ﰱ ﺑﺮﺯ ﺍﻟﺒـﺎﺏ ﺍﻷ ﺃﻛﺬﻟﻚ . ﰱ ﺣﻘﻞ ﺍﻟﺸﺮﻛﺎﺕ ﻣﺜﻠﺔ ﺍﻟﺒﺎﻫﺮﺓ ﻥ ﺍﻟﻮﻻﻳﺎﺕ ﺍﳌﺘﺤﺪﻩ ﺗﻌﺘﱪ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻷ ﺃ
ﳕﺎ ﺟﺎﺀﺕ ﻛﻨﺘـﺎﺝ ﺇﺎ ﱂ ﺗﻮﺟﺪ ﻣﺼﺎﺩﻓﺔ ﻭ ﺃﻇﻬﺎﺭ  ﻃﺮﻭﺣﺔ ﺍﻟﺘﻄﻮﺭ ﺍﻟﺘﺎﺭﳜﻰ ﻟﻠﺸﺮﻛﺎﺕ ﻹ ﺗﻠﻚ ﺍﻷ 
ﺧﺮﻯ ﻣﻦ ﺻﻮﺭ ﺍﻟﻌﻤﻞ ﺃﻭﻝ ﺑﲔ ﺍﻟﺸﺮﻛﺎﺕ ﻭﺻﻮﺭﺓ ﻛﺬﻟﻚ ﻓﻘﺪ ﻗﺎﺭﻥ ﺍﻟﻔﺼﻞ ﺍﻷ . ﻟﺘﺠﺎﺭﺏ ﻃﻮﻳﻠﺔ 
ﺳﺒﺎﺏ  ﻷ ﻠﻴﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﺸﺮﺍﻛﺎﺕ ﻓﻀﻥ ﺍﻟﺸﺮﻛﺎﺕ ﳍﺎ ﺍﻷ ﺃ  ﺇﱄ ﻭﺧﻠﺺ" ﺍﻟﺸﺮﺍﻛﺎﺕ"ﺍﳉﻤﺎﻋﻰ ﺗﺘﻤﺜﻞ ﰱ 
ﻛﺬﻟﻚ ﻛﺎﻥ ﻣﻦ ﺍﳌﻬﻢ ﰱ ﻫﺬﺍ ﺍﻟﺒﺎﺏ ﲢﻘﻴـﻖ ﻭﺗﻮﺿـﻴﺢ ﻣﻌـﲎ . ﰎ  ﻋﺮﺿﻬﺎ ﺩﺍﺧﻞ ﻫﺬﺍ ﺍﻟﺒﺎﺏ 
ﻥ ﻟـﺴﻬﻢ ﺍﻟـﺸﺮﻛﺔ ﺃﺑﺎﻟﺮﻏﻢ ﻣـﻦ . ﻫﻢ ﲰﺎﺎ ﺃﻋﺘﺒﺎﺭﻳﺔ ﻟﻠﺸﺮﻛﺔ ﻭﻋﺮﺽ ﻣﺰﺍﻳﺎﻫﺎ ﻭ ﺍﻟﺸﺨﺼﻴﺔ ﺍﻹ 
 ﻳﻀﺎﺡﻹﻗﺘﺼﺎﺩﻯ ﻟﻠﺴﻬﻢ  ﻭﺫﻟﻚ ﻇﻬﺎﺭ ﺍﳌﻔﻬﻮﻡ ﺍﻹ ﺇﻛﺎﻥ ﻣﻦ ﺍﳌﻬﻢ  ، ﻣﻔﻬﻤﻮﻣﻪ ﺍﻟﻘﺎﻧﻮﱏ ﺍﳋﺎﺹ ﺑﻪ 
ﻋﻀﻮﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ ﻫﻰ ﻣﻨـﺎﻁ . ﻗﺘﺼﺎﺩﻯ ﻟﻠﺴﻬﻢ ﻳﻘﺘﺮﻧﺎﻥ ﺑﺒﻌﻀﻬﻤﺎ ﺍﻟﺒﻌﺾ ﻥ ﺍﳌﻔﻬﻮﻣﺎﻥ ﺍﻟﻘﺎﻧﻮﱏ ﻭﺍﻹ ﺃ
ﺷﺨﺎﺹ ﺍﻟﺬﻳﻦ ﳝﻜـﻦ ﻭﻝ ﻳﻮﺿﺢ ﻃﺮﻕ ﺍﻟﻌﻀﻮﻳﺔ ﻭﺍﻷ ﻥ ﺍﻟﺒﺎﺏ ﺍﻷ ﺈﳍﺬﺍ ﻓ ، ﺍﳊﻘﻮﻕ ﺩﺍﺧﻞ ﺍﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ 
  . ﻋﻀﺎﺀ ﺑﺎﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔﺃﻥ ﻳﻜﻮﻧﻮﺍ ﺃﳍﻢ 
ﻥ ﺍﳌﻔﻬﻮﻡ ﺍﻟﺴﺎﺋﺪ ﺃﺮﻏﻢ ﻣﻦ ﻧﻪ ﺑﺎﻟ ﺃﻃﺮﻭﺣﺔ ﻳﺘﺨﻠﺺ ﰱ ﺍﻟﺒﺎﺏ ﺍﻟﺜﺎﱏ ﻭﺍﻟﺬﻯ ﳝﺜﻞ  ﻟﺐ ﻫﺬﻩ ﺍﻷ 
ﻥ ﻗـﺎﻧﻮﻥ ﺈﺳﻬﻢ ﻣﺘﺴﺎﻭﻳﺔ ﲣﻮﻝ ﻛﺬﻟﻚ ﺣﻘﻮﻗﺎ ﻣﺘﺴﺎﻭﻳﺔ ﻓ ﺃﳕﺎ ﻳﻨﻘﺴﻢ ﺍﱃ ﺇﻣﺎﻝ ﺍﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ  ﺱﺃﻥ ﺭ ﺄﺑ
ﺻـﺪﺍﺭ ﺇﳒﻠﻴﺰﻯ ﻭﻗﺎﻧﻮﻥ ﺍﻟﺸﺮﻛﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﺴﻮﺩﺍﱏ ﳝﻜﻨﺎﻥ ﺍﻟﺸﺮﻛﺎﺕ ﰱ ﻛﻼ ﺍﻟﺒﻠﺪﻳﻦ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﺸﺮﻛﺎﺕ ﺍﻹ 
ﺼﺎﺩﻳﺔ ﻭﺍﳌـﺴﻮﻏﺎﺕ ﻗﺘﳚﺎﺩ ﺍﳌﱪﺍﺭﺍﺕ ﺍﻹ ﺇﻟﺬﺍ ﻛﺎﻥ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﻼﺯﻡ  ، ﻓﻀﻠﻴﺔﺳﻬﻢ ﺫﺍﺕ ﺍﻷ ﻣﺎﻳﻌﺮﻑ ﺑﺎﻷ 
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ﺳـﻬﻢ ﻭﺿﺢ ﻫﺬﺍ ﺍﻟﺒﺎﺏ ﺍﻟﻄﺒﻴﻌـﺔ ﺍﻟﻘﺎﻧﻮﻧﻴـﺔ ﻷ ﺃﻟﺬﻟﻚ ﻓﻘﺪ . ﺳﻬﻢﺍﻟﻘﺎﻧﻮﻧﻴﺔ ﻟﻠﺘﻔﻀﻴﻞ ﺑﲔ ﲪﻠﺔ ﺍﻷ 
ﺳـﻬﻢ ﺃﻥ ﺃﱃ ﺇﺳﻬﻢ  ﻭﲢﻘﻖ ﻣﻦ ﻃﺒﻴﻌﺘﻬﺎ ﻭﺧﻠـﺺ  ﻧﻮﺍﻉ ﺗﻠﻚ ﺍﻷ  ﺃ ﺳﺘﻌﺮﺽﺇﻭ، ﺍﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﻤﻮﻣﺎ 
ﺴﺆﻟﻴﺔ  ﺫﺍﺕ ﺍﳌ  ـ ﺍﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ ﰲﻟﺘﺰﺍﻣﺎﺕ ﻥ ﺍﻹ ﺃ  ﺇﻻ ﻦ ﺍﳌﻔﺎﺿﻠﻪ ﺑﻴﻨﻬﺎ ﻓﻴﻤﺎ ﻳﺘﻌﻠﻖ ﺑﺎﳊﻘﻮﻕ ﻜﺍﻟﺸﺮﻛﺎﺕ ﳝ 
ﻥ ﺍﳊﻘﻮﻕ ﺍﳌﻜﻔﻮﻟﺔ ﻟﻠﻤﺴﺎﻫﻢ  ﺩﺍﺧﻞ ﺃﻭﺿﺢ ﻫﺬﺍ ﺍﻟﺒﺎﺏ ﻛﺬﻟﻚ ﺃ.  ﺗﻜﻮﻥ ﺩﺍﺋﻤﺎ ﻣﺘﺴﺎﻭﻳﺔ ﺍﶈﺪﻭﺩﺓ
ﳕﺎ  ﺗﻔﻮﻕ ﺑﻜﺜﲑ ﺍﳊﻘﻮﻕ ﺍﳌﺘﻌﺎﺭﻑ ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ ﺑﲔ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﱴ ﺗﻨﺤﺼﺮ ﰱ ﺣﻖ ﺍﳌـﺴﺎﻫﻢ ﰱ ﺇﺍﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ 
ﺳـﺘﺮﺩﺍﺩ ﺇﻭﺣﻘـﻪ ﰱ ، ﺭﺑﺎﺡ ﻭﺣﻘﻪ ﰱ ﺣﺼﺺ ﺍﻷ ، ﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﺘﺼﻮﻳﺖ ﻓﻴﻬﺎ ﺇﺣﻀﻮﺭ 
ﺑﻌﺪ ﲝﺚ ﻭﺗﻘﺼﻰ ﻋﱪ ﺍﻟﻘﺎﻧﻮﻥ ﺍﻟﻌـﺎﻡ ﻭﻗـﺎﻧﻮﻥ ﺍﻟـﺸﺮﻛﺎﺕ . ﻴﺖ ﺍﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ ﺫﺍ ﻣﺎ ﺻﻔﹼ ّﺇﻟﻪ ﺱ ﻣﺎ ﺃﺭ
ﺑﻌﺾ ﻫﺬﻩ ﺍﳊﻘـﻮﻕ . ﻥ ﺣﻘﻮﻕ ﺍﳌﺴﺎﻫﻢ ﰱ ﺍﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ ﺗﻔﻮﻕ ﺍﻟﻌﺸﺮﻳﻦ ﺣﻘﺎﹰ ﺃﺗﻀﺢ ﺇﳒﻠﻴﺰﻯ ﻓﻘﺪ  ﺍﻹ
ﻭ ﻻﺋﺤﺔ ﺍﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ ﻣـﺎﳝﻨﻊ ﺃﺳﻴﺲ ﺄﺫﺍ ﱂ ﻳﻮﺟﺪ ﰱ ﻋﻘﺪ ﺗ ﺇﺑﻄﺒﻴﻌﺘﻪ  ﻳﻘﺒﻞ ﺍﳌﻔﺎﺿﻠﺔ ﻓﻴﻪ ﺑﲔ ﺍﳌﺴﺎﳘﲔ 
  ﺍﳌـﺸﺮﻭﻃﺔ  ﻓـﻀﻠﻴﺔ ﻜﻦ ﺗﺴﻤﻴﺔ ﻫﺬﺍ ﺍﻟﻨﻮﻉ ﻣﻦ ﺍﳊﻘـﻮﻕ ﺑـﺎﳊﻘﻮﻕ ﺫﺍﺕ ﺍﻷ ﻣﺃﻟﺬﺍ ﻓﻘﺪ ، ﺫﻟﻚ
ﻥ ﺑﻌﺾ ﺍﳊﻘﻮﻕ ﻻﺗﻘﺒﻞ ﺑﻄﺒﻴﻌﺘﻬﺎ ﺍﳌﻔﺎﺿـﻠﺔ ﺈﻛﺬﻟﻚ ﻓ .  ( sthgir lauqe denoitidnoc)
  (. sthgir lauqe tnerehni)ﺎ ﺳﻬﻢ ﺍﳌﺘﺴﺎﻭﻳﺔ ﺑﻄﺒﻴﻌﺘﻬﺑﲔ ﺍﳌﺴﺎﳘﲔ ﻭﻟﺬﺍ ﻓﻘﺪ ﲤﺖ ﺗﺴﻤﻴﺘﻬﺎ ﺑﺎﻷ
ﺑﺮﺍﺯ ﺇﻃﺮﻭﺣﺔ ﻳﻨﺘﻘﻞ ﺍﻟﺒﺎﺣﺚ ﺍﱃ ﺿﻮﺀ ﻋﻨﻮﺍﻥ ﻫﺬﻩ ﺍﻷ  ﺍﻟﺒﺎﺏ ﺍﻟﺜﺎﻟﺚ ﻣﻦ ﻫﺬﺍ ﺍﻟﺒﺤﺚ ﻭﻋﻠﻰ 
( ﻗﻠﻴـﺔ ﺃﻏﻠﺒﻴﺔ ﻭ ﺃ)ﳚﺎﺩ ﻧﻮﻉ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﺘﻮﺍﺯﻭﻥ ﰱ ﺍﻟﺘﻌﺎﻣﻞ ﻣﻊ ﺍﻟﻜﺘﻞ ﺩﺍﺧﻞ ﺍﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ ﺍﻟﻮﺍﺣﺪﺓ ﺍﳊﻮﺟﺔ ﻹ 
ﻥ ﺃﻳـﻀﺎ ﺃﻫﺬﺍ ﺍﻟﺒﺎﺏ ﻳﻮﺿـﺢ . ﳚﺎﺩ ﺍﳌﺴﺎﻭﺍﺓ ﺑﲔ ﺗﻠﻚ ﺍﻟﻜﺘﻞ ﺇﻧﻪ ﻟﻴﺲ ﻣﻦ ﺍﳌﻤﻜﻦ ﻋﻤﻠﻴﺎ ﺃﻃﺎﳌﺎ 
ﺍﻟـﺬﻳﻦ )ﺩﺍﺭﺓ ﺍﻟﺸﺮﻛﺎﺕ ﺇﳕﺎ ﻳﻜﻔﻞ ﺎﻟﺲ ﺇﺎﺻﺮﺓ ﺳﻴﺲ ﻭﻟﻮﺍﺋﺢ ﺍﻟﺸﺮﻛﺎﺕ ﺍﳌﻌ ﺄﺍﻟﻐﺎﻟﺐ ﻣﻦ ﻋﻘﻮﺩ ﺗ 
ﺑﺘﺪﺍﻉ ﻃـﺮﻕ ﺇﻟﺬﻟﻚ ﻛﺎﻥ ﻻﺑﺪ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﺘﺪﺧﻞ ﺗﺸﺮﻳﻌﻴﺎ ﻭ ، ﺳﻠﻄﺎﺕ ﻣﻄﻠﻘﺔ ( ﻏﻠﺒﻴﺔ ﺍﳌﺴﺎﳘﲔ ﺃﳝﺜﻠﻮﻥ 
ﳒﻠﻴﺰﻯ ﻟﻠﻤﺤﺎﻛﻢ ﺑﺎﻟﺘﺪﺧﻞ ﰱ ﻴﺎﺕ ﰱ ﺍﻟﺸﺮﻛﺎﺕ ﻛﺎﻟﺴﻠﻄﻪ ﺍﻟﱴ ﻳﻜﻔﻠﻬﺎ ﺍﻟﻘﺎﻧﻮﻥ ﺍﻹ ﻗﻠﹼﻧﺼﺎﻑ ﺍﻷ ﻹ
ﻣﺮ ﻭﻗﺪ ﻳﺼﻞ ﺍﻷ ، ﺤﻴﺰ ﺍﻟﺬﻯ ﺗﺴﻠﻜﻪ ﺍﻟﺸﺮﻛﻪ ﻭ ﺍﳌﺘ ﺃﻋﻤﻞ ﺍﻟﺸﺮﻛﺎﺕ ﰱ ﺣﺎﻟﺔ ﺍﻟﺴﻠﻮﻙ ﻏﲑ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﺩﻝ 
ﺫﺍ ﺇﻧـﺼﺎﻑ  ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺎﻳﻌﺮﻑ ﺑﻘﺎﻋﺪﺓ ﺍﻟﻌﺪﺍﻟﻪ ﻭﺍﻹ ﻥ ﺗﻘﻮﻡ ﺑﺘﺼﻔﻴﺔ ﺍﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ ﻧﻔﺴﻬﺎ ﺑﻨﺎﺀﺍﹰ ﺃ  ﺇﱃ ﺑﺎﶈﻜﻤﻪ
ﺗـﺎﺡ ﺃ ﻭwaL nommoC eht( )ﻛﺬﻟﻚ ﺗﺪﺧﻞ ﺍﻟﻘـﺎﻧﻮﻥ ﺍﻟﻌـﺎﻡ  . ﻣﺮ ﺫﻟﻚﻣﺎﺗﻄﻠﺐ ﺍﻷ
ﻧﺼﺎﻑ ﻟﻺ(  noitca lanosrep)ﻭﻣﺎﻳﺴﻤﻰ (   )noitca evitaviredﻴﺎﺕ ﻣﺎﻳﺴﻤﻰ ﻗﻠﹼﻟﻸ
ﺍﻟﺘﺠـﺎﺭﺓ  ﺩﺍﺋﺮﺓ  ﲤﺎﺭﺳﻬﺎ  ﺩﺍﺭﺍﻳﺔ ﺇ   ﲪﺎﻳﺔ  ﺳﺒﻎ ﺍﻟﺘﺸﺮﻳﻊ ﺃﻛﺬﻟﻚ ﻓﻘﺪ . ﻧﺘﻬﻜﺖ ﺣﻘﻮﻗﻬﺎ  ﺇ ﺫﺍ ﻣﺎ ﺇ
ﻭﻛﻞ ﺃﺑﻴﻨﻤﺎ ، ﳒﻠﺘﺮﺍ ﺇﰱ ( )yrtsudnI dna edarT fo tnemtrapeD eht    ﻭﺍﻟﺼﻨﺎﻋﺔ
        .                         ﺍﳌﺸﺮﻉ ﰱ ﺍﻟﺴﻮﺩﺍﻥ ﻫﺬﺍ ﺍﻟﻨﻮﻉ ﻣﻦ ﺍﳊﻤﺎﻳﺔ ﻟﻠﻤﺴﺠﻞ ﺍﻟﺘﺠﺎﺭﻯ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻡ
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Chapter (1) 
The Company and Membership 
 
 Introduction: 
Many activities in our recent life require the work of large 
business, each of which has access to immense amount of 
capitals. For gaining access to large amounts of capitals individual 
proprietorship and partnership may be inadequate. By forming a 
company large fund of capital can be brought under one 
management, for this reason the company has become the most 
important form of organizations of business. Another basic reason 
is that the shareholder of a company may enjoy a very important 
merit, the limited liability, which attracts investors to invest their 
money without fear about their private properties. Company form 
plays a very important role in our life economically, socially and, 
indeed, legally.  
What is the meaning of the word "company"? Both 
etymologically, and as a legal terminology, who are the members 
of the company?  Real questions may be arising. It seems that no 
simple answer for these questions without vestigial research in the 
company history from the earliest centuries, and through the 
medieval centuries till the recent century. The evidence that 
company represents one of the most important associations in our 
life require an exposition  for it's different roles, therefore, this 
chapter deals with the  Definition of the company, History of 
companies, Company and partnership, Separate legal entity of the 
company, Importance of the company and the Membership of the 
company.  
 
(i) Definition of Company  
1- In the English Law: 
There is no objective legal definition for the word "company". 
"Although company law is well recognized subject in the legal 
curriculums and the titles of voluminous literature, its exact scope 
is vague, since the word "company" has no strict legal meaning"1. 
The term implies an association of number of people for some 
common object or objects. "But in common parlance the word 
                                     
1  - L.C.B – Gower. Gower's Principles of Modern Company Law, at. 3 (4th ed. "1979"). 
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company is normally reserved for those associated for economic 
purpose i.e. to carry on business for gain "2. 
At the present time there are two basic legal frameworks for 
persons who wish to form an association with object of carrying on 
business, namely partnerships and companies. Partnerships are 
based on mutual trust and confidence, partnerships therefore are 
suitable for a relatively small numbers of persons who know and 
trust each other. In England the Partnership Act 1890 defined 
partnership as "the relationship which subsists between persons 
carrying on a business in common with a view of profits and which 
is not, e.g. the relation between members of a company registered 
under the Companies Acts or incorporated by, or, in pursuance of 
any other Act of Parliament or Royal Charter "3. Since such a basis 
would be impractical for larger more complicated organizations, 
the law has over many years allowed the development of many 
types of companies. In the English law now there are three types 
of companies, classified according to their means of formation. 
 
(a) Chartered Companies: 
A chartered company is formed by the grant of a charter by 
the Crown under the royal prerogative or under statutory powers. 
This method of incorporation is no longer used by trading 
companies since it is quicker and cheaper to obtain incorporation 
by registration4.Now this method of incorporation is only used by 
organizations formed for charitable or quasi-charitable objects. 
 
(b) Statutory Companies: 
In the past such companies were incorporated by special Act 
of Parliament when it was necessary for them to have special 
powers and monopolistic rights. This was the case when the 
supply of public services such as gas, water, electricity or rail –
ways was left to private enterprises5 . After this period public 
corporations were formed to hold such activities, but recently the 
most of public services have been "privatized ". 
 
 
 
 
(c) Registered Companies: 
                                     
2 - Id. at 3. 
3 - Geoffrey Morse, Charles worth & Morse Company Law at.3 (16th ed. "1999"). 
4 - L.C.B Gower, supra note 1 at 7. 
5 - Id. at 7. 
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A registered company is the company which is incorporated 
by registration under the companies Act6. 
In England the Companies Act provides for the registration of 
companies limited by guarantee, and unlimited companies and for 
companies limited by shares.  
Companies limited by guarantee and unlimited companies 
reflect a real lack of their economic importance, the former 
because; it formed "for purpose other than the profit of its 
members i.e. those formed for social, charitable or quasi-charitable 
purposes "7.and the latter because of its unlimited liability. 
The vast majority of companies in England and Sudan and the 
most important type of registered companies are the "companies 
limited by shares", both public and private. In such companies the 
capital divided into shares and the members of a company are 
liable to pay for their shares.  People usually prefer the forming of 
company in order to protect their private properties from the claims 
of the company's creditors. Once they have paid for their shares, 
they are under no further liability and the company said to be 
(limited by shares). 
It is very important to be noticed here that our thesis will be 
focused only in the companies limited by shares because of its 
importance in our economic and legal life. 
 
2- In the United States Law: 
In the United States the word "corporation" comes from the 
Latin word "corpus" i.e. person, this "person" is created when a 
charter for its existence is issued by State Government. Because 
there is no one Federal law for corporation, the Model Business 
Corporation Act had been proposed by the American Advocates 
Association to be adopted by the American legislature, but it was a 
mere proposal to create a unification for different corporation laws 
in the United States of America8. Corporations (companies) in the 
United States of America has no one definition, and the United 
States' corporation rules depend on the Federal statutes, that any 
state has it's own statutes about corporation, but there are main 
similar features that enable writers to define the word corporation 
as " an artificial person, created under the statutes of a state or a 
                                     
6 - Geoffrey Morse, supra note 3 at 3. 
7 - L.C.B. Gower, supra note1 at 11.  
8 - (This model defined Corporation as artificial being, invisible, intangible and existing only in 
contemplation of law): (Smith & Roberson's Business Law Uniform Commercial Code, at 668 (5th ed). 
Pub. West Publishing Company- New York. 
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nation, organized for the purpose set out in the application for 
corporate existence "9.  
In all state statutes there is no distinction between the large 
public corporations which include millions of shares, and the 
private small family corporations.  
 
3- In the Sudanese Law: 
The Sudanese Company Act 1925 was derived from the 
English companies Act (ECA) 1908, therefore, also there is no 
specific definition for the word " company ", but from s.2 (5) we can 
imply that the legislature defined     "company" just from a formal 
point of view as: "any company incorporated and registered under 
the provisions of this Act, and the liability of it's members extends 
only to their unpaid shares". The Sudanese company Act provides 
that the company may be public or private.         
In 1984, The Civil Transactions Act was passed, and in a 
serious drawback the legislature defined the company in S.244 as 
"a contract whereby, two persons, or more, agree to contribute in a 
business, and to distribute the profits or to bear the losses resulted 
from this business. The 1984 Civil Transactions Act was derived 
from the Jordanian law and passed for the purpose of 
"Islamization" of the Sudanese laws. Although the (SCA) 1925 was 
not yet repealed, the legislature in the Civil Transactions Act 1984 
provided for the principle of the "separate legal entity" for some 
types of Islamic companies. 
The Civil Transactions Act 1984 may be suitable for 
partnerships not companies, but the legislature did not state for 
this expressly in the Act, a thing which will create a climate 
favorable for confusions and contradictions in the judgments.  
 
 (ii) History of Companies: 
There is no exact moment of recorded history to specify the 
existence of the first form of company, but some evidence 
suggests that people recognized the concept of corporate 
personality to some extent as early as the time of Hammurabi  "   
about 2083 B.C "10. Also by the Roman times a feature of 
corporateness had appeared through imperial FIAT. This means 
that the concept of corporateness had created depended on 
legislations11. This legislative nature of company personality may 
                                     
9 - D.D. Davidson & B.Knowles. & L.Forsythe. & R.R. Jeperson. – Business Law Principles and Cases 
at 635 (2nd ed "1991"). 
10 - Id at 636.  
11 - Id at 636. 
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justify the recent concept of the company as a separate person 
with legal entity distinct from the entity of its shareholders. 
In England the earliest trade associations existed in the 
medieval times12. They were Guilds of merchants, some of them 
hoped to obtain monopolies over local trades or over particular 
commodity, and the only way for incorporations at that time was to 
obtain a charter from the Crown, but these Guilds did not resemble 
the modern companies, since that the members traded on their 
own names, and were liable to their own debts. 
The Joint Stock Companies emerged in the 17th century "stock 
here means stock in trade, not stocks and shares 13". I.e. in 
addition to trade on their own accounts, the members would 
operate a joint account with joint stock. Many of these Joint Stock 
Companies were large and powerful monopolies. By this time 
there were two methods of incorporation, either by charter, or 
special Act of the Parliament. The Joint Stock Companies 
possessed some of the advantages of incorporation, for example 
they would sue the outsiders on their own names, but they did not 
possess the main advantage of recent company, i.e. the limitation 
of member's liability that the creditors of the company had access 
to the member's private assets. And the creditors would be allowed 
to takeover the company's rights to recover sum due from 
members as in the early English case, (Salmon v. Ham borough 
Co. "1671")14.  
In second half of the 17th century the large monopolistic 
companies began to decline15, and there was a boom of formation 
of companies concerned with domestic trade. In many cases the 
procedure for obtaining charter was far too slow, and also 
expensive. Companies were formed, therefore based on contract. 
The contract would include rules for the conduct of members, and 
provide for the transfer of shares. In law such bodies basically 
regarded as partnerships and the liability of members was 
unlimited. The domestic companies became unpopular with the 
legislature, mainly because of the activities of fraudulent promoters 
and shareholder, for example promoters would acquire charters 
from obsolete companies. 
In order to check the boom in speculative and fraudulent 
companies the Bubble Act 1720 was passed16. Exactly what 
                                     
12 - L.C.B Gower, supra note1. at 22.  
13 - R.R.Pennington. Pennington's Company Law at 5 (3rd ed. "1973"). 
14 - [1671] 1.Ch. Cas 204. 
15 - L.C.B Gower, supra note 1 at 28. 
16 - Id at 30. 
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intended was not clear, the examples were given including 
purporting to act under obsolete charters, or the transfer of shares 
without authority of Act of  Parliament, and the brokers dealing in 
securities of illegal companies were liable to penalties. The effect 
of Bubble Act was to suppress business association, and make it 
difficult for them to obtain corporate form17, therefore between 
passing the Bubble Act in 1720, and its repeal in 1825 only various 
types of partnerships were formed as a form of several persons 
agree to be associated in an enterprise with joint stock. 
In 1837 the Chartered Companies Act empowered the Crown 
to grant letters patent i.e. to grant privileges of incorporation 
without actually granting a charter. However, such associations 
were not regarded as corporate bodies, and although member's 
liability was limited, any judgment against the company would be 
enforced against every member until three years after his 
membership has ceased. 
Between 1844, and 1855, there was a great pressure for 
limited liability. In 1855 the limited liability Act was passed, and 
introduced, subject to several conditions, companies liability limited 
by shares. This Act was repeal by the Joint Stock Company Act 
1856, which retained the limited liability18, it also introduced the 
modern shape of the company. 
The companies Act 1862, was the first modern Act. It 
contained more than 200 sections, and repealed and consolidated 
all the previous Acts. 1862 Act was followed by numerous 
amending Acts and consolidating Acts in 1908 and 1927. 
The basis for the present legislation is the companies Act 
1948, it contains over 450 sections. This Act was amended and 
new provisions were introduced by companies Act 1967, 1976, 
1980 and 1981. The confusion caused by having five major Acts 
leaded to pressure for consolidation of company legislation. The 
consolidation came into force on 1st of July 1985, it consist one of 
major Act and three satellite Acts (the insider dealing Act 1985, 
The Business Names Act 1985 and The Companies consolidation 
Act 1985).    
Through the latter half of 19th century judicial decisions played 
a very important role in the development of many principles of 
company law, for example :-  
* (Foss v. Harbottle " 1843"19) – 
                                     
17 - Id at 31.  
18 - Id. at 39. 
19 - [1856] Hare 461. 
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{Where a wrong is done to a company, the company, not individual 
member, is the proper plaintiff}. 
* (Royal British Bank v. Turquand "1856"20) –  
{When a person deals with a company in transaction which is not 
inconsistent with the registered documents, he can enforce the 
transaction against the company despite any irregularity of internal 
management}.  
* (Ooregum Gold mining Co. v. Roper " 1892"21) – 
 {a company can not issue shares as discount}. 
* (Salomon v. Salomon & Co. "1897"22) – 
 {Which established the legality of the incorporation of small 
business where one person holds the vast majority of the shares}. 
 
In our humble view, the role of modern judgments in the field 
of company law also should not be underestimated. 
                   
(iii) Company and Partnership: 
 
There are two frameworks allowed to a person to carry on a 
business as an association, namely companies and partnerships. 
The distinction between companies and partnerships is often 
merely one of machinery and not of a function. If small number of 
persons wish to carry on business in common with a view to profit 
they may either form themselves into partnership or a company, " 
the only restraint on their freedom of their choice is that if their 
numbers are too great for that mutual trust appropriate to 
partnership, they must form a company"23, " but it must be noticed 
in each choice, the company is more advantageous form of 
business association from the point of view of the member or the 
shareholder"24. That means not that partnership has no 
advantages. Partnership has its advantages, so, there must be a 
comparison between the two frameworks of business associations. 
 
1- Advantages of the registered company: 
A registered company has many advantages over partnership 
these are:  
 
                                     
20 - [1856] 6 E. & B 327. 
21 - [1892] A.C. 125. 
22 - [1897] A.C. 22. 
23 - L.C.B, Gower, supra note 1 at 5. 
24- - R.R. Pennington, supra note 13 at 3.   
25 - Geoffrey Morse, supra note 3 at 25. 
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(a) The separate legal entity of the registered company: 
A registered company is a corporation i.e. a separate legal 
person distinct from it's members, whereas the partnership is 
merely aggregate of the partners and as a consequences for this, 
firstly: the owners of shares in the company may enjoy the limited 
liability, this means that the owner can not lose more money than 
he has invested in the company, whereas, in partnership every 
partner is jointly and severally liable with other partners for all 
debts and obligations incurred while he is a partner. Secondly: 
unless it is wound up, a registered company continues in existence 
so that it is not affected by the death, bankruptcy and mental 
disorder of its member. On the other hand in the case of 
partnership on the death, bankruptcy of a partner, subject to any 
agreement between the partners, the partnership is dissolved, " in 
practice the share of partner who dies, or retires has to be taken 
out of the business, or provided for by the other partners, and this 
may cause serious financial problems to the firm "25. Thirdly: the 
property of registered company belongs to the company, so that 
there is no change on the ownership, or in the formal title of the 
company, but in a partnership the property belongs to the partners 
and vested in them, consequently there are changes in the 
ownership and in the formal title. Fourthly: A registered company 
can contract with the members without any restriction. Fifthly, each 
partner is normally an agent for the firm for the purpose of the 
business of the partnership and, subject to any agreement to the 
contrary between the parties, may take part in the management of 
the partnership business, while the members of registered 
company as such are not agent, and have no power to manage it's 
affairs, but the directors are agents and managers i.e. they have 
powers given to them by the articles. Sixthly: In public companies, 
shares are transferable and can be mortgaged without consent of 
the other shareholders (but the articles of a private company may 
impose restrictions on the transfer of shares. For example, articles 
may give existing members the right to buy the shares of a 
member who leaves). In partnership and subject to any agreement 
to the contrary, a person can not be introduced as a partner 
without consent of the other partners. 
 
 (b) Preferred Taxation: 
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In some countries companies have more preferred treatment 
in taxations than that of partnership and individual proprietor26. 
(Basically to encourage the investors to invest in a company form)  
 
(c) Number of Members: 
There is no limitation for the number of members in the public 
company form, but with some exceptions, partnership with more 
than a certain number of partners is prohibited in most of countries 
(but also in private companies there may be a limitation of number 
of members in the most laws of different countries).  
         
 2-Advantages of the Partnership:  
Partnerships advantages over company are rare, and most of 
them deal with some formalities, for example a fewer formalities 
are to be observed in the formation of the partnership, less 
publicity than that required for company, no need to file a 
memorandum or articles with the registrar of companies while 
memorandum and article are two basic requirements for 
incorporation of a company and partnership accounts are not open 
to public inspection27. 
 
(iv)The Legal Entity Of The Company And The limited 
Liability: 
  The most important consequence of incorporation of 
company is that the company becomes a legal personality. The 
separate personality (entity) of the company is an important 
principle in the English law since that "a legal person is a being 
that the law regards as capable of having rights and duties 
.English law recognizes  two types of full legal persons : natural 
persons and corporations. Corporations are artificial entities which 
the law deems to exist once certain procedures for their creation 
have been complied with "28. Therefore, the company is a person 
in the eyes of the law quite distinct from the individuals who are its 
member. That means the company can own property, enter into 
contracts or suffer wrongs, sue and be sued in its own name29. 
The case which clearly established the independent legal 
personality of the company is (Salomon v. Salomon & Co. Ltd.)30. 
In this case: Salomon formed a limited company with other 
                                     
26 - R.R.Pennington, supra note 13 at 5.  
27 - Geoffrey Morse, supra note 3 at 27. 
28 - Clive R.Newton. General Principles of Law at134 (2nd ed. "1977"). 
29 - R.R.Pennington, supra note 13 at 1. 
30 - [1897] A.C.22. 
27 
 
members of his family, and sold his private business to the 
company for £ 39,000, he held  £20,001 of the £20,007 shares 
which had been issued by the company , and £10000 of 
debentures , about a year after its formation the company was 
wound – up. The assets at that time were just sufficient to 
discharge the debentures, but nothing was left for the unsecured 
creditors with debts of about £ 7500. The creditors claimed that 
they should have priority because Salomon and the company were 
in effect the same person. The House of Lords held that Salomon 
and the company were separate legal entities, the company had 
been validly formed, and there was no fraud on the members and 
creditors. Salomon was therefore entitled to the remaining assets. 
Lord Mac_ Naugten was stated:  
"The company is at law a different person altogether 
form those forming the company and , though it may be that 
after incorporation , The business is precisely the same as it 
was before , and the same persons are manager ,and the 
same hands receive the profits , the company is not in agent 
of the subscribers or trustee for them . Nor as the 
subscribers as member liable, in any shape of form, except 
to the extent and in the manner provided by the Act"31.  
 The invention of the separate legal personality of the 
company is vital as it means that it is free to develop as an 
instrument of business shaped by both peoples involved in its 
running and those who brought it into existence32. 
There has been considerable dispute about the true nature of 
the company personality and several theories have thought to 
explain the nature what it means, that the company remains an 
artificial creation which can only function if it has real persons to 
act for it and make decisions on its behalf. Professor O.S Hiner 
summarized the different theories of the nature of the company as 
follow33:-  
"The fiction theory makes the proposition that the grant 
of legal personality to company is a grant to an entity which 
has no mind or will of its own. The law imputes to a company 
personality which is fictitious determined solely by what the 
law prescribes: it is not personality that enables a company 
to act willfully or intentionally as real persons do. 
                                     
31 - Janet Dine – Company Law at 23 (4th ed. "2001") . 
32 -Id.at 24. 
33 - O.S Hiner, Business Administration, an Introductory Study at 6, 7 (1st ed. "1968"). 
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But this theory could be argued against by that in many 
countries it is clear that companies can do wrongs and be 
punished for doing so. 
The bracket theory states that while human beings can 
have personal interests and individual rights, a company can 
not, it is simply a legal device to enable certain complex 
relationships to be more easily defined and understood. 
When people form a company, it is convenient to give them 
collective identity and to enclose them , so to speak , in 
brackets to which distinctive name is attached , but at any 
time it may be necessary to remove the brackets before the 
real position of the company can be known. While it is true 
that the veil of incorporation must often be lifted and the 
façade of the legal entity in order to discover the true state of 
affairs the full acceptance of bracket theory would deny the 
feasibility and desirability of distinguishing between the 
rights, duties and assents of corporate entities whose 
creation is sanctioned by law and those of persons who 
associate to create them. The conclusions that can be drawn 
form this theory have not commended themselves to British 
courts.  
In contrast to the fiction theory the realist theory 
consider the company as an organism with character and 
spirit of its own, one part of the organism acting as ahead, 
another as the trunk and others as the limbs. It is argued that 
the reason we possess as individual has its counterpart in 
the reason of an incorporated group also can have its own 
will, purpose and honor. but it has not been proved that the 
group has a unique mental unity outside the minds of it is 
members , and if a company compared  with a human being 
made the bearer of natural rights , and deemed to have mind 
and will of its own , some strange results may follow". 
The consequences of the separate personality are many but 
the most important of them:-  
 
(a) The Separation of Ownership and the Management: 
The famous research of Berle and Means, (A.Berle and G. 
Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property_ New York, 
1932)34. Showed that the identification of the shareholders with the 
company is no longer represented the reality. That means by 1932 
the concept of the separate legal entity of the company distinct 
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from it's member became a common concept and the ownership 
and control of professional management of the company are totally 
different concepts and the company should be regarded more and 
more as a person has its own rights and this person must struggle 
to identify what are its interests as an entity quietly distinct from its 
owners.  
 
(b) Perpetual Succession: 
The continuity of the company is not affected by the death or 
incapacity of some or all of its members. This is one of the obvious 
advantages of the (company)35. 
 
(c) Increased Borrowing Powers: 
It is logical to assume that unlimited partnerships would find it 
easier to borrow money because of their unlimited liability. This is 
not the case since a company can borrow money more easily than 
a partnership and it can give as security for its debentures a 
floating charge. This is not available to partnership. A floating 
charge is a mortgage over the constantly fluctuating assets of a 
company. It does not prevent the company dealing with these 
assets in the ordinary course of business. Such a charge is very 
useful when a company has no fixed assets such as land which 
can be included in a normal mortgage, but never the less has a 
large and valuable stock – in- trade36.  
 
(d) Transferable Shares: 
Incorporation greatly facilitates the transfer of member's 
interest. Shares are items of property which are freely transferable 
provided the constitution of the company does not contain an 
express provision to the contrary. Moreover, in the absence of 
limited liability the opportunity of transfer would be in practice 
much restricted37. 
 
(e) Suing and being sued:- 
This consequence of the separate legal entity of the company 
is related to the legal actions and specifically in 
contracts.Companies has contractual capacity and can sue and be 
sued on their contracts. In our humble view, one of the main 
features of the separate legal entity of the company appears in that 
the company can be sued even criminally. In Sudan, Elsadiq 
                                     
35 - Id at 25 
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Salman J. in (S. G. v Abdelraouf Osman & Others "1978") S.L.J.R, 
34 said: 
 "Beyond the doubt the artificial person, as a legal entity, is 
criminally liable and subject to the criminal punishment as well 
as the natural person." 
S.3 of the Sudanese Criminal Act 1991 defined the word "person" 
to include the natural person, committee, company or group of 
persons. 
 
(f) The limited liability:- 
The most important and the greater consequence of the 
separate personality of a company is the limited liability. When a 
company formed on the basis of limited liability, its members are 
not liable for the company's debts. Complete absence of liability is 
not permitted and such member is liable to contribute, if called 
upon to do so, the full nominal value of his shares which has not 
already been paid38. 
The 1855 (ECA) limited the liability of a member of a company 
to the amount not paid up on his shares, for example: if Mr. X 
purchases one share of £ 50 and has paid so far only £ 30, then 
he is required to pay further £ 20 to see that he has paid in all £ 
50. He is liable to pay not exceeding £ 50 (being the nominal value 
of the shares he has purchased). It should be noticed that the 
shareholder of a limited company is free of his liability the moment 
his share is fully paid- up and hence his private property can not 
be seized in the event of winding –up the company for the 
payment of its debts39.  
The consequences of the limited liability were greatly to 
broaden the flow of finance and commerce. It enabled investors to 
minimize the risks of finance by spreading their holdings over a 
number of businesses, a policy which in the days of unlimited 
liability would only have magnified the hazards of investment40. 
Limited liability was thus the instrument by which the field of 
investment in companies was favored for the very wealthy and 
those of more modest means. Limited liability assisted in the 
development of large scale businesses organization and facilitated 
the development of the inter-company network41 . Why so 
important? A question which could be answered by that: a huge 
proportion of the world's wealth is generated by companies, and 
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companies are most often used by people as a tool of running 
commercial enterprises. Many of these businesses start in a small 
way, often by co-operation between a small numbers of people42. 
There are some criticisms against the limited liability of the 
company as a consequence of the separate personality of the 
company, and against the separate personality itself. The main 
criticism against the limited liability is that it constitutes a great risk 
for those who deal with the company, but this can be justified on 
the ground that persons who deal with limited company know the 
risks although it is not usually practical to take all the available 
precautions, such as a search of the company's file at the registrar 
office. The criticism against the separate personality is that it may 
be abused by those purporting to fraud under the name of the 
company. The decision in Salomon V. Salomon itself had been 
criticized by this reason. Other criticism against the separate 
personality is that it is not "in many events" beneficial for the 
company's member43 as in the English case (Macura v. Northem 
Assurance "1925")44 (Macura owned a timber estate, He formed a 
limited company and sold the timber estate to it. like Salomon he 
was basically a " one –man " company. Before he sold the estate 
to the company, it had been insured in his own name. After the 
sale to the company he neglected to transfer the insurance policy 
to the company. The estate was destroyed by fire. It was held that 
Macura could not claim under the policy because the assets that 
were damaged belonged to a different person, namely the 
company, and Macura, as a shareholder, had no insurable interest 
in the assets of the company. 
Despite these criticisms we believe that the separate legal 
personality of the company remains a great innovation which 
encourages people to invest their savings in a company from and 
all criticisms are of less importance when compared with the 
advantages of the separate personality of the company.  
 
 
(v) The Importance of the Company:-  
In the recent time, companies play considerable roles in our 
life, for example in the economic development, international 
competitive advantages and the share of the company play a very 
important role as a means of wealth. 
                                     
42 - Janet Dine, supra note 31 at 1. 
43 - Id. at .28 
44 - [1925] A.C. 619. 
32 
 
 
 
1-The Role of Company in Economic Development: 
 
The role of company in the economic development is 
substantial one, especially in building of infrastructural projects and 
other greatest projects. By its nature as a firm of collection of 
financial sources, the company must take the leadership of 
establishing the mentioned projects that these types of 
investments can not (or rarely) be established by the individuals.  
The developed countries had early understood the lessons of 
the incorporation of companies, that which put them on the 
leadership of the world, both economically and politically. With 
statistical economical point of view we can examine the role of 
companies in the largest economy in the world, the United States 
of America economy, " In 1984, corporations in the United States 
of America produced ($ 2, 77.2) billions worth of product and 
services. This production coupled with fact that corporations made 
($ 235.7) billions of profit taxes in 1984, graphically illustrates that 
corporations currently represent a vitally form of business 
organizations in the United States. An understanding of the 
essential of the formation of corporation therefore seems 
warranted "45. And in the different kinds of the economical activities 
in the United States we find that "corporations represent 98% of 
total manufacturing and their role in services is about 50% "46.  
The manufacturing companies reflect lack of their importance 
in the economies of the least-developing countries, while the 
services companies reflect a high level of importance, for example, 
in transportation, airlines, or communication ( the basic elements 
of national economic development ), " the difference between 
manufacturing and services companies in the least-developing 
countries is too great, in fact the comparing between them may 
seem futile, yet the product and manufacturing is no deeply rooted 
in the least- developing countries"47.  
 
2-The Role of the Company in the International Competitive    
Advantages: 
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By the collapse of the communism at the end of the past 
century, the free economies such as the western economies and 
South Asian economies took the leadership of the international 
economies. The term "Globalization" became familiar in many 
different fields, but basically in the global economic competition. 
All nations now must prepare powerful firms for the purpose of 
the global competition. Companies, indeed, are the most important 
means which should be prepared for facing the globalization 
challenge that "companies not nations, are on the front line of 
international competition, they must increasingly compete globally. 
Yet globalization does not supersede the importance of nations. 
The home- base shapes a company's capacity to innovate rapidly 
in technology and methods, and to do so in proper direction. It is 
the place from which competitive advantage ultimately emanates 
and from which it must be sustained"48. The home- base of a 
company includes the company's national legislations which 
should be modernized and updated to satisfy the requirements of 
the international competition that the company can not compete 
globally without exploiting its home –base advantages49. 
The internal strategy of a company must be directed to the 
purpose of the international competition, i.e. to make its 
"sustainable advantages obsolete even while they are still 
advantages "50.  
 Despite the fact that the English Companies Law 1908 (from 
which the Sudanese Company Law 1925 was derived) had been 
developed many times through many decades to accommodate 
the development in the economic and legal activities, the 
Sudanese company law still frozen regardless of the changes in 
the Sudanese economy, or the international economical progress 
of the world around the Sudan.             
 
  
3-The Role of the Company's Share as a Means of Wealth:  
 
 A share was defined in the early English case : ( Borland's 
Trustee v. Steel " 1901"51) as " the interest of the shareholder in 
the company, measured by a sum of money for the purpose of 
liability in the first place and of interest in the second, but also 
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50 - Id. at 582. 
51 - [1901] 1 Ch. 279. 
34 
 
consisting of a series of mutual covenants entered into by the 
shareholder52 ".  
There are two types of shares, ordinary shares and preference 
shares. Preference shares are designed to appeal to investors 
who want steady return on their capital combined with a high level 
of safety. The main difference between the ordinary share and 
preference share is that the owner of the former is a member of 
the company and the owner of the latter is regarded as a 
temporary member of the company. 
 Nowadays, a share of a company may result in wealth to its 
holder in the case of successful, well-managed company. In public 
companies the shares are to be listed in a stock- exchange, for 
example, (London Stock Exchange, New York Stock Exchange 
and Khartoum Stock Exchange); these markets provide a 
convenient market for the sale of shares. In most of countries the 
stock-exchange require full financial reports from the listed 
companies for the use of investors, this requirement enables 
investors to select their options in the shares depending on a solid 
ground. The share also may be selected for growth, which an 
investor is free to select between those of high dividends, or of 
growth (which pay little, or no dividends, but stand to rise in price) 
"most investment counselors agree that young people should 
choose strategy of capital growth "53.            
 
 
 
 
(vi) The Company and Membership:- 
 By forming a company, company members are entitled to 
enjoy some rights conferred on them by law and also to bear some 
liabilities. For the first look one may think that persons who are 
entitled to rights and liabilities are only those called "shareholders" 
, but in fact, and from  legal view point, other categories of persons 
may enjoy or bear these rights or liabilities in addition to share 
holders that " members of a company are its shareholders ( the 
two expressions may be used interchangeably without harm ) 
provided that it is remembered that in some situations a person 
may be a member of  a company without being a shareholder (in 
the case of company limited by guarantee) , or a shareholder 
without being a member ( in the case of company limited by 
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shares)" 54. Since that our thesis will be concerned with companies 
limited by shares, we believe that the basis of equality in a 
company is its membership not merely the ownership of its shares, 
that the former is wider than the latter. Membership includes in 
addition to the share holders other categories of persons, so we 
need an exposition to show who those persons are. 
 The subscribers to the memorandum of association are 
deemed to be members of the company and their names must be 
entered into the register of members, but some persons may 
become members by methods other than this. 
 Section 27 of the Sudanese companies Act (SCA) 1925 and 
section 352 of the (ECA) 1985 provides that every company must 
keep a register of its members, and the addresses of members, 
and the date in which each person entered in the register as a 
member and the date at which any person ceased to be member55. 
From the above requirements of the register we can imply that the 
legislature considered the shareholder just as "one" of many 
members of the company, so in this part we will be concerned with 
the ways of becoming a member, who can become a member and 
the register of members. 
 
1-Ways of Becoming Member: 
 
(a)Subscribers to the memorandum 
"A subscriber to the memorandum becomes a member on 
registration of the company, and an entry in the register of 
members is not necessary to make him a member of the company 
"56. An entry to the subscriber's name in the register is a duty of 
company directors (s. 20 of the (SCA) 1925), but he cannot 
escape from the liability for calls in the shares for which he has 
signed the memorandum, and the obligations of the subscriber to 
take the shares which he has subscribed is not satisfied by the 
later allotment of shares credited as fully paid and to which some 
one else is entitled 57 as in Migotti case (1876)58 
 
(b) Directors who have signed and delivered to the registrar an 
undertaking to take and pay for their qualification shares (ss.77, 78 
of the (SCA) 1925.)    
                                     
54 - R.R Pennington. Supra note 13 at 1. 
55 - Geoffrey Morse. Supra note 3 at 163. 
56 - Id at 158. 
57 - Id at 158. 
58 - [1876] L.R. 4EQ.238. 
36 
 
 
 (c) Every other person who agrees to become a member and whose     
name entered on the register of members (s. 26 "2" of the (SCA) 
1925)    
A person cannot become a member under this category 
unless he agrees to do. The agreement of a subscriber for shares 
is always expressed in his application for them, and the agreement 
of renounce of a letter of allotment by his completing the 
application form on it, but if a person acquired shares from an 
existing member, the instrument of transfer used to state that he 
agree to accept the shares 59 " and his execution of the instrument 
containing that statement evidenced his agreement to become a 
member "60. A person of his category does not actually become a 
member until his name is entered in the register of members. Such 
a person may take the allotment of his shares direct from the 
company or may purchase shares from an existing member, or he 
may succeed to share on the death or bankruptcy of a member.61 
 
2- Who can be members:- 
 
(a) Minors: 
In Sudan by s.55 of the Civil Transactions Act 1984 and in the 
English Law a minor, i.e. a person under the age of 18 may be a 
member unless this is forbidden by the articles and the minor 
contract to take shares is avoidable by him before or within a 
reasonable time after he attains the age of 1862. That means a 
minor who has been registered as a member may repudiate his 
membership before or within a reasonable time after reaching the 
age of maturity. But he cannot recover the money paid unless 
there has been a total failure of the consideration of which the 
company was paid, as in the English case :( Steinberg v. Scala 
Ltd.)63 , in this case a minor purchased some shares. When the 
company made a call she repudiated the contract and attempted to 
recover the money paid for the shares. It was held that she did not 
have to pay the call, but she could not recover the money paid 
because there had not been a total failure of consideration. She 
had received something for her money, i.e. the right to vote and 
receive dividends. 
                                     
59 - R.R Pennington, supra note 13 at 283. 
60 - Id at 238.  
61 - Geoffrey Morse, supra note 3 at 159. 
62 - Id at 150. 
63 -[1923] 2Ch.452,CA 
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(b)Personal representatives (Table A. reg.22 of the (SCA) 1925): 
On a member's death his shares vest in his personal 
representative who may acquire registration of himself as a 
member. If a personal representative is registered as a member he 
is entitled to vote and he is personally liable for calls although he 
may claim an indemnity out of the deceased assets.   
A personal representative is not obliged to become a member 
for Table A. reg. 23 of the (SCA) 1925 and s. 183(3) of the (ECA) 
1985 provide that the legal representative may make a valid 
transfer of the deceased's shares without becoming a member and 
to receive all dividends, bonus of other benefits from the share, but 
the articles usually prevent them from voting at general meetings.64  
If the personal representative neither registers as a member, 
nor transfer the shares, the deceased remains in the register. 
In our humble view to avoid this practice, the registrar must 
require the personal representative of the deceased either to 
transfer the shares to other person or register as a member within 
a fixed period of time. 
 
(c)Trustee in Bankruptcy (s. 151 of the (SCA) 1925.): 
The position of a trustee on bankruptcy is similar to that of 
personal representative in that he can transfer the shares without 
being registered as a member, or he can acquire registration . 
A bankrupt may be a member of a company although the 
beneficial interest in his shares will be vested in his trustee in 
bankruptcy as from the time when he is adjudged bankrupt unless 
the articles provide to the contrary65  
 
3-The Register of Members:- 
 
The register of members is compulsory for every company. 
Sufficient Information contained therein must be up to date and 
clear. The entry on the register is considered the crucial test of 
determining the membership of a person .Hence every change 
effected in the case of a member must be incorporated as early as 
possible .Further, the register is open for public inspection and 
extracts are to be given if demanded by any person. 
                                     
64 - Geoffrey Morse, supra note 3 at 161. 
65 - Id at 162. 
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S. 27"2" in the (SCA) and s.352 in the (ECA) 1985 provide that 
every company must keep a register of members which must 
contain the following particulars:    
(a) The name and address of each member. 
(b) A statement of shares held by each member, with 
distinguishing. Numbers (if any). Where the company has 
more than one class of issued shares they must be 
distinguished by classes.  
(c) The amount paid up on shares. 
(d) The date of entry on the register.  
(e) The date of cessation of membership 
By s. 352 of the (ECA) if the number of members of a 
company falls to one, a statement to that effect must be entered in 
the register, together with the date of the occurrence .If the 
member ship of such a company then increases to two or more the 
occurrence of the event, its date and the name and address of 
person who was formerly the sole number, shall be entered in the 
register.                                      
 S.32"1" in the (SCA) 1925 and s. 353 in the (ECA) 1985 
require the register to be kept at the registered office, unless it is 
made up at some other place in which case it can be kept at that 
other place. The registrar must be informed of where the register is 
kept, and of any change in that place.  
 By s. 354 every company with more than 50 members must 
keep an index of members showing how each member can be 
readily found in the register. 
 By s. 32 of the (SCA) and s. 356 of the (ECA) 1985 members 
may inspect the register free of charge. Non-member may inspect 
the register on payment of small fees. Any person may require a 
copy of the register with payment of fees.  
 By s. 33 of the (SCA) 1925 and s.358 of the (ECA) 1985 the 
company may close the register for up to 30 days each year. The 
company must give notice in a newspaper circulating in the district 
where the registered office is situated. The effect of closure is that 
share transfers are not entered in this period and the public may 
not inspect the register. The purpose is to keep the register static 
while dividend warrants are prepared. In practice very few 
companies close their register; they declare a dividend payable to 
members of the register at a future date and then extract a list of 
members at that date. 
 By s.34"1" of the (SCA) 1925 and s. 359 of the (ECA) 1985 
the name of a person without sufficient cause entered in or omitted 
from the register or, in the case of default or delay takes place in 
39 
 
entering the cessation of a person's membership, then on the 
application of either the aggrieved person, any member and the 
company ; the court may order rectification of the register and the 
payment of damages by the company to the aggrieved person 
.The power to rectify the register is not restricted to the above 
circumstances, rectification may be granted whenever the register 
is incorrect, and the fact that is in liquidation does not prevent 
rectification . 
  A company may remove from the register any entry that 
relates to a former member provided that person has not been a 
member for at least 20 years. 
 By s.29 of the (SCA) 1925 and s. 360 of the (ECA) 1985 no 
notice of a trust shall be entered on the register. For example, a 
man buys shares for his infants cannot enter a notice of a trust. 
 In both Sudan and England the owner of a beneficial 
(equitable interest) in shares, for example an equitable mortgagee 
or the recipient of a bequest of shares, may protect his interests by 
serving a "stop notice" on the company. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion: 
 
Despite the fact that there is no objective definition for the 
word "company" in the Sudanese and (ECA)s, company remains a 
very important word in our legal, economical and social life. 
Company did not emerge by accident, but resulted from long 
historical developments.  
For gaining access to large amounts of money, individual 
proprietorship and partnership may be inadequate but by forming a 
company, large funds of money can be brought under one 
management. 
The innovation of the separate legal entity of the company 
remains one of the most important innovations through all the 
human history. The main feature for the legal entity of the 
company is the limited liability which attracts people to invest their 
money in a company form without fear about their other properties. 
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Membership of a company is the virtue of the rights in such 
company. The familiar forms for becoming a member are 
represented in the subscriber to the memorandum; directors who 
have signed and delivered to the Registrar an undertaking to take 
and pay for their qualification shares and every other person who 
agrees to become a member and whose name entered on the 
register of members. Minors, personal representatives and trustee 
in bankruptcy also can be members in a company for different 
considerations.  
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 Chapter (2) 
 
Preferentiality and Equality in Shareholders' Rights 
 
Introduction: 
It's well known that in the different company laws and 
specifically in the English law that a share does not confer its 
owner a right to the physical possession of any thing. It confers 
number of rights against the company, for example to attend 
company's meetings and vote. The face value of the share is also 
a measure of the shareholder's interest in the company. In the 
case of winding up the company the amount that will come to any 
shareholder will be proportionate to the face values of the shares 
owned by him. But the question of the legal nature of the share 
remains a very important question. 
 In the English law there is a presumption to the equality of 
rights between the shareholders unless there is evidence to 
otherwise. That means the memorandum, articles or the 
documents describing the shares when they were issued may 
describe other types of shares in addition to the ordinary shares. 
These types of shares called "preference share" and they confer 
on their holders' priority to some rights over the ordinary 
shareholders. Here the important question which may arise is what 
the rights of the shareholders are, and what are the limits of the 
presumption of the equality of rights between the share holders?. 
To answer these questions there must be an exposition to the 
rights of the shareholder generally, and to explain the presumption 
of the equality between the shareholders and its exceptions, so 
this chapter will be concerned with the legal nature of the share 
and its definition, the types of company shares, the rights of the 
shareholder (fundamental rights and other rights) and lastly the 
presumption of equality between the shareholders and its 
exceptions in concern with some rights.         
 
(i)The legal nature of the share:- 
          What is the exact juridical nature of the share? this a 
question more easily asked than answered 66.In the old types of 
companies in England(which was a merely an enlarged 
partnerships) it was clear that the members'  shares entitled them 
to an equitable interest in the company's assets, but the nature of 
                                     
66 - L.C.B Gower, Gower's Principles of Modern Company Law, at 387(4th ed. 1979).    
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this equitable interest was not quite clear that the members could 
not , while the company was going concern, lay claim to any 
particular asset, or prevent the directors from disposing of it67 .Also 
in the recent time the shareholder have ceased to be regarded as 
having equitable interests in the companies assets, and this is one 
of the most important consequences of the separate personality of 
the company doctrine, and as a consequence for this doctrine the 
shareholders are not in the eye of law part owners of the 
undertaking ,and the word share  become something of a 
misnomer, for shareholders no longer share any property in 
common ; at the most they share certain rights in respect of 
dividends, return of capital on a winding up, voting, and the like68. 
Some opinions defined the share as a mere contractual right 
depending on the fact that the memorandum and articles of 
association constitute a contract of some sort between the 
company and its members and it is these documents which directly 
or indirectly define the rights conferred by the shares. But it seems 
that the share is something more far than mere contractual right 
and this can be implied from the rules related to the infant 
shareholders who are liable for calls on the share unless they 
repudiate the allotment during infancy, and who can not recover 
any money which they have paid unless the shares have been 
completely valueless69. 
Farwell J. in the famous English case: (Borland's Trustee v. 
Steel& Co. Ltd) 70defined the share as  
"the interest of shareholder in the company measured by a 
sum of money, for the purpose of liability in the first place, and 
of interest in the second, but also consisting of a series of 
mutual covenants entered into by all the shareholders". 
According to this definition the followings should be noted: 
1. "Measured by a sum of money" is the reference to 
nominal value.  
2. "Liability" indicates that the member has a duty to pay for 
his shares. 
3. Interest shows that the shareholder has rights, for 
example to attend and vote at meetings. 
4. "Mutual covenants" stresses the contractual nature of a 
shareholder rights.  
 
                                     
67 - Id at p. 397. 
68 - Id at p. 398. 
69 - Id at p. 398. 
70 - [1951] 1 Ch.279. 
43 
 
(ii)Types of Company Shares:- 
  In Sudan and also in England a company may issue all its 
shares with same rights , on the other hand a company is free to 
issue its shares by a way to confer different rights on different 
classes of shares , such classes may be described as ordinary 
shares and preference shares . 
1. Ordinary shares  
Ordinary shares are sometimes described as a residuary 
class i.e. their rights are the rights that remain after the rights of 
the other classes of shareholders (if any) has been satisfied71i.e. 
their rights to dividends and their claim on the company's assets 
may also be exercised after the claims of the creditors and 
preference shareholders have been met .Normally the holders of 
the ordinary shares are the founders of the company and unless 
the memorandum , articles  or the documents describing the 
shares when they were issued , otherwise provide, ordinary 
shareholders are entitled to receive dividends when they are 
declared (they cannot enforce a declaration), and to be paid a 
proportion of company's assets after payment of the creditors 
when the company is wound up .The amount will be proportionate 
to the size of his shareholdings and if the amount to be distributed 
exceeds the nominal value of the company's shares, each 
shareholder will participate in this "surplus" in proportion to the 
nominal value of his shareholdings72. 
 An ordinary shareholder will also normally have the right to 
exercise one vote for each share he holds at the general meetings 
of the company. These rights of the ordinary shareholders only 
subsists if there is nothing to the contrary in the documents 
describing the original issue of the share in the articles or 
memorandum .The rights otherwise given by law to shareholders 
are often varied by those documents, for example it is common for 
a company to have more than one class of ordinary shareholders 
with different voting rights73 . 
 It was stated: 
"The ordinary shareholders bear all the immediate risks of 
ownership and possess a full claim on its rewards after prior 
charges have been met. The burden of company taxation, 
for example falls ultimately upon earnings available for 
distribution to ordinary shareholders, since there is no way 
                                     
71 - L.C.B. Gower, supra note 1 at. 423 
72 - Janet Dine. Janet Dine Company Law at 295 (4th ed.2001). 
73 - Id at. 296. 
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whereby a company may pass on its charge for profit tax to 
preference shareholders entitled by contract to a fixed rate of 
return. If the profits of a company fall, the existence of prior 
charges means that the level of earning available for 
distribution to ordinary shareholders will be reduced by an 
even greater proportion; conversely, a rise in company profits 
means a proportionately larger increase in these equity 
earnings"74. 
It seems that the ordinary shareholders are at a serious 
disadvantageous position as regard with the distribution of the 
company's profits, nothing could be said except that in law the 
assets of a company, including its retained profits, belong to the 
company and not its shareholders as such, so that the extent to 
which ordinary shareholders are able to enforce their claims will 
depend on circumstances. The tendency for directors to pursue 
conservative dividends policies, of course, also limits the risk 
borne by ordinary shareholders, in that many companies may be in 
a position, in the event of fall profits, to maintain their existing 
equity dividend at the expense of a decline in undistributed 
profits75. 
 By the above opinion about the weak position of the ordinary 
shareholders in relation to the distributed profits of the company, a 
real question may arise: why do some investors choose to be an 
ordinary shareholder? In our humble view the reason for this 
choice is that when profits are high the dividends on ordinary 
shares rise and may become greater than those paid on preferred 
shares. Moreover, the market value of the share may increase if 
the company continues to show profits. That is, the Stock 
Exchange price for a share of this type of shares may increase, so 
that the   present shareholders could sell their shares at a higher 
price than they originally paid for them. 
 
2. Preference Shares: 
    It is well known that in England and Sudan companies may 
have different classes of shares. Since that it is permitted by law, 
also companies may issue what is normally called "preference 
shares" in order to satisfy investors who want a steady return of 
their capital with a high level of safety. As their name implies they 
confer on holder's preference over the ordinary shares in respect 
of their dividend, repayment of capital, or both. 
                                     
74- H.B. Rose .Economic Background to investment at  .147.(1st ed. 1960)  
75 - Id at. 148. 
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 The question which may arise is why some companies issue 
such types of shares despite the fact that such types of shares 
may cause an unequal treatment between the shareholders of one 
company, especially in concern of the ordinary shareholders who 
are, usually, the founders of the company. Many of company law 
writers tried to justify the issuing of the preference shares, for 
example Professor Pennington said: 
 " the reason for this is manifold, but the primary amongst 
them are the following: The original shares of the company, its 
ordinary shares, may still be held by the persons who started 
the companies business, and they may be unwilling to issue 
further ordinary shares to strangers, because ordinary shares 
usually carry the majority of the voting rights at shareholder' 
meetings and take the bulk of the profits as dividends, so that 
if further ordinary shares were issued to strangers, the 
founders' voting and financial control over the company would 
be diminished and might be destroyed . In such a case the 
original ordinary shareholders would insure that the company 
raised further capital by issuing preference shares" 76 
Another reason why companies have often two or more classes of 
shares is that it is easier to induce the outside investors to 
subscribe to preference rather than ordinary shares. Such an 
investor usually has little knowledge of the company's business 
and no wish to participate in its management, and so to him the 
greater security of preference shares compared with ordinary 
shares outweigh the financial and voting control which the ordinary 
share carries77. A third reason for issuing preference shares is that 
at the time when some companies have needed to raise new 
capital, their existing shares were worth less than their nominal 
value, and it is practicable to raise new capital by issuing the 
preference shares with preferential rights to encourage the new 
investors78 
 The rights of the different classes of the shareholders may 
be set out in the company's memorandum or articles of 
association, but usually the articles authorize the directors to issue 
such type of shares. Also the shareholders of the company in a 
general meeting may determine these rights. This is the position in 
the English law, but in some countries which follow the common 
law, such as the Australian Corporations Act, provides that the 
rights of preference shares must be set out in the memorandum or 
                                     
76 -R.R Pennington. Pennington's Company Law at.177   (3rd ed. 1973). 
77 - Id at. 177. 
78 - Id at. 177. 
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the articles79. Also in the most corporations statutes of the states in 
the United States of America the articles of incorporation must 
spell-out the preferences expressly and such preferences 
generally will not be implied80  
 The holders of preference shares are entitled to have their 
dividends before those of the ordinary shareholders are paid. The 
term of issue of these shares or the memorandum of association 
and articles can determine the rights of the holders but, the court 
have had to provide a net work of rules which make up possible 
gaps in the description of the shareholders rights which appear in 
these documents. Rules are usually expressed in the terms of  
"presumption" that is, the courts will presume that a particular right 
does or does not attaches to a share unless it can be shown that 
this cannot be the case because of the way in which the shares 
are described in one of the documents mentioned. The alternatives 
are that the preference shares can be preferred over the ordinary 
shares in respect of dividends, return of capital or both,81so, the 
preference shares may have a fixed rate of dividends, for example 
10% of this dividends must be paid to the preference shares 
before the ordinary shares receive any thing 
 Preference shares are cumulative unless the articles or 
terms of issue state otherwise82. This means that if the company 
cannot pay dividends in one year the arrears must be carried 
forward to future year and all the out standing preference 
dividends must be paid before the ordinary shareholders receive 
any thing83.If preference shares are not cumulative and the 
company cannot pay a dividend the arrears are not carried out 
forward, so the preference shareholders will not receive a dividend 
for that year. 
 Preference shares are normally non-participating84, i.e. they 
are not entitled to share in the surplus profits of the company after 
payment of specific dividends of the ordinary shares. 
 In voting unless the articles otherwise provide, preference 
shares carry the same voting rights. However, it is usual to restrict 
the preference shareholders right to vote to specified 
                                     
79 - L.C.B. Gower. Supra note 1 at. 425. 
80 - D.D. Davidson & B. Knowles & L. Forsythe & R.R. Jespersen .Business Law Principles and cases 
at.660. (2nd ed. 1991). 
81 - Janet Dine Supra note 7 at p. 296w 
82 - Geoffrey Morse. Charles worth & Morse Company La w    at. 178 (16th ed. 1999) . 
83 -This is the decision in many English cases, for example (Webb v. Earle "1875") L.R. 20 EQ 556, or 
(Ferguson & Forrester Ltd. v. Taylor "1888") 15R. 711. 
84 - Geoffrey Morse, supra note 17 at. 179.  
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circumstances which directly affect them, for example when the 
rights of preference shareholders are being varied. 
 In the case of liquidation preference shareholders do not 
automatically have a right to prior return of their capital. If the 
articles are silent preference shareholders and ordinary 
shareholders will be treated equally. But in the most companies 
the articles will give preference shareholders priority of return of 
capital  
 If the dividends have been declared it must be paid. If 
dividends have not been declared the arrears of dividend may only 
be paid if there is a provision in the articles85, this is the decision in 
the famous English case :( Will v. United Plantation Co. Ltd 
"1914")86. The articles must provide for the payment of the arrears 
rather than the arrears due, because arrears are not due until 
declared (the words "arrears due "would therefore exclude un 
declared arrears). Where arrears of dividends are paid on 
liquidation they are paid out of the assets remaining after payment 
of the other debts. It does matter that the dividends are not being 
paid out of distributable profits87. 
 Finally, as between the ordinary shares and preference 
shares the following points must be noticed that it may be assist 
the choice of an investor to select the suitable type of shares to 
invest his money in: 
(a) Nominal value: the nominal value of the ordinary shares is 
generally low so as to enable the middle class man to 
purchase such shares, while that of the preference shares 
is normally high. 
(b) Capital risk: investors i.e. holders who are willing to take 
capital risk prefer ordinary shares while those who want to 
receive regular and stable income prefer preference 
shares . 
(c) Where a company declares dividends, ordinary shares 
can be paid dividends only after the payment of 
preference shareholders. 
(d) In the event of a company being wound up, holders of 
preference shares have priority over ordinary 
shareholders in respect of the payment of the capital. 
Thus we find that after meeting the claims of the creditors 
of the company, holders of preference shares are paid 
                                     
85 - Id at. 179. 
86 - [1914] A.C. 11. 
87 - Geoffrey Morse, supra note 17 at. 180. 
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their shares in capital while holders of ordinary shares 
stand last in this respect. 
(e) Voting rights: so far as voting rights are concerned 
holders of ordinary shares enjoy wider powers than that of 
preference shares that the ordinary shareholder can vote 
on every resolution placed before the company. It should 
be noted that the preference shareholders are allowed to 
vote only on such matters as may affect their interest. 
(f) Despite the fact that preference shareholders are entitled 
to priority on some rights e.g. (dividends, return of capital 
after winding up) over the ordinary shareholders, they 
may be, sometimes, at a disadvantageous position that 
when the company can borrow money at a rate lower than 
the preferential dividends, then the company can reduce 
its capital by kicking out the preference shareholders. In ( 
Wilson's & Clyde Co. v. Scottish Insurance Corp. 
Ltd."1949") A.C. 462. The colliery assets of a coal mining 
company had been transferred to the national Coal Board 
under the Coal Industry Nationalization Act 1946 and the 
company was to go into voluntary liquidation. Meanwhile 
the company proposed to reduce its capital by returning 
their capital to the holders of the preference stock. The 
articles provided that in the event of a winding up the 
preference stock ranked before the ordinary stock to the 
extent of the repayment of the accounts, called up and 
paid thereon. Held, the proposed reduction was not unfair 
or inequitable. Even without it, the preference 
shareholders would not be entitled in a winding up to 
share in the surplus assets or to receive more than a 
return of their paid up capital. Accordingly, they could not 
object to being paid, by means of the reduction, the 
amount which they would receive in the proposed 
liquidation.           
 
 
(iii) Shareholders Rights:- 
 In the English law and consequently in all countries which 
follow the common law principles in their Companies Acts such as 
Sudan, United States of America, Australia and India, rights of the 
shareholder against the company are considered in relation to the 
liabilities or obligations of the shareholder to the company,88 (the 
                                     
88 - Peter Willcocks.  Shareholders' Rights & Remedies at 1. (1st ed. 1991). 
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two terms, obligations and liabilities, are used interchangeably for 
the same meaning). What are these liabilities or obligations which 
are to be satisfied by the shareholder so as to confer him rights 
against the company? Unless the share holder has fulfilled these 
liabilities he is not entitled to these rights, but what are these rights 
he is entitled to? The answers for these questions require a 
tracking through the Common Law and the Companies Act to 
show the obligations or liabilities of the shareholder to the 
company, and then his rights against the company 
 
 
 
1. The liabilities of the shareholder: 
  The liabilities of the shareholder in a company limited by 
shares are rare and the liability in this type of companies will be 
extended only to the unpaid nominal value of his shares, also the 
shareholder is liable to repay the amount of unlawful distribution of 
dividends to the company 89 . 
   
  (a) The liability to pay for the unpaid nominal value of the shares (Table 
A. reg.12 of the Sudanese Companies Act (SCA) 1925):                             
 The directors of a company may demand that a member pay 
to the company the amount which is unpaid on his shares on 
account of the nominal value or by way of premium. If when shares 
are issued, the full amount of each share is not payable at once, 
the terms of issue will provide that part is payable on application. 
However, in rare cases, the company may not require all the 
nominal amount of a share, or the full amount of a premium on a 
share, to be paid or at or soon after allotment, but may leave part 
to be called up in accordance with the provisions of the articles as 
and when required by the company or, in the event of winding up, 
by the liquidator90. Therefore, a shareholder is bound to pay the 
whole or part of the balance unpaid on his shares when called on 
in accordance with the provisions of the articles. Calls must be 
made in the manner laid down in the articles. 
 In England a call creates a specially debt due from the 
shareholder to the company (s. 14"2" English Companies Act 
(ECA) 1985), and the period within which an action can be brought 
for payment is 12 years. 
                                     
89 - L.C.B. Gower, supra note 1 at. 101. 
90 - Geoffrey Morse, supra note 17. at. 204. 
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 Like Table A reg. 12 in the (SCA) 1925, Table A of the (ECA) 
1985 provides for the general rules of the calls on shares by that 
members must be given at least 14 days notice time and place of 
payment, and provides also that a person on whom a call is made 
remains liable even if he subsequently transfers his shares. A call 
is deemed to be made when the directors' resolution is passed. 
Directors may differentiate between shareholders as to the amount 
and time of payment of calls. However, directors must always use 
their powers in a good faith and for the benefit of the company as a 
whole that such a power does not entitle directors to make a call 
on all the shareholders except themselves and this was the 
decision in the famous English case (Alexander v. Automatic 
Telephone Co.)91It was held to be abuse of power, when directors 
made calls on shareholders other than themselves. 
 Like Table A in the (SCA) 1925, Table A of the (ECA) also 
provides for the late payment and the non payment of shares. In 
the case of late payment the (ECA) provides for interest to be paid 
from the day the call was due at a rate fixed by the terms of 
allotment, or in the notice of the call (since 1983 interest is 
prohibited in Sudan), but the directors may waive payment of 
interest wholly or in a part. In the case of non payment it is usual 
for the articles to give the company a lien on member's shares; in 
addition the articles may give a company a lien for non payment of 
a general debt owed to the company. However, by s. 150 of the 
(ECA) 1985 a lien taken by public company is void unless it is a 
charge on its own partly unpaid shares for an amount payable in 
respect of them92. 
 Generally we can say that a lien is a form of security which 
gives the company an important equitable interest in the members' 
shares. If the money owing to the company is not paid, the 
company may enforce its security by selling the shares under 
power given in the articles and the balance of the money received 
after deducting the amount owing to the company, must be paid to 
the member. 
 The important question which may arise is that when a third 
party advances money on the security of shares, whether the third 
party has priority over company's lien. In such a case, if the third 
party gives notice of his security to the company before the 
company's lien arises, the third party will have priority, but 
otherwise not93.   
                                     
91 - [1900] 2 Ch. 56, CA. 
92 - Geoffrey Morse, supra note 17. at. 205 
93 -  Id at. 206. 
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 In the English case (Bradford Banking Co. v. Briggs & 
Co.)94The articles of the company gave a first and paramount lien 
and charge on shares for debts due from the shareholder. A 
shareholder created an equitable mortgage of his shares by 
depositing the share certificate with a bank as security for an over 
draft and the bank gave note of the deposit to the company. The 
shareholder consequently became indebted to the company 
thereupon a lien arose in favor of the company. Held, the bank had 
priority as the company's lien arose after notice of their equitable 
mortgage. The notice was not notice of a trust contrary to what are 
now s. 360 but notice affecting the company, in its charter of 
trader, with knowledge of the bank's interest. This decision was 
also the same to the decision in the other English case 
(Champagne Perrier-Jouet S.A v. H.H Finch Ltd.).95  
 Where the shareholder is a trustee, the company's lien will 
prevail over the claims of the beneficial owners unless the 
company is given notice before the lien arise, that the shareholder 
is a trustee96. 
 A company may forfeit i.e. take away a members shares for 
non payment of a call provided there is authority in the articles, but 
shares may not be forfeited for any other type of debt owed by the 
member to the company. The directors may waive payment wholly 
or in part or they may enforce in full without any allowance for the 
value of forfeited shares. Forfeiture being, in the nature of penal 
proceedings, is valid only if the provisions of the articles are strictly 
allowed and any irregularity will avoid the forfeiture. To protect 
purchaser of the forfeited shares against possible irregularities in 
the forfeiture, the articles usually provide that the title of the 
purchaser shall not be affected by any invalidity in the proceedings 
in reference to the forfeiture.97 
 By Table A in both the Sudanese and (ECA) the shareholder 
may make a voluntary surrender of his shares for non payment of 
calls. This voluntary surrender is only allowed if there is a provision 
in the articles authorizes the board of directors to accept such 
surrender. However, a company articles may give power to the 
directors to accept surrender of shares where they are in a position 
to forfeit such shares i.e. for non payment of calls on those 
shares98. Usually the directors accept the surrender when it is 
                                     
94 - [1886]. 12. App. Cas. 29 
95 - [1882] 1 W.L.R. 1359. 
96 - Geoffrey Morse, supra note 17 at. 206. 
97  - Id at. 208. 
98 - Id at. 209. 
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desired to avoid the complicated formalities of forfeiture. A 
surrender of partly paid shares, not liable for forfeiture, is unlawful 
because it releases the shareholder from further liability in respect 
of the shares and it amounts the purchase of the company to its 
own shares and lastly is a reduction of capital without sanction of 
the court as in the English case (Bellerby v. Rowland & Mar wood 
Stemship Co. Ltd.)99 In this case a company sustained a loss of ₤ 
4000 and the directors agree to share the loss between 
themselves. They therefore surrendered shares to the amount of ₤ 
4000. The shares were ₤ 11 each, ₤ 10 paid, and the intention was 
that the directors should be released from the remaining ₤ 1 a 
share un- paid. The company subsequently became more 
prosperous and the directors took proceedings to have the 
surrender declared invalid. It was held, the surrender was invalid 
as amounting to purchase by the company of its own shares. 
 
(b) The liability of a shareholder to repay unlawful distribution of 
dividends:  
 Dividends are payments made out of profits of a company to 
its members. Dividends paid to preference shareholders will be at 
a fixed rate, whereas paid to ordinary shareholders will vary with 
regard to the prosperity of the company. Shareholders do not have 
an automatic right to dividends even if profits are available. 
Directors may consider it is more prudent to retain profits within the 
company. A dividend is therefore not a debt of the company until it 
is declared. Even then, on liquidation, it is not payable until the 
outside creditors have been paid 
 The general rule of dividends is that it cannot be paid if this 
would result in the company's being unable to pay its debts as they 
fall due100, this was the decision in the English case ( Peter 
Buchanan Ltd. v. Mc Vey "1950" )101. All the rules are subject to 
this overriding condition of solvency. Clearly if a company did pay 
dividends in this situation it would have to pay its debts out of 
capital. In both the Sudanese and (ECA) no company whether 
public or private, may make a distribution of dividends except out 
of its accumulated realized profits less its accumulated realized 
losses. In addition unrealized profits may be used in paying up 
debentures or amounts unpaid in issued shares. Also s.267 in the 
(ECA) 1985 provides that a public company may not make a 
distribution if its net assets are less than the aggregate of its called 
                                     
99 - [1902] 2 Ch. 14 CA. 
100 - L.C.B. Gower, supra note 1 at. 231. 
101 - [1950] reported at [1955] A.C. 516 n., 521- 522. 
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up capital plus un distributable reserves (un distributable reserves 
means: the share premium account and the capital redemption 
reserve, any other reserves which the company is prevented from 
distributing by law or by its memorandum or articles, and the 
excess of accumulated un realized profits over accumulated un 
realized losses). 
 Whilst the (SCA) 1925 doesn't, s. 270 of the (ECA) 1985, 
specifies the accounts which must be referred to when determining 
the legality and amount of any distribution. The relevant accounts 
are the last annual accounts. Such accounts must have been 
properly prepared and the auditors must have a report in respect 
of them102. 
 As consequences to the unlawful distribution of dividends, 
s.277 of the (ECA) 1985 provides that every shareholder who has 
received an unlawful distribution and who knew or ought to have 
known that it was paid out of un distributable funds is liable to 
repay it to the company. Where dividends cannot be recovered 
from shareholders, every director who was knowingly a part to the 
unlawful distribution must pay the company the amount lost plus 
interest, but in this cases a shareholder who has knowingly 
received a dividends paid out of capital cannot individually, or on 
behalf of the company, maintain an action against the directors to 
replace the dividends so paid, at any rate until he has repaid the 
money he has received103.  
 In the (SCA) 1925 the legislature expressly stated for the 
liability of the shareholder to pay for the un paid nominal value of 
his shares, but did not clearly state for the liability of the 
shareholder to repay to the company the unlawful distributions.  
 About the liability of the shareholder to pay for his unpaid 
shares,  table A (12) of the (SCA) 1925  provides that the board of 
directors may partially demand a member to pay to the company 
money which un paid on his shares provided that the amount to be 
paid shall not exceed one – fourth of the nominal value of his 
shares each call, and the member shall not be obligated to pay 
unless one month has elapsed since the last call, and the member 
who received the call must pay to the company the amount of his 
un paid shares in the time prescribed in the notice of the call. On 
receipt of this notice which shall be made fourteen days before 
prior to the dead line of payment. 
                                     
102 - Geoffrey Morse, supra note 17 at. 430, 431. 
103 - Id. at. 432. 
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 Like Table A of the (ECA), Table A (17) of the (SCA) 1925 
provides that the board of directors may differentiate between the 
shareholders as to the amount and time of payment of calls. In the 
case of non payment of a call, the board of directors may, again, at 
any time require the member to pay by a new notice with the same 
conditions of the previous notice. In the case of non compliance 
with the second notice, the board of directors may forfeit a 
member's shares104.   
 By Table A reg. (27) of the (SCA) 1925, the board of 
directors, if thinks fit, may sale the unpaid shares, but at any time 
before the sale, the board of directors may repeal the forfeiture of 
such shares under any conditions imposed by the board of 
directors on the member. The membership of the member will be 
ceased in relation to the forfeited shares, but the member will 
remain liable to pay to the company all amounts due at the time of 
the forfeiture to the limit of the nominal vale of his shares105. 
 About the unlawful distribution of dividends, Table A reg. (97) 
of the (SCA) 1925 provides that any distribution of dividends, 
except from the realized profits is prohibited, but the Act did not 
expressly state for the repayment of this distributions to the 
company. 
 
(2)Rights of Shareholders:-  
  
 In the English law, a member of a company does not in 
general control the company and its operations. The management 
and control of the company is vested in its board of directors and 
the member or shareholder have no direct say in the management  
and the control of the company unless they also happen to be on 
the board of directors. In this event their power to exercise control 
over the operations of the company, will be in their capacity as 
directors not in their capacity as members. So because of this lack 
position, some rights must be conferred by the law on the 
members, to some extent, to enable them to share the control of 
the company and its operations. These rights are usually known 
as: the right to attend the company meetings, and the voting rights. 
 Since that the most important object of the vast majority of 
companies is economical, the concept of the word "right" may be 
restricted in the dividends rights which are distributed by the 
company yearly. 
                                     
104 - Table A. reg. (24), (25) of the Sudanese Company Act 1925. 
105 - Table A. reg. (28), of the Sudanese Company Act 1925. 
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 Even in minds of some lawyers the concept of the word 
"right" may not exceed the three known rights, (attendance and 
voting in the company meetings, dividend right and the right to 
return of capital after winding up the company).  
 In our humble view, the concept of the rights of the member 
or a shareholder should be regarded more widely to include, in 
addition to the mentioned rights, other types of rights, these rights, 
despite the fact they are not directly connected with the well-known 
mentioned rights, are very important in many other directions. As 
an example for these rights, is that in the English law the share 
holder has a right to prevent the company from acting ultra vires, 
since that the company powers are set out in the "object clause" of 
its memorandum of association. The essential function of the 
object clause is to protect the shareholders who invested their 
money on the understanding that the company would only do the 
things specified. Any shareholder can seek a court injunction to 
proposed ultra vires or unauthorized transaction, but this cannot 
avoid a contract already made. Moreover, the proposed contract 
can be ratified by a special resolution (s.r) of shareholders. So it is 
a very important to grant to the shareholder the right to prevent the 
ultra vires act before it takes place. Another example arise in that 
the member or the shareholder when subscribing or buying a 
share of a company is assumed to know well his obligations or 
duties to the company, so the shareholder should not have his 
obligations to the company increased without his consent, a thing 
which represents an important right to protect the shareholder. A 
third example arise in that the shareholder must have a right to 
have a share certificate  issued to him or to receive a copy of the 
balance sheet and the statutory report , or the right of a member to 
have the register of members rectified, and the like. We mean by 
the last example that some documents should be granted to the 
shareholder. 
 Despite the fact that these types of rights are widely 
scattered through the Common Law and the Companies Act, they 
do not often meet the same importance of the meeting, voting, 
dividend and return of capital rights 
 In general, shareholder's rights are not exclusively counted 
in the majority of the most important English references, but Peter 
Willcocks  counted them in his modern book ( Shareholder's Rights 
& Remedies )106as follow :-  
                                     
106 - Peter Willcocks, supra note 88 at 92, 93. 
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(a) The right of the share holder to restrain the company from 
acting ultra vires.  
(b) The right to prevent an irregular forfeiture of shares. 
(c) The right to impugn a resolution of a general meeting if 
the notice convening the meeting was not sufficiently 
informative. 
(d) The right to have a reasonable opportunity to express 
views.        
(e) The right to have amendments to resolution proposed at 
meetings. 
(f)  The right of a member to transfer his shares.  
(g) The right of a member not to have his obligations to the 
company increased without his consent. 
(h) The right to relief when the company majority did not act 
bona fide for the benefit of the company as a whole. 
(i) The right to vote (if voting shares). 
(j) The right to exercise powers conferred by the articles to 
appoint directors 
(k) The dividend rights. 
(l) The right to set a side an allotment of shares made for 
improper purpose. 
(m) The right to inspect documents and register kept by a 
company. 
(n) The right to have a share certificate issued to him. 
(o) The right to appoint a proxy. 
(p) The right to demand a poll. 
(q) The right to attend company's meetings. 
(r) The right to have a register of members rectified. 
(s) The right to a copy of the sheet balance and statutory 
report. 
 In our humble view this long list of shareholder's rights can 
be summarized to be as follow:- 
(a)The right to prevent the ultra vires act. 
(b) The right of a member to prevent an irregular forfeiture of 
shares. 
(c) The right of a member to attend company meetings and the 
relevant rights. 
       (d)The right of a member to transfer his shares 
(e)The right of a member not to have his obligations to the 
company increased without his consent. 
(f) The right to relief where the majority did not act bona fide to 
the benefit of the company as a whole. 
(g)Voting right and the relevant rights 
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(h) The right to some formalities (share certificate, register of 
members and the statutory report). 
 (In the next part of this chapter we will explain all these rights 
under the light of the two types of shares, preference and 
ordinary). 
 
(iv)The Presumption of Equality Between     
Shareholders:- 
 In the English law companies limited by shares must issue 
shares and these shares must, as we have previously mentioned, 
confer some rights on its shareholders. The question which may 
arise here: are these rights inevitably equal between the 
shareholders? Simply the answer for this question is that the type 
of the share whether ordinary or preference determines the rights 
of its holder. Since that there are many types of shares in one 
company, the rights of the members of this company are not equal. 
It is very important to say that in the absence of evidence to the 
contrary, equality is assumed between shareholders. Professor 
Gower said  
"The typical company – one limited by shares must issue 
some shares, and the initial presumption of law is that all 
shares confer equal rights and impose equal liabilities. As in 
partnership equality is assumed in the absence of evidence to 
the contrary. Normally the shareholder's rights will fall under 
three heads (i) dividends, (ii) return of capital in a winding up 
(or authorized reduction of capital), and (iii) attendance of 
meetings and voting, and unless there is some indication to 
the contrary all the shares will confer the like rights to all three 
"107. 
 Also Professor Gower said: 
 "There is similar presumption of equality so far as concern the 
share holder's liabilities. As we have seen, in the company 
limited by shares the only liability qua shareholders will be to 
pay the nominal amount of shares, so that if shares are of the 
same nominal value the holder's liabilities are necessarily the 
same. And in call up the unpaid liability, this equality must be 
preserved "108. 
 The expression "evidence to the contrary" clearly means that 
if the memorandum or the articles of association authorize the 
directors to issue preference shares, in this event no way to speak 
                                     
107 - L.C.B. Gower, supra note 1 at. 403 
108 - Id at. 403. 
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about equal treatment between shareholders of the company, so it 
is to be noticed that the equality between shareholders is a 
conditioned equality that this presumed equality takes place only in 
the absence of a provision authorizing directors to issue 
preference shares with preferred treatment. 
 In Part (3) of this chapter we said that Peter Willcocks in his 
book "Shareholder's Rights & Remedies" exclusively counted 
shareholder's rights. Despite the fact that the preference share 
confer on its holder a preferred treatment with regard to the 
ordinary share we find that many of these rights cannot be 
differentiated i.e. it should be equal regardless of the type of the 
share (whether preference or ordinary), while the other rights can 
be differentiated. So, according to our humble view the 
shareholder's rights, with regard to the presumption of the equality 
between the shareholders, can be classified to two categories of 
rights: (i) The inherent equal rights, (ii) The conditioned equal 
rights. On other words the first category confers similar rights on all 
the members of the company regardless of the type of their 
shares, and in the other category the equality depends on the type 
of their shares. 
 In this part of the chapter we will explain the shareholder's 
rights under the two mentioned titles. 
 
1. The Conditioned Equal Rights:- 
 
(a) The right to attend the meetings of the company and the relevant 
rights 
 Much of the constitutional work of companies is done 
through meetings of members. In both Sudanese and English laws 
there are two types of meeting (in addition to the statutory meeting 
which must be held only by a public company and once through 
the life time of the company): An annual general meeting (a.g.m) 
and the extra ordinary meeting (e.g.m). 
 The first general meeting must be held within 18 months of 
incorporation, and then after at least once in every calendar year, 
with not than 15 months between any two meetings.109If meeting is 
not held in accordance with these rules, s.69 of the (SCA) 1925 
and s. 366 (4) of the (ECA) 1985 provide that the company and 
any officer of it who is in default is liable to fine. Both Sudanese 
and English Acts does not  specify in any details as to the 
business to be transacted by the (a.g.m.), but the ordinary 
                                     
109 - S. 366 of the (ECA). 1985. 
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business of the (a.g.m.) is the approval of the annual accounts, the 
reading of the auditors report and the appointment of auditors to 
the future, the directors report and which will include the director's 
recommendations of the dividend to be paid to shareholders (a 
resolution will be proposed that the amount recommended be paid 
by the way of dividend), appointment of directors where some are 
retiring, a resolution to pay the auditors and a resolution to pay the 
directors110.  
 The (e.g.m.) is any general meeting other the (a.g.m.).  S.71 
of the (SCA) 1925 and Article 37 of the (ECA) 1985 provide that 
the directors may convene a meeting of members. They will do so 
if special business of importance requires a meeting of members. 
S. 71 "1" of the (SCA) 1925 and s. 368 of the (ECA) 1985 give the 
holders of one-tenth of the voting power at a general meeting, the 
power to require the directors to convene such a meeting within 21 
days. Also by s. 370 two members or more holding at least one- 
tenth of the issued capital, (whether paid or unpaid) can 
themselves call a meeting. 
 In England by s. 371of the (ECA) 1985 the court can order 
that (e.g.m.) be held if it is otherwise impracticable to call or 
conduct one properly. Any director or member can apply, or the 
court can take the initiative itself, as in the famous English case 
(Re El Somboro- 1958)111. In this case the applicant held 90% of 
the shares in a private company, but was not a director. The rest of 
the shares were divided equally between two persons who were 
directors. The company's articles state that the quorum for meeting 
was two persons. Wishing to remove the directors the applicant 
convened a meeting under s. 132 of the (ECA) 1948 (now s. 368). 
However since the directors did not attend no quorum was 
present. An application was then made to the court under s. 135 
Companies Act 1948 (now s.371). The court held that one member 
could constitute a quorum. The applicant could therefore remove 
the directors. And Wynn- Parry J. said in this case: 
 "the court must examine the circumstances of the particular 
case and answer the question whether as the practical matter, 
the desired meeting of the company can be conducted, there 
being no doubt of course, that it can be convened and held"112.  
However, the Court of Appeal held that it would be wrong to use 
the power in s. 371 to call a meeting and determine its quorum if 
the effect of that would be to override class rights which were 
                                     
110 - Janet Dine, supra note 7. at. 158, 159. 
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embedded in a shareholder agreement. In (Harman and Another v. 
BML Group ltd)113 the capital of the company was divided into A 
and B shares, the B shares being registered in the name of B. H 
and M held the majority of the A shares. Under agreement signed 
by all the shareholders it was provided a meeting of shareholders 
would not be valid unless a B or proxy was present. H and M 
applied for an order under s. 371 Companies Act 1985 that a 
meeting of the company be summoned, ruling that any two 
members of the company would constitute a quorum. The court of 
appeal held that this was not a proper use. 
 Irrespective of the type of business there are three types of 
resolutions at company meeting. Firstly, the ordinary resolution 
(o.r) which is not defined in the (SCA) 1925 and the (ECA) 1985114 
can be passed by a simple majority of those voting. Table A of the 
(SCA) and the (ECA), if applies, gives a casting vote to the 
chairman. It should be emphasized that the rule is one vote per 
share, not per person. Someone holding the most of the voting 
shares can therefore dictate what will be passed (but if voting is by 
show of hands then the rule is one vote for one person). 
Sometimes the articles or the term of issue can give weighting 
voting rights as in (Bushell v. Faith)115, in this case a director held 
one-third of the ordinary shares. The articles however, provided 
that on any resolution to remove that director, his shares should 
then carry three vote each. This was held valid. Secondly, s.74 "1" 
of the (SCA) 1925 and s. 378 of the (ECA) 1985 define an extra 
ordinary resolution (e.o.r.) as a resolution passed by at least a 
three-fourth majority of the votes of the members entitled to vote, 
in person or, where allowed by proxy, at a general meeting of 
which notice specifying the intention to propose the resolution as 
(e.o.r.) has been duly given. From this definition we can imply that 
this resolution must be passed by a three-quarters majority of 
votes cast. Notice of intention to move such a resolution must be 
given to the members when the meeting is called. It is very 
important to be noticed here that the three quarter majority 
required for this type of resolutions is taken from the attended 
members not all the registered members, and this is the decision 
of the Court of Appeal in the Sudanese case (Rainbow Limited 
Company v. Mustafa Abdelhameed Abu Elizz.1984)116. This type 
of resolutions is normally needed for decisions connecting with the 
                                     
113 - [1994] 2 BCLC 674. 
114 -  Geoffrey Morse, supra note 17 at 228. 
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voluntary winding up, and the articles may require elsewhere. 
Thirdly, by s. 74 "2" of the (SCA) 1925 and s.378 "2" of the (ECA) 
1985, a resolution is (s.r.) if passed by at least three fourth majority 
votes of members entitled to vote, in person or, if allowed by a 
proxy, at a general meeting of which notice specifying the intention 
to propose the resolution as (s.r.) has been duly given. There must 
be another meeting within not more than 30 days and not less than 
14 days to confirm the resolution (it is to be noticed that the 
confirmation can be passed only by the simple majority and the 
majority of three quarters is not required). 
 It is well known that a member of a company has the right to 
attend company's meetings. This is a common concept; the 
question which may arise is whether all classes of shareholders 
have the right to attend all the types of meetings regardless of 
whether the meeting is assigned for specific class of shareholders. 
Lord Russell of Kill Owen answered this question in the English 
case (Carruth v.ICI – 1937)117, 
 "Prima facie a separate meeting of a class should be a 
meeting attended only by members of the class, in order that 
the discussion of the matters which the meeting has to 
consider may be carried on unhampered by the presence of 
others who are not interested to view those matters from the 
same angle as that of the class and if the presence of 
outsiders was restrained in spite of the ascertained wish of the 
constituents of the meeting for their exclusion , it would not, I 
think, be possible to say that a separate meeting of the class 
had been duly held" . 
 As we have previously mentioned, the right to attend the 
company's meetings is a conditioned equal right and the law left to 
the company's memorandum and articles to determine a class of 
persons who are entitled to attend a certain meeting. It is clearly 
that the decision in the above case deals with a preferred classes 
of shares. Unless the articles otherwise provides, preference 
shares carry the same rights. However it is usual to restrict the 
preference shareholders rights to vote to specified circumstances 
which directly affected them, for example when the rights of 
preference shareholders are being varied, so consequently they 
are usually not allowed to attend meetings specifically affect the 
rights of the ordinary shareholders118. However, the conditioned 
equality in the right of attending company's meetings will be clearly 
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appeared in the following rights which are relevant to the right of 
the member to attend company's meetings. 
  The first relevant right is the right of a member to impugn a 
resolution of a general meeting if the notice convening the meeting 
was not sufficiently informative119. This right was early followed in 
the English law by the decision in (Kaye v. Gordon Tramways 
Co."1888")120.The member has a right to receive a notice and a 
meeting cannot be held unless a proper notice of it has been 
given. The length of the notice depend on the type of the meeting. 
In the (a.g.m) , for example in the English law it must not be less 
than 21 days, and in the extra ordinary meeting (e.g.m) it is 14 
written notice unless (s.r.) is to be moved in which case 21 days 
notice is required. The notice must specify the date, place and the 
time of the meeting. It is not necessary to give detail of ordinary 
business, but the nature of any other business must be specified. 
However, where special or (e.o.r) is to be moved the notice must 
set out the full text of the resolution and any amendment proposed 
at the meeting will be ineffective unless all the members (not 
merely those present) agree waive their right to notice, this was 
the decision in (Re Moorgate Mercantile Holding)121. Also if the 
directors have interest in the passing of a resolution, it must be 
fully disclosed in the notice calling the meeting, so if their interests 
in the meeting are not disclosed and the resolution is passed, it is 
void. If the notice of the meeting satisfied the mentioned 
conditions, then it will be considered as a sufficiently informative 
notice, and if no, the member has a right to impugn a resolution of 
a general meeting that the notice convening the resolution was not 
sufficiently informative.  
 This right depends on whether the member has the right to 
vote in the meeting and professor Pennington said:  
"Members who have no voting rights need not be summoned 
to the meeting and have no right to attend it.122"  
 The second relevant right is the member's right to have a 
reasonable opportunity to express views. This right connected with 
the conduct of meeting and specifically it is a responsibility of the 
chairman of the meeting (the chairman may be the chairman of the 
board of directors, any director or any member).The chairman 
according to Table A of the (SCA) 1925 and the (ECA) 1985 must 
act in good faith in the interest of the company as a whole, ensure 
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that business is conducted in an orderly manner in the order set 
out in the agenda, allow all points of views to be adequately 
expressed and then put the motion to be voted. Chairman's 
responsibilities are many but here we will be concerned with his 
responsibility to allow members to express views, for example: "a 
meeting may resolve to close discussion on a resolution and to 
take a vote on it for with, but the closure may not be moved until 
members have had a reasonable opportunity to discuss the 
substantive resolution, and if the closure is applied in order to stifle 
discussion, the vote take on the substantive resolution is void. 
Members may also resolve to dissolve the meeting or to adjourn it 
until a later day unless the chairman is given power to dissolve or 
adjourn by the articles and he refuse to consent to a dissolution or 
adjournment"123. 
 This relevant right is a conditioned right because of the same 
reason of the first relevant right. Since that member who have no 
voting right according to the articles need not be summoned and 
have no right to attend such meeting and consequently no way for 
him to express his views.  
 The right of a member to express his views was early 
adopted in the English law by the decision in (Wall v. London and 
Northern Assts Corporation "1898")124. 
 The third relevant right to the right of a member to attend 
company's meeting is the right of a member to move amendments 
to resolution proposed at meeting .When a resolution has been 
moved any member may speak on it or move amendments. There 
is no need to give notice of proposed amendment to the company, 
unless it is substantially alters the nature or effect of the 
resolution.125So if a positive amendment, pertinent to the subject 
matter of the resolution, is proposed it must be voted upon it first. If 
the chairman refused to put a proper amendment to the meeting 
the resolution if passed, is not binding. Also amendment cannot be 
moved if it goes beyond the notice convening the meeting. This 
simply, means if the resolution to be passed is (s.r.), it should be 
verbatim126in the notice convening the meeting and the only 
method of voting is yes, or no. Other types of resolutions are not 
required to be set out verbatim in the notice of the meeting so a 
member may move amendment. But even in (s.r.) and in certain 
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cases a member may move amendments without harm, professor 
Geoffrey Morse said about these exceptions: 
"Because notice of a special business must state the 
resolution to be passed in such a way as fairly to state the 
purpose for which the meeting is convened, there is little 
scope for amendment where a resolution is special business. 
Where a notice of meeting stated that to pass, with such 
amendments as should be determined, a resolution that three 
named persons be appointed directors, an amendment to 
elect two other directors as well is held valid. Again, there is 
little scope for amendment for special, extra ordinary and 
elective resolution since the notice of such resolution must set 
out in substance the exact wording of the resolution. However, 
where a notice of a meeting stated that it was to be passed 
(s.r.) to wind up voluntary and to appoint X as a liquidator, and 
the second resolution was dropped and a new one to appoint 
Y as a liquidator was passed, it was held that Y's appointment 
is valid because as soon as the resolution to wind up was 
passed a liquidator could be appointed, without notice, under 
the Act"127.  
The right of a shareholder to move amendments to resolutions 
proposed at meetings was early agreed by the decision in the 
English case: (Henderson v. Bank of Australia "1890")128, the 
decision in this case was "if the chairman improperly refuse to 
allow an amendment to any resolution to be discussed and voted 
upon, and the resolution is put to vote and carried, the resolution is 
void". 
 Again, it is to be mentioned that this relevant right (to the 
right of a member to attend company's meetings) is a conditioned 
right. It depends on whether the member has the right to attend the 
certain meeting or not. 
 The fourth relevant right is the right of the shareholder to 
appoint a proxy. The term proxy is used both to refer to the person 
appointed to act on behalf of the member and the instrument which 
gives him the required authority. Although there is no common law 
right to vote by proxy, s. 372 of the (ECA) 1985 gives such a right. 
By s.372 every member has the right to appoint a proxy to attend 
and vote for him. The proxy does not need to be a member. A 
proxy may be deposited with the company at any time up to 48 
hours before the meeting. The articles may specify a shorter but 
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longer period. When a company invites proxies by issuing proxy 
cards it must issue them to all members, not merely to those from 
whom the directors expect support. A proxy may be general i.e. 
given a discretionary power to vote, or special, i.e. required to vote 
at a particular resolution as instructed. The instrument appointing a 
proxy must be in writing under the hand of the appointer, or if the 
appointer is a corporation, either under seal or the hand of a duly 
authorized officer. The articles usually provide for the form and 
proof of proxies. It is the duty of a chairman to decide in the validity 
of proxies. But where proxy forms sent out to all shareholders in 
the company and the chairman was named as their proxy, it was 
held that he was bound to demand a poll in order to ascertain the 
sense of the meeting, and bound to exercise all the proxies in 
accordance with the instructions which they contained129. 
 The right of a shareholder to appoint a proxy is a conditioned 
one, it depends on whether the appointer has the right to attend 
such meeting that" members who have no voting rights need not 
be summoned to the meeting and have no right to attend it"130, and 
consequently , have no right to appoint a proxy to attend such 
meeting. 
 
(b) Voting right and the relevant rights:- 
 Voting right is the powerful weapon of the shareholders 
which enables them to take the control of the company. The 
Jenkins Committee said that: 
"The companies act gave shareholders powerful weapon 
provided they choose to use them, and even if practical 
considerations make them difficult for the small investors to 
wield the same cannot be said of the large institutional 
investors"131. 
 It is clear that voting right is a one of the most important rights of 
the shareholder. The voting right of the shareholder will normally 
be set out in the articles. The usual practice is to vote by show of 
hands, i.e. each member present has one vote regardless of the 
number of the shares held. However, if a poll is properly demand, 
then a members' vote will depend on the number of the voting 
shares he holds. The circumstances in which a poll may be 
demanded may appear in the articles. However, the (ECA) 1985 
provides a minimum standard for the articles132, s.373 reads:    
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"(1) A provision contained in a company's articles is void in 
so far as it would have the effect of their: 
(i) Of excluding the right to demand a poll at a general 
meeting on any question than the election of the chairman 
of the meeting or the adjournment of the meeting. 
(ii) Of making ineffective a demand for a poll on any such 
question which is made either: 
(a) By not less than 5 members having the right to vote at 
the meeting   or: 
    (b) By a member or members representing not less than 
one-tenth of the total voting rights of all the members having 
the right to vote at the meeting or: 
    (c)By a member or members holding shares in the company 
conferring a right to vote at the meeting, being shares on 
which an aggregate sum has been paid up equal to not less 
than one-tenth of the total sum paid up on all the shares 
conferring that right. 
      (2) The instrument appointing a proxy to vote at a meeting of a 
company shall be deemed also to confer authority to demand or 
join in demanding a poll , and for the purpose of sub section (a) a 
demand by a person as proxy for a member is the same a demand 
by a member." 
  Table A reg 63 of the (SCA) 1925 and Table A of the (ECA) 
1985 provides that no member shall vote at any general meeting 
or at any separate meeting of any class of shares in the company 
either in person or by a proxy unless all moneys presently payable 
by him in respect of that share have been paid133. Table A also 
provides that no objection shall be raised to the qualification of any 
voter except at the meeting or adjourned meeting at which the vote 
objected is tendered, and every vote not disallowed at the meeting 
should be valid. Any objection made in due time shall be referred 
to the chairman whose decision shall be final and conclusive134. In: 
(Max v. Estate & General Investments Ltd.)135Brightman J. said 
that  
"There is much to be said for an article like regulation 58. In 
that case a proxy form, which was liable to stamp duty 
because it authorized a proxy to vote at more than one 
meeting but which was un stamped, was not void but a valid 
authority capable of being stamped, and since a company had 
accepted it without objection at the meeting at the votes cast 
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by the proxy were valid. Further by virtue of regulation 58 the 
objection taken several days after the meeting was made was 
too late". 
       The right of a shareholder to vote is a conditioned equal right 
between the shareholders and not inherent equal right that a 
company may issue two types of shares, ordinary shares and 
preference shares. The articles or the terms of issue normally 
restrict the preference shareholders' rights to vote to specified 
circumstances which directly affect them, for example when the 
rights of preference shareholders are being varied, but unless the 
articles or terms of issue otherwise provide preference shares carry 
the same voting rights as the ordinary shares. Also the 
memorandum or articles may provide for a complicated structure of 
voting rights, for example in recent years some companies have 
issued non voting ordinary shares. The purpose of such issues is to 
enable the companies concerned to raise money and at the same 
time enable those with the majority of existing voting shares to retain 
control136. The idea of non voting shares has been attacked from 
time to time. An example for the opinions against the idea of non 
voting shares is to be found in a note of Dissent to the "Jenkins 
Committee report"137. The note of dissent was singed by Mr. L. 
Brown, Sir George Eriskine and Professor L.C.B. Gower:  
"Feeling as we do, that the development of non voting equity 
shares is undesirable both in principle and practice, we find 
our selves unable to concur in the failure to stronger 
recommendations for their control. 
2- In our opinion the growth of non voting and restricted voting 
shares (a) strikes at the basic principle in which our Company 
Law is based (b) is inconsistent with the principles underlying 
our Report and Reports of earlier Company Law Committees 
(c) is un desirable. 
3- The businesses corporation is a device for enabling an 
expert body of directors to manage other people's property for 
them. Since these managers are looking after other's people's 
money it is thought that they should not be totally from any 
control of supervision and the obvious persons to exercise 
some control are the persons whose property is being 
managed. Hence the basic principle adopted by British 
Company Law (and, indeed, the laws of most countries) is that 
ultimate control over the directors should be exercised by the 
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shareholders. This control cannot be exercised in detailed and 
from the day to day, but the shareholders retain the ultimate 
sanction in that it is they who "hire and fire" the directorate. 
   When the directors own the majority of the equity they 
are free from out side control, but here they are managing 
their own money, Hence the interests of the directors and the 
shareholders are unlikely to conflict, and self interest should 
be a sufficient curb and spur (subject to certain legal rules to 
protect the minority against oppression). When, however, the 
directors have no financial stake in the prosperity of the 
company, or only a minority interest, the out side control 
operates. (Paragraph 4 and 5 showed that the trust of must 
Company Law Reports was increase effective shareholder 
control) 
6- In recent years, however control by shareholders has been 
stultified in two ways ; firstly in a few cases by cross-holding 
and circular holding within a group of companies and secondly 
by non voting equity shares. The first method has already 
received the attention of the legislature and an attempt has 
been made to control it by section (23 of the Companies Act 
1985). In our discussion of this section … we recognize that it 
is improper for directors to maintain themselves indefinitely in 
office, again the wishes of the other shareholders. We also 
recognize that section (23 Companies Act 1985) does not go 
far enough in preventing this mischief and we reject an 
extension of the section with reluctance and only because of 
the complexity and arbitrary nature of the provisions which 
would be necessary … The second method of maintaining 
control by the existing directors, by utilizing non voting shares, 
is not as yet controlled in any way, it is only of recent years 
that it has become major issue. Today non voting shares are 
the simplest and most straightforward method whereby 
directors can render themselves irremovable without their 
consent, notwithstanding that they only own or control a 
fraction of the equity. 
7- It is said that the shareholder control is ineffective because 
of the indifference of shareholders. Everyone would probably 
agree that a shareholder is apathetic while all goes well. But 
while all goes well, there is no reason why they should not be 
apathetic; their intervention is only required when things go ill. 
No doubt it is true that the small individual shareholders has 
little power even then, but, as we point out…the institutional 
investor has considerable influence; and even non-institutional 
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shareholder are collectively powerful as long as they have 
votes. It can be hardly doubted that the possibility that a take-
over bidder will obtain control by acquiring those votes has 
caused directors to pay greater heed to the interests of 
shareholders. 
8- It is also said that the shareholder control is ineffective, 
since directors as a class, know better what is good for 
business and for shareholders than the shareholders 
themselves. In the normal case this is usually true. But if 
shareholders control is destroyed and nothing put in its place 
we have to go still further and say that business inefficiency is 
best ensured by allowing the directors to function free from 
any out side control, except that of the courts in the event of 
fraud or misfeasance, and by making themselves irremovable, 
without their own consent, however inefficient they may prove 
to be."138. 
 Despite these criticisms mentioned in the above report 
nothing has been made in the English law about the non voting 
shares. 
 The important question which may arise is what the limitation 
of the voting power is. Is it an absolute power? It is well known that 
there is a general rule that members must exercise their power of 
voting bona fide for the benefit of the company as a whole.139It was 
held that  
"The shareholders are not trustees for another, and unlike 
directors, they occupy no fiduciary duties. They vote in respect 
of their shares, which are property, and the right to vote is 
attached to the share itself as an incident of property to be 
enjoyed and exercised for the owner's personal 
advantages"140.  
Further, it was held that a member is not precluded from voting or 
using his voting power to carry a resolution merely because he is 
interested in the subject matter of the vote.141 
"However, a member does not have a complete and 
unfettered power to as he sees fit for he has a duty not to affect a 
fraud on the minority"142.Professor Ford categorize this principle as 
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falling within the doctrine of "fraud on a power". The doctrine of 
fraud on the minority has been stated by Professor Ford as follows: 
 "The essential notion is action beyond the scope of the 
power. The terms of the power imply an obligation not to use it 
for an ulterior purpose143". 
Peter Willcocks said: 
    "It appears to be generally accepted that it is neither possible 
nor wise to attempt to delineate the boundaries of the 
principles that a person, in exercising his voting rights, must 
do so in a manner which does not constitute a fraud on the 
voting power. However, there are certain areas where this 
doctrine has been considered and applied in detail, the 
alteration of articles of association and the disposal of 
corporate property"144.  
  Firstly, about the alteration of the articles of association it 
must be noticed that it is not possible, by the article of association 
to make an unalterable article and there is a very important 
condition which should be satisfied that the alteration of the articles 
must be bona fide for the benefit of the company as a whole not 
merely the benefit of the majority of the shareholders , this is the 
decision in the English case ( Peters' American Delicacy Co. Ltd.v. 
Heath )145in this case Latham CJ laid down the following rules : 
"1- A company cannot deprive itself of the statutory power to 
amend the articles, either by agreement or by a provision 
contained in the articles. 
2- It follows that that the contract between members of the 
company and between the company and its members which is 
constituted by the articles must be regarded as containing 
among its terms a provision that articles may be altered in a 
manner provided by the Act, that is, by (s.r.). 
3- It follows that where the right of a member of a company 
depends only upon the articles it is possible to alter the rights 
of members or of some only of the members by altering the 
articles. The fact that an alteration prejudices or diminishes 
some of the rights of the shareholders is not itself a ground for 
attacking the validity of an alteration. 
4- The power to alter articles must be exercised bona fide 
5- It is for the shareholder to determine whether an alteration 
of the articles is or is not for the benefit of the company, 
                                     
143 - Id at 540. 
144 - Peter Willcocks, supra note 23 at 111. 
145 - [1939] C.L. R. 457. 
71 
 
subject to the provision that the decision is not such that no 
reasonable man could have reached it. 
6- An alteration which is made bona fide and for the benefit of 
the company, if otherwise within the power, will be good, but is 
not the case that is necessary that shareholder should always 
have only the benefit of the company in view. In case where 
the question which arises is simply a question as to the 
relative rights of different classes of shareholders the problem 
cannot be resolved by regarding merely the benefit of the 
corporation. 
7- When the validity of a resolution is challenged, the onus of 
showing that the power has not been properly exercised is on 
the party complaining. The court will not presume fraud or 
oppression or other abuse of power. 
Latham CJ. then summarized the foregoing as follow: 
"The result of applying these principles is that the special 
resolution altering the articles cannot be declared to be invalid 
merely upon the ground that the original articles conferred 
special rights upon the holders of partly paid shares of which 
the alteration deprived them, or upon the ground that the 
voting holders of fully paid shares were interested in making 
the alteration adversely to the holders of partly paid shares. If, 
however, the resolution was passed fraudulently or 
oppressively or was so extravagant that no reasonable person 
could believe that it was for the benefit of the company it 
should be held invalid"146. 
  Secondly, about the disposal of corporate property, it has 
been held that the majority may not dispose of the company's 
assets to their benefit essentially to the exclusion of that of the 
majority, this was the decision in the old English case (Burland v. 
Earle " 1902")147.But the decision in the English case (Ngurli Ltd. v. 
Mc Can "1958") frankly appeared the prohibition of such practice, it 
is stated: 
"There are two lines of cases in which it has been held that the 
courts will interfere to prevent the abuse of powers by articles 
of association. One instance is where it is necessary to 
prevent an abuse by the majority of powers conferred upon a 
company in general meeting. The other instance is where it is 
necessary to prevent an abuse by the directors of the powers 
conferred on them in by the articles. The court is more ready 
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to interfere in the second than it is in the first instance. 
Shareholders even where they also directors are not trustees 
of their votes and as individuals in general meeting can 
usually exercise their votes for their own benefit. But there is a 
limit even in general meetings to the extent to which the 
majority may exercise their votes for their own benefit. That 
limit is expressed in the classic passage from the judgment of 
Lindley MR in Allen v. Goldreef of West Africa The power of a 
three fourth majority to alter articles of association must, Lord 
Lindley said "like all other powers exercised subject to those 
general principles of law and equity which are applicable to all 
powers conferred on majority and enable them to bind 
minorities. It must be exercised , not only in the manner 
required by law, but also bona fide for the benefit of the 
company as a whole, and must not be exceeded" The extent 
of such a majority to alter the articles in fully discussed in this 
court in Peters' American Delicacy Co. Ltd. v. Heath. Nor can 
the majority of shareholders exercise their voting powers in 
general meeting so as to commit a fraud on the minority. They 
must not exercise their votes so as to appropriate to 
themselves or some of themselves property, advantages or 
right which belongs to the company".148  
 
(c)The Shareholders' Right to Dividends:- 
"Dividends are a portion of the amount of the profits of the 
company and are distributed amongst the members in proportion 
to their shares"149. Dividends must be distinguished from interest. 
Interests are paid to debenture holder. It is a debt and must be 
paid out of capital if no profits are available. 
 By Table A reg. (97) of the (SCA) 1925 and s. 263 of the 
(ECA) 1985, dividends must only be paid out of the profits 
available for the purpose. Anything else would be unlawful 
reduction in capital. Profits available are the company's 
accumulated realized profits. The existence of available profits 
must be shown by the relevant accounts (normally the latest 
audited annual accounts). Profits in earlier year can be 
accumulated for future years. 
The realized profits are: trading profits plus realized capital 
profits from actual disposal of fixed assets. Unrealized capital 
appreciation, such as an assumed increase in the value of the 
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company's land, cannot be included; nor can be capitalized profits 
which have already been used to redeem or buy the company's 
own shares or to issue bonus shares. 
The procedure for declaring and paying dividends is governed, 
normally, by the articles. Where Table A of the (SCA) 1925 and the 
(ECA) 1985 apply the initial decision is made by the directors, who 
may (if profits are sufficient) recommend a dividend. This 
recommendation is then put to members, who can vote 
themselves a dividend by (o.r) in a general meeting. The amount 
voted upon may be up to, but not exceeding, the amount 
recommended by directors. 
The members may declare more than one dividend in a year. 
Table A of the (ECA) 1985 allows directors to recommend "interim" 
dividends in addition to the annual "final dividends". Payment will 
take place on the date or dates resolved by the members. 
Dividends must be paid in money unless the articles provide 
otherwise. Table A also allows members to resolve that they be 
given the option to take shares in the company instead of money. 
Table A in both the (SCA) 1925 and in the (ECA) 1985 can be 
altered in various ways, for example articles may provide that all 
decisions about dividends be left to the directors, without the need 
for members' resolution. 
Whilst there is no specific section in the (SCA) 1925, s. 277 of 
the (ECA) 1985 covers dividends paid unlawfully. Where a 
distribution, or part of one, is made unlawfully and, at the time of 
distribution the member knows or has reasonable grounds to 
believe that it is made wrongfully, he is liable to repay the whole or 
the unlawful part to the company. If the distribution was not made 
in cash, he must pay the cash value of the unlawful part. The 
directors who recommended an unlawful dividend may also be 
liable to the company. 
The right to dividend is a one of the fundamental rights of a 
shareholder and may be the main purpose for forming a company. 
This right is a conditioned equal right in that in the case of absence 
of a provision to the contrary no differentiation between the shares 
in respect of dividends and every share is entitled to the same part 
of dividends. But as we have previously mentioned that the articles 
may authorize the company to issue what called a "preference 
shares", then the distribution of dividends will be unequal 
distribution between the shareholders, and any preference 
shareholder must be normally paid the preferential amount in full 
before money becomes available to ordinary dividends (dividends 
of ordinary shares ). Preference shares are entitled to a fixed rate 
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of dividends and may be "participating" i.e. in addition to 
preferential dividend, holders are also entitled to ordinary dividend 
declared. Preference shares are presumed to be none 
participating unless the articles provide otherwise. Preference 
shares may be "cumulative" that is to say their part in the profit will 
automatically be carried forward (if not paid in the current year), so 
that in the future all arrears are to be paid before any one else gets 
a dividend. Unless otherwise provided in the articles, preference 
shares are presumed cumulative. 
(d) The right of the shareholder to return of capital on a winding up:  
"Liquidation or winding up is the process by which the 
company life brought to an end and its property administered for 
the benefit of its members and creditors."150 
The right of a shareholder to return of capital on winding up of 
the company is a conditioned equal right between the different 
types of shareholders that in case of winding up the company, the 
holders of shares will not be treated equally that it its normal for 
the articles of companies to give the preference shareholders a 
priority to return of capital over the ordinary shareholders. This 
right is deemed to be exhaustive that it is presumed that the rights 
of preference shareholders have been specified. They, therefore, 
have no right to share in the distribution of any assets that remain 
after all the capital has been returned. However, Professor Janet 
Dine summarized the differentiation between the two types of the 
shareholders in respect of return of capital after winding up the 
company as: 
"The preference shareholders have the right to return their 
capital as well as the ordinary shareholders. If after these two 
operations there is still a surplus for distribution, there is a 
question as to whether the preference shareholders may 
participate in the distribution of the surplus. These two 
dilemmas are showed by: 
(1) The presumption that all shareholders should be treated 
equally so that unless there is specific right spelled out in the 
documents giving the preference shareholders  a preference as 
to the repayment capital then they have no such preference. 
     (2)The rule that where a preference as far as the repayment 
of capital is expressed, the rights set out in the documents 
describe the totality of the rights as far as capital is concerned. 
The description of rights is said to be exhaustive; where a 
preference as to capital is given to preference shareholders, 
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they will therefore not participate in any surplus remaining after 
capital has been repaid unless an express right to do so is 
written into the issues of documents, the memorandum or 
articles."151 
 (2) The inherent equal rights 
This category of rights should be equally exercised between 
the different types of shareholders whether preference or ordinary. 
This category concerned with the following rights: 
 (a)The right of a shareholder not to have his obligations to the    
company increased without his consent: 
As  we have previously mentioned that the obligations of a 
shareholder in a company  limited by shares does not exceed his 
obligation to pay for the unpaid nominal value of his shares, and to 
repay the amount of unlawful distribution of dividends. The holder 
in such types of companies is under no obligation to any further 
payment to the company. So if the directors, and for any purpose, 
for example to enter in any contract, have no right to make a call 
on the fully paid shares to pay any further amount of money. 
Another example is that the liquidator cannot require the holders of 
fully paid shares to pay any further amounts to the creditors. 
This right is one of the main features of the limited liability 
which protects the private properties of the shareholders. So any 
amount other than the nominal value of shares is a private 
property and is insulated from the claims of the company creditors. 
This is the decision in the English case (Hole v. Garnsey 
"1930")152. 
 
(b) The right of a shareholder to prevent an irregular forfeiture of 
shares: 
Directors of a company may demand the shareholder to pay 
the unpaid nominal value of his shares through many calls. 
Another call should be made in the case of non payment, then the 
directors have the right to make a "lien" on the unpaid shares, also 
directors may forfeit the unpaid shares. Directors may forfeit 
shares only if expressly authorized to do so by the articles and 
only for non payment of shares on a call.  
Table A reg.25 of the (SCA) 1925 and Table A reg.17of the 
(ECA) 1985 provide that if a call remains unpaid after it has 
become due and payable the directors may give to the person 
from it is due not less than 14 days notice requiring payment of the 
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amount unpaid together with any interest which may have 
occurred. The notice shall name the place where payment is to be 
made and shall state that if the notice is not complied with  the 
shares in respect of which the calls was made will be liable to be 
forfeited. Any forfeiture must satisfy the conditions specified by 
Table A and if no, the forfeiture will be an irregular forfeiture and 
the shareholder has the right to prevent such forfeiture regardless 
of the type of the share he holds. So this right is an inherent equal 
between the types of holders. The forfeiture is an irregular 
forfeiture if: 
1- Directors are not authorized to do so (by articles). 
2- Shareholder has not been notified to pay for his unpaid 
shares in the named period of time (14 days). 
3- The notification does not specify place and date of payment 
4- The notification does not explicitly state that failing to pay 
will inevitably lead that the share be forfeited  
The right of a shareholder to prevent an irregular forfeiture of 
shares was early established in the English Law by the decision in 
(Johnson v. Lyttle Iron Agency "1877")153. 
 
(c) The right of a shareholder to prevent ultra vires act: 
The ultra vires rule was established by the English case 
(Ashbury Railway Carriage and Iron Co. "1875")154. In this case the 
memorandum gave the company the right to make and sell railway 
carriages. The company purported to buy a concession for 
constructing a railway in Belgium. Later the directors repudiated 
the contract and were sued. Their defense was that the contract 
was ultra vires, i.e. out side the memorandum. The court held that 
the contract made by the directors of such a company in a matter 
not included in the memorandum of association was not binding in 
the company even though it was expressly assent to by  all 
shareholders. This was because of the principle of agency law that 
an agent (in this case a director) cannot have power more than the 
principal (in this case the company) 
It is clear that prior to 1989 in England the basic rule was that 
an act out side the object clause was ultra vires and void and 
therefore could not be enforced by the company and outsiders. 
This was unpopular with the companies (for whom it could be 
inconvenient to have restricted power) and directors (who might 
find that their contracts could not be enforced). This was generally 
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the case if the outsider did not actually know of the restriction on 
the company's power. Companies therefore sought to void the 
ultra vires rule by drafting lengthily object clauses allowing them to 
do almost everything they could ever wish to do. They usually 
included general powers allowing them to carry any thing in 
incidental to any of their other objects and powers. The effect of 
the ultra vires rule was further restricted by s. 35 of the (ECA) 1985 
(now repealed) which stated that if an outsider dealt with the 
company in good faith, any transaction decided on by the directors 
would be deemed to be within the company capacity, regardless of 
any limitation in the memorandum or articles. 
The 1989 (ECA) has abolished the application of ultra vires in 
respect of outsiders, but retained the power of members to bring 
proceedings to restrain ultra vires acts. This ensured that 
commercial transaction cannot set a side once they have been 
entered into, but retains some member's rights. 
By s. 108 of the (ECA) 1989 any member may bring 
proceedings to restrain an intended act which would be beyond the 
capacity of the company. However, this right is restricted in that if a 
company is required to carry out an ultra vires act in pursuance of 
a legal obligation arising from a previous act of the company, the 
company can proceed and members cannot bring proceedings to 
restrain that act.  
However, it is appears that by s.108 of the (ECA) any member 
has the right to prevent the proposed ultra vires act. So this right is 
an inherent equal right between the different types of the holders 
of the shares whether preference or ordinary. 
Despite the developments in the English Companies Law 
(from which the (SCA) was derived) in concern of the ultra vires 
rule, there is no any developments in concern of this rule in the 
(SCA) since 1925. 
(d)The right of a member to transfer his shares: 
It is likely to start the exposition of this right by Gower's' 
statement;  
"Prima facie company's shares are freely transferable. It is this 
feature which constitutes one of the great advantages of an 
incorporated company. Unless the company's regulations 
provide otherwise, shareholder is entitled to transfer to whom 
he will."155  
                                     
155 - L.C.B Gower, supra note 1 at 445. 
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From this statement we can imply that this right is one of the 
most favorable rights which attract investors to form a company or 
buy company's shares. 
In the private companies and to retain the control of the 
company, the articles usually contain either a pre-emption clause 
i.e. that no shares shall be transferred to an outsider as long as a 
member can be found to purchase them at a fair price, determined 
in accordance with the articles or a power vested in the directors to 
refuse to register a transfer. The mentioned restrictions are usually 
in the private companies. The restrictions in the public company 
began to decline many decades ago. So, we can say nowadays 
the right of a shareholder (in a public company in England) is 
almost an inherent equal right, and no differentiation between the 
holders of the two types of shares, preference or ordinary. 
The right of a shareholder to transfer his shares was early 
agreed in the English Law by the decision in the old English case 
(Re. Smith Knight and Co. v. Bank of Australia "1898")156.  
On death of a member, his shares are transmitted to his 
personal representatives under a will or on intestacy. The personal 
representatives can registers as members, and vote on 
resolutions, but they must in due course dispose of the shares 
under the term of the will or intestacy rules. Alternatively personal 
representatives can dispose of shares directly to the deceased 
beneficiaries, without ever them selves becoming members. 
 
(e)The right to have set aside an allotment of shares made for an 
improper purpose: 
The subscribers to the memorandum will be the first 
shareholders. Each must take at least one share, and may take 
many more, subsequently, the directors will usually be responsible 
for allotting and issuing shares, and they may be given authority by 
the articles. In the (ECA) 1985 the authority given to directors has 
limits, these are: 
1. A share must not take total holdings beyond the current 
nominal capital, but share holders can also raise the 
nominal capital by ordinary or written resolution. 
2. A public company. By s.10 of the (ECA), must not allot a 
share unless at least one-quarter of the share's nominal 
value, and the whole of any premium on it, have been 
received. 
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3.  By s. 29 of the (ECA) 1985, for both public and private 
companies, if it is proposed to offer new shares for cash to 
specific buyers, the existing members must first be given 
pre-emption in proportion to their existing holdings, they 
must have at least 21 days notice, and this can give some 
protection to their existing rights in the company. This can, 
however be excluded by the articles or by (s.r.). 
Alternatively, the articles may give pre-emption rights if 
shares are offered other than for cash, for example in 
exchange for other assets. 
4. The authority of directors may be restricted by the 
company itself. The article or resolution might only 
authorized them to issue ordinary shares, not preference, 
for example the authorization must impose a maximum 
number or amount which they may issue, also, when the 
authority expires, normally after five years. These limits 
may be extended by another, duly registered resolution. 
Authorized by written resolution in a private need have no 
time limit. 
5. Above all, there is equitable general rule that directors 
must exercise their powers for the benefit of the company 
as a whole. They must not for instance act mainly to protect 
or increase their own interests. In (Piercy v. Mills & Co Ltd 
"1920")157 the directors issued voting shares to themselves 
and their supporters, not because the company needed the 
extra capital, but solely to prevent the election of rival 
directors. The issue was held void. Also in (Howard Smith 
v. Ampol Petroleum "1973")158, the directors of M Ltd. 
issued 4, 5 million new shares to Smith Ltd., so as to 
change the balance of powers in M Ltd. After the issue, the 
previous majority shareholders, Ampol, would no longer 
have a majority. The issue was set aside. By the decisions 
in the two cases, we can say that the shareholder has an 
inherent equal right to have set aside the allotment of 
shares made for an improper purpose , regardless of the 
type of his share whether preference or ordinary share.  
 
(f)The right of a shareholder to share certificate issued to him:  
Every company must complete share certificates and have 
them ready for delivery within two months (three months in the 
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(ECA) 1985) after the allotment of any of its shares or after the 
date in which the transfer of its shares is lodged for registration, 
unless the conditions of issue otherwise provides, under penalty of 
default a fine (s. 185 of the (ECA) 1985)159. 
The share certificate is a formal statement by the company 
under its common seal if it has one, or of its official seal or other 
wise signed by the company in accordance of the law. The 
purpose of the share certificate is to give the shareholder some 
document which can use as an evidence of his title. It also 
provides the company with a check on the identity of the registered 
shareholder, and the company will not normally accept any dealing 
unless the certificate is produced.160 
The share certificate may give rise to estopple against the 
company. The company cannot deny the truth of the certificate 
against a person who has relied on the certificate and in 
consequence has changed his position. In the English case (Re 
Bahia and San Francisco R-lwy Co. "1868") 161T. the registered 
holder of share, left the share certificate with her broker. T's 
signature was to transfer in favor of S. T. did not reply to the notice 
of the transfer sent to her by the company and a new certificate in 
the name of S. was issued by the company. A bought from S. and 
paid for the shares on delivery of the share certificate and a new 
share certificate was issued to A. The fraud was subsequently 
discovered and T's name was restored to the register. Held, the 
company was liable to indemnify A. The giving of the certificate to 
S. amounted to a statement by the company, intended to be acted 
upon by purchaser of shares in the market, that S. was entitled to 
the share, and A. was entitled to recover from the company and 
damages the value of the share at the time when the company first 
refused to recognize him as a shareholder, with interests. 
Professor Gower said: 
"A share certificate is in no sense a contractual document 
and, although under the companies seal, it is not a deed. The 
holder legal rights depend not on the certificate but upon entry 
in the register, and the certificate is merely a declaration by 
the company stating what these rights are an affording prima 
facie evidence of them. It is totally different from the 
documents of the title of un registered land, which consist of 
the deeds disposing of the property itself, but exactly 
comparable to the land certificate issued by the land register 
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in respect of registered land, indeed land registration is an 
attempt to adopt the procedures relating to shares to the more 
complicated case of land."162 
However, the issuing of the share certificate to the 
shareholder is an inherent equal right, and the ordinary 
shareholder as well as the preference shareholder has the right to 
a share certificate. 
 
(g)The right of a shareholder to inspect documents and registers kept by 
the company: 
 The shareholder has aright to inspect the following registers 
and documents which are usually kept at the registered office of 
the company: 
1- The register of members. 
2- The register of directors and secretaries. 
3- The directors' interests in shares and debentures. 
4- The register of debentures holders. 
5- The register of charges. 
6- Copies of the instruments creating the charges. 
7- The minute book of general meeting. 
8- Directors' services contracts. 
9- The minute book of directors meetings. 
10- The accounting records. 
The above register and documents which every company is 
required to keep by law, they are subject to the right of inspection, 
and this right is an inherent equal right between the two types of 
holders, preference or ordinary. 
(h) The right of a shareholder to have the register of members rectified 
(see chapter 1 part "5"). This right is also an inherent equal right 
between the different types of shareholders preference and 
ordinary. 
 
(i) The right of a shareholder to a copy of balance sheet and statutory 
report: 
For most shareholders, the main source of information is the 
company's statutory annual accounts and the statutory directors' 
and auditors' reports which must accompany them. 
Every company must choose an accounting reference date, if 
it does not, then the date will be the last day of the month one year 
after incorporation. This then determines the company's' 
"accounting reference period" and "financial year". For each 
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financial year the company must produce annual accounts and 
reports, and circulate these to shareholders and debentures 
holders. 
The accounts must comprise a "profits and losses account", 
giving a true and fair view of the state affairs of the company as at 
the end of the financial year. 
There must be detailed provisions for the accounts to be 
approved by the board of directors. There must be a balance sheet 
signed by a director on behalf of the board, and his name must 
appear on copies sent to members. 
The right to receive copies of statutory report and balance 
sheet is an inherent equal right between shareholders preference 
and ordinary. 
 
Conclusion: 
The scope of the juridical nature of the share is vague since 
that the share does not confer its holder a right to a physical 
possession of any thing. The share confers the holder number of 
rights. However, Farwell J. in the famous English case (Borland's 
Trustee v Steel)163defined the share as "The interest of a 
shareholder in the company measured by a sum of money, for the 
purpose of the liability in the first place, and of interest in the 
second, but also consisting of a series of mutual covenants 
entered into by all the shareholders." 
The share may be preference or ordinary. Preference share 
confer his holder priority over the ordinary shareholder in concern 
of some rights, normally in the right to the company's dividends 
and the right to return of capital after winding up the company. In 
some other rights preferentiality is not applicable that these rights, 
by their nature, are not preferable i.e. preference and ordinary 
shareholders must be treated equally in concern of these shares.  
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Chapter (3) 
 
The Balance of Powers and Shareholders' Relief 
 
Introduction: 
 From a theoretical view point, shareholders who are the 
owners of the company and decision makers, the decision in a 
company is presumed to be passed through certain mechanisms 
agreed by shareholders formerly. Therefore, outsiders and not 
shareholders are the persons who are expected to go into 
disputes with the company to enforce their rights against the 
company. This theoretical view point may be faced by that in the 
English Law and consequently in all countries which follow the 
common law (like the Sudan); the legislature put shareholders in 
a serious disadvantageous position. Save in so far the 
constituent documents of the company (being the memorandum 
and articles of association) do not provide otherwise, the 
management and control of the company is vested in its board of 
directors and as such the members and shareholders of the 
company have no direct say in its management and control 
unless they also happen to be in the board of directors. 
 In fact and from a practical view point, in the Common Law 
and in the (ECA), and consequently in countries which follow the 
common law, many mechanisms have been created to relief 
shareholders' grievances. This means that in these countries 
(included the Sudan), despite this theoretical point of 
shareholders' control, the law in these countries recognizes many 
cases in which shareholders rights may be violated, therefore, 
this chapter will be concerned  with the control of the company 
management, members' statutory relief and members' Common 
Law relief.  
 
(i)The Control of Management:- 
   
(1) Directors control of management: 
 It was stated by Greer LJ in (John Shaw & Sons "Sal ford" 
Ltd. v. Shaw): 
"If the powers of management are vested in the directors, they 
and they alone can exercise these powers. The only way in 
which the general bodies of the company shareholders control 
the exercise of the powers vested by the articles in the 
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directors is by altering their articles, or, if the opportunity arises 
under the articles, by refusing to re elect the directors of those 
actions they disapprove. They cannot themselves usurp the 
powers which by the articles are vested in the directors any 
more than the directors can usurp the powers vested by the 
articles in the general body of shareholders"164. 
 By the decision in above case and the decisions in the 20th 
century, for example the decision in (Quinn & Ax tens Ltd. v. 
Salmon)165, (Automatic Cleaning Syndicates Co.)166, appears that 
if the articles of association are silent on determining who 
controls the company, the control of the company is exclusively 
vested in the board. But "it would appear that if the articles of 
association are silent in the point then on the basis of the 
principles used in 19th century cases ultimate control of the 
company may well be vested in the company in general meeting 
i.e. in the shareholders themselves. However, it is almost un 
heard for articles of association in modern times not to allocate 
the power of control of a company between the directors and 
shareholders by way of provisions in the articles of association, 
and the current usual provision in the Companies Act"167. These 
provisions in Table A of the (SCA) 1925 and (ECA) 1985.From 
the mentioned Tables we can say that there are some things in a 
company which can only be done by a resolution of shareholders, 
such as a change of the name of the company, objects, nominal 
capital or articles. Moreover, members can give directions to the 
board by a special resolution. Subject to this however, the 
directors have wide powers which depend on the articles. Table 
A reg.70 provides that" The business of the company shall be 
managed by the directors, who may exercise all the powers of 
the company". 
 Directors powers must generally be exercised as a board in 
its meeting (directors meeting). These can be called by a 
company secretary at request of any director. The board can 
agree without meeting if each member signed a written 
resolution. The articles usually fixed a quorum for meetings, and 
power to elect chairman. Decisions are taken by a majority; often 
with a chairman have a casting vote. Generally each member of 
the board of directors has one vote regardless of his 
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shareholdings. Minutes must be kept available to directors but 
not shareholders 
 Individual director as such has no authority to act on behalf 
of the company, unless the board has expressly or impliedly 
delegated to him powers. Directors also may have service 
(employment contracts) with the company. And these can often 
affect their relation with the company. 
 In Sudan there are many statutory controls over the 
directors' powers. Most of these controls contained in ss. (28), 
(63"1"), (70"2"), (70"5"), (70"7"), (71"1"), (71"4") and (85"2"). All 
these controls in the Sudanese Act 1925 connect with some 
formalities which must be followed by the directors, for example 
s. (71"1") of the (SCA) 1925 provides that the board of directors 
must make a call for an extra ordinary meeting on request of one 
tenth of the shareholders. 
 In England there are many statutory controls over the power 
of directors. Most of the statutory provisions arise where there is 
a potential conflict between the personal interest of the director 
and the interests of the company, for example by s.317 of the 
1985 Companies Act, it is a duty of a director who is in any way, 
whether directly or indirectly, interested in a contract or proposed 
contract with the company to declare the nature of his interest at 
a meeting of directors. This also applied to contracts with persons 
connected with the director, such as spouse, infant children, and 
associated companies in which the director or his family have a 
one-fifth share interest. 
 By s.319, director services contract for 5 years which cannot 
be ended earlier by the company, must be approved by an 
ordinary resolution of members. If Table A applies a director 
cannot vote on his own contract, a copy must be kept at the 
recognized office. A contract which is not approved may be 
ended by the company on reasonable notice. 
 By s.320 of the (ECA) 1985, a company must have the 
approval of shareholders, by ordinary resolution, before any 
contract for valuable property with any of its directors.    The 
"requisite value" is currently ₤ 100,000 or over 10% of the 
company's assets, with ₤ 2000 minimum. If the approval is not 
obtained, the contract is avoidable by the company. The directors 
must account for any profits, and other directors who authorized 
the transaction must indemnify the company against losses. 
 Sections 330-347 of The (ECA) 1985 impose detailed 
constraints on loans and credit to directors. A loan over ₤ 5000 to 
the director is generally unlawful, but there are exceptions, 
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particularly to help a director to meet expenditure which he 
incurred for the purpose of the company, or to enable him to 
perform his duties properly. 
 
(2) Members' control of management. 
 As we have previously mentioned at the beginning of this 
chapter, members control in the modern companies is to exercise 
limited authorities, such as the change of the company's name, 
objects, nominal capital or articles, but members of a company 
can exercise wide authorities by stating in the articles for these 
authorities. Another way for members is by amending the articles 
of association. This latter method has always been available to 
the members for removing exclusive  control of the company from 
the directors (the amendment of article need 75% majority), but 
the alteration will not invalidate any prior act of the directors 
which would have been valid if that amendment had not been 
made168. 
 The problem of members' control of the company is usually 
arising in one of three situations: 
(a) Where a board of directors has been appointed by a majority 
of members acting in such a manner, which although not 
objectionable to the minority. In this instance the minority 
simply do not have the voting power at general meetings to 
remove the board and appoint new directors. 
(b) Due to circumstances or, more usually, provisions in the 
article of association, the board of directors represents a 
minority of shareholders, at least in terms of numbers rather 
than voting power, and because of the inability of the majority 
either to amend the articles of association (due to 
requirements of a 75% majority) or because of the inability of 
the majority to mobilize sufficient number to pass the 
resolution the course of action taken by the board of directors 
is objectionable to the majority rather than to the minority 
(c) Where the shareholding is equally divided between two 
opposing numbers (or groups of members) so that neither has 
a majority vote enabling him to remove or appoint directors.169  
(ii) Members statutory relief:- 
 
(1) Unfair prejudice conduct : 
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         In the (ECA) by s.459, a member may petition the court for 
an order on the ground that the affairs of the company are being 
or have been conducted on a manner which is unfairly prejudicial 
for the interest of its members generally or some part of the 
members (including at least himself) or any that proposed act or 
omission of the company is or would be so prejudicial. 
 The defendants conduct must be both unfair and 
prejudicial170. In the English case (Re London School of 
Electronics Ltd.)171, the petitioner held 25% of the shares of the 
London School of Electronics (the company). The remaining 75% 
where held by City Tutorial College, which was controlled by two 
others persons. A dispute arose between the petitioner and City 
Tutorial College because C.T.C appropriated for itself students 
who approached the company. The petitioner the set up a rival 
college known as the London College for Electronic Engineering 
and took with him a number of students who had enrolled with 
the company. The petitioner claimed that City Tutorial College 
conduct was unfairly prejudicial. His action was successful. The 
judge rejected the defense that the petitioner did not come to the 
court with clean hands because he had taken some of the 
company's students. The petitioner conduct would only be 
relevant if it renders of other sides' conduct, even if prejudicial, 
not unfair or if it affected the relief that the court thought fit to 
grant. The judge ordered that the majority should purchase the 
shares of the minority and that the price would be calculated pro 
rata, i.e. the value of 25% shareholding will not be discounted 
because it was a minority interest. The date of the petition was 
used to ascertain the price. 
 By the decision in the above case and by the requirements of 
s.459, a number of questions may be arising such as what is the 
meaning of "conduct of company's affairs? Must there be 
infringement of a legal right to show unfair prejudice, what 
interests in the company must the petitioner has and in what 
capacity must the defendant be complaining172 
 About the "conduct of companies' affairs", Professor Janet 
Dine said: 
 "The decision in the two following cases early appeared the 
meaning of (conduct of company affairs). In Re A Company 
(No. 00761 of 1986)173the court held, the act of a shareholder 
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in a personal capacity out side the conduct of the company's 
affairs were irrelevant. Thus the court was not interested in "an 
attempt to blacken the respondent's name and to make the 
court look on her with disfavor as an immoral and attractive 
woman". (In Red Label Fashion. Ltd.)174 The respondent was 
alleged to be subject to disqualifications proceedings as a "de 
facto" director. Although she had been in business with her 
director husband, the court held that there was no evidence 
that she assumed the role of director and exercised 
management responsibilities. She had acted as "a dutiful wife" 
rather than as a director." 
 About the infringement of legal rights, it appears that the 
concept of unfair prejudice is wider than the infringement of a 
legal right such as the right to dividends, the right to vote or the 
right to return of capital on winding up. For example, it was held 
that the member's interest in a private company may include a 
legitimate expectations that he will continue to be employed as a 
director and his dismissal from that office and exclusion from the 
management of the company may therefore be unfairly 
prejudicial to his interests as a member175. The important case of 
(Re Saul D Harrison & Sons PLC) 176contains an extensive 
analysis of the operation of s.459 to protect "legitimate 
expectations". Hoffman LJ said: 
"In deciding what is fair for the persons of s.459, it is important 
to have in mind that fairness is being used in the context of a 
commercial relationship. The articles of association are just 
what their name implies; the contractual terms which govern 
the relation ship of the shareholders with the company and 
each other…Since keeping promises and honoring 
agreements is probably the most important element of 
commercial fairness, the starting point on any case under 
s.459 will be to ask whether the conduct of which the 
shareholder complains was in accordance with the articles of 
association…Although one begins with the articles and the 
powers of the board, a finding that conduct was not  in 
accordance with the articles does not necessarily mean that it 
was unfair, still less that the court will exercise its direction at 
grant relief. There is often sound sense in the rule in Foss v. 
Harbottle177. In choosing the term "unfairly prejudicial" the 
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Jenkins committee (Para. 204) equated it with Lord Cooper's 
understanding of "oppression" in Elder v. Elder and 
Watson178"a visible departure from the standards of fair 
dealing and a violation  of the conditions of fair play on which 
every shareholder who entrusts his money to a company is 
entitled to rely". So trivial or technical infringements of the 
articles were not intended to give rise to petition under 
s.459"179 
 Hoffman J goes on to point out that technically lawful actions 
may be unfair, he said: "the personal relationship between 
shareholders and those control the company may entitle him to 
say that it would in certain circumstances be unfair for them to 
exercises a power conferred by the articles upon the board or the 
company in general meeting. I have in the past ventured to 
borrow from public law the term "legitimate expectations" to 
describe the correlative "right" in shareholder to which such a 
relationship may give rise. It often arises out of a fundamental 
understanding between the shareholders which formed the basis 
of their association but it was not put into contractual form, such 
as an assumption that each of the parties who has ventured his 
capital will also participate in the management of the company 
and receive the return of his investment in the form of salary 
rather than dividend. 
 About what interest in the company must the petitioner 
have? The court in (R & H Electric and Another v. Haden Bill 
Electric Ltd.)180Held that a board view should be taken of the 
capacity in which a petitioner complained for the purpose of s.459 
(2). In this case a company controlled by P. was a major creditor 
of Haden Bill Electrical (H.B). P was a creditor and chairman of 
(H.B) until relationships broke down and he was removed at short 
notice. The court held that P. could rely on his interests in having 
being instrumental in raising the loan through his company and 
the understandings that flowed from that and was not just 
confined to his interest as a shareholder. 
 Also s.459 (2) of the (ECA) 1985 allows those to whom 
shares has been transferred or transmitted by operation of law, 
for example by inheritance, to complain. 
 About the capacity in which the complaint be made. By s.459 
a person has the right to complain in his capacity as a member. 
As we have previously mentioned in the first chapter; the concept 
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of the word member, in company law is wider than the word 
"shareholder" that the word member includes other categories of 
persons in addition to the shareholders181.  
 Professor Geoffrey Mores ascertain the powers of the court 
to relief the member of the company182in case of unfair prejudice 
conduct of the company by that the court  may make any order it 
thinks fit, although the petitioner is required to state in his petition 
what form of relief he seeks the court may make: 
(a) An order regulating the affairs of the company in the future, 
for example in the English case (Re Harmer "1959") 183a 
successful company was controlled by Mr. H. He and his wife 
(who always voted with him) could control both ordinary and 
special resolutions at general meetings. The directors were 
Mr. and Mrs. and their two sons. Mr. H. was the chairman and 
had a casting vote. The two sons brought the action on the 
ground that their father repeatedly abused his controlling 
power, particularly with respect to the appointment and 
dismissal of staff, and the opening of a branch in Australia 
(this was opposed by the sons and proved to be an 
unsuccessful venture). Mr. H. was generally intolerant of views 
contrary to his own, whether held by his sons or other 
shareholders. At the time of hearing Mr. H. was 89 years old. 
 The court granted an order under s.210 (1948 Act) now s.459 
since there had been a course of oppressive conducts (now 
known as unfair prejudicial conduct). The order removed Mr. 
H. from the board and made him "president" of the company 
for the life at a salary of ₤2500 per year. This post gave him 
no right, and imposed no duties on him. It was directed he 
should not interfere with the affairs of the company except in 
accordance with the decisions of the board. 
(b)The court may make an order requiring the company to do or 
to refrain from doing any act. Thus the court may require the 
company not to make any alteration either to its memorandum 
or articles, or to make specific alteration. 
(c) The court may make an order authorizing civil proceedings to 
be brought in the name and on behalf of the company by such 
persons and such terms as the court may direct (this is 
important because if the court authorizing proceedings a 
minority shareholder can sue a director on behalf of the 
                                     
181 - See chapter 1 (part vi) of this thesis. 
182 - Geoffrey Morse, Cahrlesworth & Morse Company Law at 329. (16th ed. 1999). 
183 - [1959] 1 W.L.R. 62, CA. 
91 
 
company even if he cannot bring his claim within one of the 
exceptions to the rule in Foss v. Harbottle. 
(d) The court may make an order providing for the purchase of 
any member's shares by other members or a purchase of 
such shares by the company itself. In the latter case it will 
arrange for the reduction of capital accordingly. 
(e) The court may make an order providing the purchase of the 
majority shareholder's shares. In (Re Nuneaton Borough 
Association Football Club "1991") 184the petitioner, S, had 
acquired 24000 ₤1 shares in the club when the authorized 
capital was apparently only ₤2000 divided into 2000 shares. 
The respondent accepted that the company had never validly 
increased its share capital. Thus the petitioner had paid a 
substantial sum of money for shares that did not legally exist. 
The court therefore, held that the affairs of the company had 
been conducted in a manner unfairly prejudicial to S. The case 
is interesting because the order made was that K. (the 
chairman of the board and majority shareholder) should 
transfer to S. the 1,007 shares which he held out of the 2000 
validly created and issued shares. The consideration for the 
transfer would be payment of the true market for blocks of 
controlling shares, determined by reference to the price such 
shares would fetch in the open market between a willing seller 
and a willing buyer. The case was complicated by the fact that 
K. and a company controlled by him had made substantial 
interest free loans to the club. The court decided that it would 
not be fair to order K. to relinquish his controlling interest 
without also ordering the payment of the loans. The decision is 
of importance because it represents a rare example of a 
majority shareholder being ordered to sell his shareholding to 
the petitioner. 
 Finally, and from a practical point of view, in the English Law 
a petition under s.459 have been successful in the following 
situations: Firstly, where directors of a private company made 
incorrect statements to their shareholders regarding acceptance 
of an offer for their shares made by another company owned by 
the directors. Secondly, where the majority made a rights issue 
with a view to altering the voting balance, because they knew that 
the minority shareholder could not afford to exercise his right to 
purchase. Thirdly, where the majority made a right issue with a 
view to depleting the fund if a shareholder engaged in litigation 
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with the company or with the majority shareholders185, although it 
is difficult to draw the cases together to draw a clear picture of 
unfair prejudice, several points have become clear: 
(*) Illegality is not necessary to show unfair prejudice. 
(*) The test of what constitutes unfairly prejudicial conduct is 
objective, bad faith or lack of fair dealing by those in control being 
irrelevant. 
(*) The remedy can be use to enforce a director's fiduciary duties. 
(*) The word "interests" is wider than rights and a member may 
present a petition even if his rights as a member have not been 
affected186.  
 
(2) Winding Up on The Just and Equitable Ground:  
 The second and the more commonly utilized members' 
statutory relief is the power of a member to apply to the court for 
winding up the company. The court may order the winding up of 
the company if it is of the opinion that it is just and equitable that 
the company wound up (s.122 (1)"g" of the Insolvency Act 1986). 
 S.122(1)"g" of the Insolvency Act 1986 is qualified by s.125 
of the same Act, where the company should not be wound up if 
some other remedy is available to the petitioners, and the court is 
of the opinion that they are acting unreasonably in seeking to 
have the company wound up instead of pursuing that other 
remedy187. 
 The leading on just and equitable ground is (Re Westbourne 
Galleries Ltd.)188This affords an excellent illustration of its scope 
as well as establishing a number of important principles. In this 
case, the petition was brought by Mr. Elibrahimi, who for many 
years had been an equal partner with Mr. Nazar in a business 
dealing in Persian Carpet. In 1958 it was decided to incorporate 
the business and Elibrahimi (E) and Nazar (N), who were both 
appointed directors, each held 500 shares. Soon after this N's 
son was made a director and E and N transferred 100 shares to 
the son. After this the Nazars held a majority of votes. In 1985, 
the relationship between Nazars and E began to break down. In 
1969, the Nazars used their majority to remove E from his 
directorship. Then after he was not able to take any part in the 
management of business and he received no money since all 
payments were made to the participants in the business by the 
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way of directors' salaries rather than dividends. The court held 
that the removal of E had been unlawful. Nevertheless, because 
the company was in essence an incorporated partnership, the 
Nazars had abused their power and were in breach of the good 
faith partners owed t o one to another. E was therefore entitled to 
a winding up. The decision in Elibrahimi case established that the 
remedy may be available even where there has been no fraud or 
wrong doing.189The types on which the "just and equitable ground 
is applied are: 
(a) When the substratum of the company has gone i.e. the main 
purpose for which the company was formed has been fulfilled 
or has become incapable of achievement. In (Re Bleriot 
Aircraft Co. 1916.)190A company was formed to acquire the 
English part of an aircraft business owned by the well known 
French airman M. Bleriot. M. Bleriot however refuses to agree 
to the acquisition. It was held that the company be wound up 
because its main object had failed. 
(b) Where there is dead lock in the management of business 
because the directors cannot agree on vital matters or 
become personally antagonistic. In (Re Yenidji Tobacco 
Company Co. - 1916) 191the company had two shareholders 
who were both directors. Although the company was 
successful the directors failed to agree many important 
matters, for example the appointment of the senior 
employees. They would not speak to each other and all 
communication was via the company secretary. It was held 
that the winding up was justified. 
(c) Where there is justifiable lack of confidence in the 
management. In (Loch v. John Blackwood – 1924) 192the 
directors failed to call meetings, submit accounts or 
recommended a dividend. The reason was to keep the 
petitioners ignorant as to the value of the company, so that the 
directors could acquire their shares at an under evaluation. 
Winding up was ordered. 
 
 
(iii) Member's Common Law Relief:- 
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 In addition to the various statutory remedies detailed above 
there are common law obligations which exist within a corporate 
structure, the enforcement of which can comprise a further two 
member's remedies. These obligations can essentially be divided 
into two separate areas: 
(1) Obligations owed by the directors to the company. 
(2) Obligations owed by the company to the members. 
  These Common Law obligations owed by a company to its 
members (and enforcement thereof) are the subject of what 
called (the personal action). The Common Law obligations owed 
by the directors to the company are subject to what called (the 
derivative action). 
 
(1) The Derivative Action: 
  It was settled in the Common law that directors owe their 
obligations or duties (being the duty of care, diligence and skill 
and fiduciary duty) and in the event of breach of these duties the 
company is the proper plaintiff. 
    In the famous English case (Foss v. Harbottle)193two 
members brought an action against the directors of a company to 
compel them to make good a loss suffered by the company as a 
result of the defendants selling their own land to the company at 
more than it was worth. It was held that the action failed. The 
wrong was done to the company and there was nothing to stop 
the company taking action if it chooses to do so. A more recent 
example for the rule in (Foss v. Harbottle) is in (Pavlides v. 
Jensen) 194where the directors sold an asset of the company to a 
third party at a gross under evaluation. A minority shareholder 
commenced an action. It was held that he could not do so; it was 
up to the company to decide whether to sue the directors for 
negligence. Alternatively the company could decide to exonerate 
them. 
  Despite the criticisms to the decision in (Foss v. Harbottle), 
there are nevertheless reasons for the rule. The first reason is 
that it is logical a consequence of the fact that the company is a 
separate legal person. It is that the company who suffered a loss, 
therefore it is the proper plaintiff. The second reason it preserve 
the principle of majority rule. The third reason it prevents multiple 
actions, so if each shareholder were permitted to sue, the 
company might be subjected to many law suits started by 
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numerous plaintiffs. The fourth it prevent futile actions. If the 
irregularity is one which be ratified by the company in general 
meeting, it would be futile to have litigation about it without the 
consent of the general meeting. 
  On other hand the rule in Foss v. Harbottle may be criticized 
in that "it would seem that the rule in Foss v. Harbottle would 
remove from the directors the restrains and the controls of their 
Common Law duties for clearly it is unlikely that the director 
would cause the company to seek relief against 
themselves".195However, and not surprisingly, there have arisen 
certain exceptions to the rule in Foss v. Harbottle to a degree that 
the rule is possibly better known for its exceptions rather the rule 
itself196. 
  The rule is subject to a number of exceptions, in which case 
a minority of shareholders, or even an individual shareholder, 
may bring a minority shareholder's actions. Usually the minority 
shareholders sue on behalf of themselves and all other 
shareholders except those who are defendants, and may join the 
company as a defendant. The directors or majority shareholders 
are usually defendants. This action is brought instead of an 
action in the name of the company. A member may bring a 
derivative action in respect of wrongs done before that person 
become a member, but it may not be continued by him after he 
has ceased to be member. 
  Not withstanding that the derivative action constitutes a 
representative action there is nothing to prevent the action being 
brought where there is only shareholder although it is difficult t o 
see how the case would never fall within the exceptions to the 
rule in Foss v. Harbottle. Neither is it any objection that the 
plaintiff's interest in the company is only nominal.197 
  The nature of the derivative action is that it is a "procedural 
device for enabling the court to do justice to a company 
controlled by miscreant directors of shareholders. It follow that 
the court is entitled to examine the conduct of whoever intends to 
start such proceedings, the person must be doing so far the 
benefit of the company and not for some other purpose, also the 
plaintiff must come to the court with clean hands198. In the 
English case (Nurcombe v. Nurcumbe 1985)199a husband and 
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wife were only directors and shareholders of a small company. In 
breach of fiduciary duty H diverted company contracts to another 
company in which he had interest. Latter in divorce proceedings 
W was awarded a lump sum which took account of H's improper 
profit. W then commenced a derivative action on behalf of the 
company to recover the lost profit for the company. The court of 
appeal rejected her claim since she had, in effect, already 
recovered the profit as part of the divorce settlement. 
  It is interesting that the judge in the divorce proceedings 
ignored the corporate veil when he ordered H to make a personal 
payment based in the improper profit of a company in which he 
had an interest. The Court of Appeal also lifted the veil when they 
refused to allow H and W's original company to recover because 
W personally had already been compensated. 
A defendant to a derivative action can rise many defenses which 
he would have raised had the action been brought by the 
shareholder personally.  
The exceptions to Foss v. Harbottle for which the derivative 
action can be brought are: 
 
(a) Where the act is one which illegal or ultra vires the company's 
powers. 
  Under the (ECA) 1985, even one shareholder can restrain an 
ultra vires act; so long this does not break a contract with the 
company already made. There seems to be some doubt as to 
whether this exception is applied where the ultra vires act has 
been completed. It seems settled that this exception applies 
where the ultra vires act is proposed or still continuing. If the ultra 
vires act has been completed then and by the decision in the 
English case (Hawkesbury Development Co. Ltd. v. Landmark 
Finance Pty Ltd. 1969)200, this exception to the rule in Foss v. 
Harbottle is applicable201 . However, the proposal to act can 
proceed if it is ratified by special resolution of members (s.35"3"). 
Even if the act is illegal e.g. under the Companies Act, however 
the majority may validly resolve to take no action to remedy the 
wrong done and if that resolution is made in good faith and in 
what the majority consider to be for the benefit of the company, it 
will bind the minority202. 
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  In (Smith v. Croft -1987)203the action involved alleged 
payments by the directors by breach of s. 151 of the (ECA) 1985 
i.e. the financial assistant rules, which if proved would have been 
illegal. The judge held that an individual shareholder did not have 
an absolute right to bring a derivative action on that basis to 
recover money so spent, as distinct from preventing it 
beforehand. Such right of recovery would only be available if the 
company has such right. In that case the majority of independent 
shareholder did not wish the action for recovery to be brought 
and the judge regarded that as a sufficient reason to disallow the 
action. In this case Knox J said: 
 "Ultimately the question which has to be answered is; 
is the plaintiff being prevented improperly from bringing the 
proceedings on behalf of the company? if it is an expression of 
the corporate will of the company by an appropriate 
independent organ that is preventing the plaintiff from 
prosecuting  the action he is not improperly but properly 
prevented and so the answer to the question is No. The 
appropriate independent organ will vary according to the 
constitution of the company concerned and the identity of the 
defendants, who will in most cases be disqualified from 
participating by voting in expressing the corporate, will" 
 
(b) Where the matter of which complaint is made in one which can only 
be validly done or sanctioned by a majority in excess of a simple 
majority: 
  Whilst reference to majorities able to pass special resolution 
text, it would appear that the requirement is that the required 
majority to be more than a simple majority in order to bring this 
exception into play204. In (Edwards v. Halliwell)205 Jenkins LJ 
stated as obiter dicta that something requiring a two third vote fell 
within this exception and accordingly as the matter complained of 
had been only passed by an ordinary majority and not two thirds, 
an individual member was entitled to sue206. The rational behind 
this exception is if it did not exist then any requirement in the 
article of association requiring a special majority could be 
ignored. However, both the exception and explanation are 
confusing, perhaps because nowhere it is stated that it must also 
follow that if the matter of which complaint is made is sanctioned 
                                     
203 -[1987] B.C.L.C. 335 
204 - Peter Willcocks, supra note 18 at 83 
205 - [1950] All ER 1064. 
206- Peter Willcocks, supra note 18 at 83.  
98 
 
by the requisite special majority prior to the complaint being 
heard the individual member's action will fail not because the 
individual has no standing but because he has no wrong of which 
to complain. This certainly would have been the case in (Edward 
v. Haliwell)207. The exception may be better expressed as (where 
the matter of which complaint is made can be done by resolution 
of a particular majority and this majority has not been obtained). 
This exception has been extended so to apply to board meetings 
requiring special majority in that failure to obtain the majority 
cannot be overridden or ratified by the company by ordinary 
resolution.208 
 
(c)Where there is fraud on the minority by those who control the 
company. 
  Professor Pennington said; 
  "The fraud or oppression need not amount to a tort at 
Common Law, but it must involve an unconscionable use of 
majority's power resulting, or likely to result, either in financial 
loss or in unfair or discriminatory treatment of the minority, or it 
must certainly be more serious than the failure of the majority 
to act in the interest of the company as a whole, which will 
induce the court to annul a resolution altering the company's 
memorandum or articles"209. 
   Whilst it is clear that the expropriation of the property of the 
company or that of the minority and certain breaches of director's 
fiduciary duties to the company would constitute a fraud it is 
certainly not clear whether voting for a members' resolution that 
is not bona fide in the interest of the company as a whole will do 
so.210 
In order to establish this exception it must be shown that the 
wrongdoers control the company. In (Prudential Assurance Co. 
Ltd. v. Newman Industries) 211Vinelott J. held that de facto control 
was sufficient. Also in (Smith v. Croft) 212Knox J. said: 
  "In my judgment the word "control" was deliberately 
placed in inverted commas by the court of appeal in 
(Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Newman Industries) 
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because it was recognized that voting control by the 
defendants was not necessarily the sole subject of 
investigation. Ultimately, the question that has to be answered 
in order to determine whether the rule in Foss v. Harbottle 
applies to prevent a majority shareholder seeking relief as 
plaintiff for the benefit of the company is ' is the plaintiff being 
improperly prevented from bringing these proceedings on 
behalf of the company? 'It is an expression of the corporate 
will of the company by an appropriate independent organ that 
is preventing the plaintiff from prosecuting the action, he is not 
improperly but properly prevented and so the answer to the 
question is "No". The appropriate independent organ will vary 
according to the constitution of the company concerned and 
the identity of the defendants, who will in most cases, be from 
participating by voting in expressing the corporate will" 
  Knox J. concluded that it was proper to have regards to the 
views of independent shareholders so that it may become not a 
question of the majority versus minority but the question of other 
independent shareholders versus the plaintiff and it was stated 
that the majority of votes should disregarded if, but only if, the 
court is satisfied either that the vote or its equivalent is actually 
cast with a view to support the defendants rather than securing 
benefit of the company, or that the situation of person whose vote 
is considered is such that there is a substantial risk of that 
happening.213 
(d)In the subsequent cases to Foss v. Harbottle it has been suggested 
that the derivative action is also available where justice requires that 
an exception be made to the rule in Foss v. Harbottle.214 
  As an example for this exception is in that where all that is 
alleged is damage to the company arising from a director's 
misfeasance in withholding an asset of the company without 
fraud or ultra vires as in the English case (Heyting v. Dupont – 
1964)215, In this case the company was to exploit an invention of 
the defendants consisting of a machine for making plastic pipes 
and the defendant withheld the company's patent application. 
However, the company could not exploit the invention because it 
was in a state of paralysis owing to discord, so there was no 
damage to the company and therefore justice did not require that 
exception be made. In other English case this exception to the 
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rule in Foss v. Harbottle is clearly stated in the decision, it was 
held. 
   "In the third place it is alleged that there remains open 
an exception to the rule in Foss v. Harbottle where justice so 
requires. There are to be found amongst discussions of the 
rule in Foss v. Harbottle some expressions of doubts as to 
whether there is in truth any room for any further extension of 
the exceptions under this broad heading …it is, perhaps, a 
useful door to left open lest in some extremely usual 
circumstances justice would result from applying the rule. No 
exhaustive or even descriptive statement of such 
circumstances has been propounded…for the purpose of the 
present judgment I am prepared to accept the existence of a 
further exception to the rule in Foss v. Harbottle where justice 
so requires"216. 
 
(e)Further exception to the rule in Foss v. Harbottle: 
   was suggested in (Hodgson v. National & Local Government 
Officers Association)217, namely that even if wrong would be 
ratified or approved by an ordinary resolution, an individual will 
have standing to sue  if to deny such  who received the dividend 
(apparently knowing of the illegality) were held not to be entitled 
to bring a derivative action against the company. 
 
(2)The Personal Action and the Memorandum and Articles 
  Some times the directors may commit a wrong to the 
member personally rather than to the company. By the (ECA) 
1985 s.14, the memorandum and articles are a contract between 
the members. If the directors refuse to a member his rights under 
the articles, the member has a right of action which is not 
affected by the rule in Foss v. Harbottle. In (Pender v. lushington 
– 1877) 218the chairman wrongly refused to accept a 
shareholder's vote, which would have defeated an amendment to 
a resolution. Refusal infringed the member voting rights under the 
articles, and the injunction which he sought against directors was 
granted. 
  As we have previously mentioned that by Foss v. Harbottle 
that where the company has a cause of action, the company is 
the proper plaintiff to enforce that cause of action provided that 
an individual shareholder may bring a derivative action (that is an 
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action deriving out of the right of the company to bring an action) 
if that of which he complains cold not be validly effected or 
rectified by the company by ordinary resolution passed in general 
meeting. The essential rationale behind the rule in Foss v. 
Harbottle is that in the case of obligations owed to a company, 
the company is a proper plaintiff. However, there remains the 
area where obligations owed by the company to its members and 
in this instance a breach of the obligation entitles a member to 
bring proceedings against the company on his own rights rather 
than way of derivative action. It may well be that the action 
brought by the member may be a representative action if the 
same wrong has been done to other members. "the dividing line 
between personal and corporate rights is very hard to draw, and 
perhaps the most that can be said is that the court will incline to 
treat a provision in the memorandum or articles as conferring a 
personal right on a member only if he has a special interest in its 
observance distinct from the general interest which every 
member has in the company adhering to the terms of its 
constitution."219However, there are five bases upon which the 
member may have a personal action against a company these 
are: pursuant to contract, pursuant to common law, pursuant to 
Companies Act, pursuant to fiduciary duty and pursuant to the 
memorandum and articles of association.220 
 
 (a) Pursuant to contract: 
  A member is clearly entitled to enforce any contract between 
him and the company whether arising under general law or as a 
consequence of the memorandum and articles of association. In 
so far as such contract may arise at general law it is not 
proposed to make any further reference to this remedy available 
to a member as it is more properly the subject of the law of the 
contract. 
 
(b) Common Law: 
  In the Common Law there are many rights accepted as 
personal rights, for example the right to restrain the company 
from acting ultra vires, the right of a member not to have his 
obligations to the company increased without his consent and the 
right to have set aside an allotment of shares made for an 
improper purpose and the like. 
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(c) The Companies Act:  
  Also by the Companies Act there are many rights given to 
the member, for example the right of a member to have a share 
certificate, the right of a member to a copy of the balance sheet 
and statutory report and the like 
 
(d) Fiduciary duty: 
  It was held that in (Percival v. Wright)221that the directors of  
a company owe their duties to the company and not to individual 
shareholder. This in turn has given rise to the rule in Foss v. 
Harbottle with the consequence that in general circumstances, 
when ever directors have breached their duties to the company 
(being fiduciary duty or otherwise) it is the company which the 
proper plaintiff unless one of the exceptions to the rule in Foss v. 
Harbottle is applicable. However, notwithstanding the statement 
made in (Percival v. Wright) it is clear that the rule stated therein 
is only general rule and it was held in (Allen v. Hyatt) 222that it 
was possible under certain circumstances for the director to owe 
fiduciary duty directly to shareholders from the date of the 
decision in (Percival v. Wright) until the decision in (Gething 
v.Kilner)223, where in the context of a takeover, Brightman J. held 
that the directors of the offeree company had a duty to be honest 
and not mislead224. 
 
(f) Memorandum and article of association: 
  S.14 of the (ECA) reads as follow: 
 "Subject to the provisions of this Act, the memorandum and 
articles, when registered, bind the company and its members 
to the same extent as if they respectively had been signed and 
sealed by each member to observe all the provisions of the 
memorandum and articles." 
     Subject to the above section, the constitution of the company 
has the effect of a contract under seal between the company and 
each member, between company and each eligible officer and 
between a member and each other member. 
  It was held in (Hickman v. Kent or Romney Marsh Sheep 
Breaders – 1915) 225that the articles of association only constitute 
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a contract to the extent that they affect members in their capacity 
as members rather in their capacity as outsiders, whether or not 
the person is subsequently becomes a member. 
Also it has been stated: 
  "Not every provision contained in the memorandum 
and an article of association is capable of being enforced by a 
member in his own personal capacity. The extensions are the 
follows: 
(1)Where the statutory contract created by the memorandum 
and articles of association imposes rights and obligations 
upon a person in a capacity otherwise than that of a member. 
Accordingly, careful regard must be had to the provisions of 
the memorandum and articles of association which is sought 
to enforce against the company as under certain 
circumstances a member may be precluded from enforcing the 
statutory contract. 
(2) Where the failure to observe the memorandum or articles 
of association is capable of being ratified by a simple majority 
of members in general meeting. Whilst it follows from this that 
it is not every breach of the memorandum and articles of 
association which gives rise to a personal action on behalf of a 
member, this rule still leaves the question begged for their 
appears to be no clear answer as to what types of breaches 
the memorandum or articles of association are capable of 
being ratified by a simple majority"226. 
 
(iv)Other Member's Statutory Relief:-  
 
Department Of Trade Investigation (in England) 
  The Department of Trade and Industry is the government 
Department concerned with the conduct of the companies and 
the law which governs them. By legislation the Department is 
given various powers to investigate the affairs of the companies.  
One way that can be done is by the appointment of an inspector 
to look into the affairs of the company. The appointment can be 
instigated in a variety of ways: 
 
 
(1)On The Application of the Company: 
  By s.431 of the (ECA) 1985 the Department of Trade may 
appoint inspectors where company has a share capital, on the 
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application of at least 200 members, or members holding at least 
10% of the issued shares. Where the company has no share 
capital, then on the application of at least 20% of members. In 
any cases, on the application of the company (an ordinary 
resolution would be sufficient to authorize an application.)227. 
  In the past s.431 of the (ECA) has not often been used. This 
is because it overlaps with s.432, this section is more flexible  
than s.431 in that anyone can ask the Department to investigate 
and the Department may exercise their discretion to do if there 
are circumstances suggesting that the affairs of the company 
have been conducted with intent to defraud its creditors, or in a 
manner unfairly prejudicial to some part of members, or for 
unlawful or fraudulent purpose, or that the promoters or 
managers have been guilty of fraud or misconduct, or that proper 
information has not been given to the members. 
  When appointment of inspector is made under s.432 there is 
no obligation on the Department to reveal the reasons for the 
appointment, or who supplied the information leading to the 
appointment, nor need the Department forewarn the company. In 
(Norwest Holst v. Secretary Of State For trade- 1978) 228two 
inspectors were appointed to under s.432. In the previous two 
years the company had made record profits, where there was no 
evidence to doubt it is solvency and the auditor's report had not 
been qualified. The company sought a declaration that the 
appointment was invalid since it knew of one of the 
circumstances specified in s.432. It also sought disclosure of the 
reasons for the appointment. The action failed because there was 
nothing in the Act requiring the Department to disclose its 
reasons, and also the investigation was not necessarily against 
the company, but against persons who might be acting wrongfully 
towards the company and its shareholders. 
  The powers conferred by s.432 are exercisable even if the 
company is in voluntary liquidation. Also the word "members" 
includes persons who are members but to whom shares have 
been transferred or transmitted by operation of law, for example 
personal representative.229 
  Application for the Department of Trade and Industry 
investigation is a drastic step which dissatisfied shareholders will 
usually only be considered after they have failed to obtain a 
remedy at a general meeting convened by the order of the court 
                                     
227 - Geoffrey Morse, supra note 18 at 333. 
228 - [1978] 3 All E. R. 280. 
229 - See chapter (1) of this research. 
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through the courts. When an application is received the 
Department will call for the company to produce documents and 
records for internal examination by its staff. If the complaint is 
trivial or insubstantial it will go no further. An inspection will only 
be ordered if a strong case is made out since an appointment will 
attract publicity and cause damage to the company. If an 
inspection is ordered, the inspectors are usually appointed, 
normally a barrister and an accountant. 
 
(2) Inspection by The Order of the Court. 
  The Department of Trade must appoint an inspector to 
investigate the affairs of the company if the court so orders (s.431 
"1") of the (ECA) 1985. 
  When inspectors have been appointed the inspectors must 
exercise fair and reasonable powers.230In (Pergman Press – 
1970)231the court of appeal held that inspectors were not acting in 
a judicial or quasi judicial way. Never the less they have a duty to 
act fairly. 
  The 1989 (ECA) simplified and extended inspectors powers 
to obtain and require disclosure of information. The legislative 
charges are extended to speed up investigations and make the 
process more effective. The inspector has power to: 
(a) Require production of books and documents. Documents are 
defined to include information recorded in any form (s.56. 
(ECA) 1989). The documents must relate to a matter which 
inspectors believe to be relevant to investigation. Previously 
the document had to relate to the company. The change in the 
law increases their power to obtain information since it 
introduce a subjective approach i.e. inspectors do not have to 
demonstrate that information requested actually relates to the 
company, it is sufficient if they believe to be relevant. 
(b) Question on oath any person, and administer the oath 
accordingly (s.36 of the (ECA) 1989). 
(c) Obtain a warrant to enter premises and search for documents 
(whether or not the documents have been previously 
requested). To obtain the warrants the inspectors must have 
reason to believe a serious offence has been committed and 
that there is a danger that the relevant documents may be 
moved, tampered with or destroyed unless the element of 
surprise is available (s. 64 (ECA) 1989) 
                                     
230 - Janet Dine, supra note 7 at 287.  
231 - [1970] 3 WLR 792. 
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(d) Investigate the affairs of related companies. 
(e) Inform the Secretary of State of any matters coming to his 
knowledge as a result of the investigation. 
 
The inspector's report (s.437 (ECA) 1985)  
  The inspector presents his findings in a report to the 
Department. In some cases the inspector will also make interim 
reports232. The Secretary of State has a discretionary  to send a 
copy of the report to the company's registered office or to provide 
copies to specified classes of persons, for example members, 
auditors or persons referred to in the report. The inspector may 
publish the report, unless inspectors were appointed subject to 
specific terms that the report would not be published. When 
inspectors are appointed under a court order, the court must be 
sent a copy of the report. 
  By s.55 of the (ECA) inspectors may now be appointed on 
specific terms that the report the make will not be published i.e. 
the decision to be published is made at outset. This allows a full 
investigation to be carried out merely to decide whether ground 
exists for a prosecution or some form of the regulatory action. 
  By s.57 of the (ECA) 1989 the Secretary of State may curtail 
an investigation when it becomes clear that a criminal offence 
may have been committed and the matter has been referred to 
the appropriate prosecuting authority. In such cases inspectors 
need not submit a final report to the Secretary of State unless 
they were appointed by order of the court or unless the Secretary 
otherwise directs. 
 
Consequences of the report: 
  By s.60 of the (ECA) 1989 if as the result of the report, it 
appears to be in the public interest that the company be wound 
up the Department may present a petition that company be 
wound up because it is just and equitable to do so, i.e. the 
petition is presented. An inspector's report may be used as 
evidence to support a shareholder's petition under s. 122 (the just 
and equitable ground). 
  By s. 460(1) of the (ECA) 1989 if it appears that there are 
grounds for petition by a member under s.459 (i.e. that the affairs 
of the company have been conducted in an unfairly prejudicial 
manner) the Department may, as well or instead of the petitioning 
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to wind up the company, present a petition for an order under 
s.459. 
  By s.58 of the (ECA) 1989, the Secretary of State may bring 
civil proceedings on behalf of the company when it appears from 
any report made or information obtained that it is in the public 
interest to do so. 
  The Department may also institute criminal proceedings 
against persons believed to be guilty of offences. 
  By s.61 of the (ECA) 1989 an inspector's report is admissible 
in legal proceedings as evidence of the opinion of the inspectors 
in relation to any matter contained in the report. 
 
 
(3) Investigation of the Ownership of the Company. 
  By s.442 of the (ECA) 1985 (as amended by s.62 of 1989 
Act) the Department must investigate the ownership of shares on 
the application of 200 shareholders or holders of 10% of the 
issued shares, unless it consider the application is vexation, or 
unless it considers it is unreasonable to investigate any matter 
and the Department may investigate ownership if there appears 
to be good reason to do so233.  
  The Secretary of State, before appointing directors, may 
require the applicants to give up to ₤ 5000 security to costs. 
The inspector has the same general powers as in the 
investigation of the affairs of the company. The provision relating 
to the report are also similar, except that by s.44 of the (ECA) 
1989 if in the opinion of the Secretary of State , there is good 
reason for not divulging any part of the report, he may omit that 
part from the inspector's report. 
  S.68 of the (ECA) 1989 gives the Secretary of State 
additional powers of disclosure. He may disclose information 
relating to share ownership to the following persons: 
(a) The company whose ownership was subject to investigation. 
(b) Any member of that company. 
(c) Any person whose conduct was investigated. 
(d) Any person whose financial interests appear to be affected by 
matters covered by the investigation. 
  There are powerful actions to support s.442 are provided by 
s.445 and ss.454-457. In particular the Secretary of State may 
place restrictions on shares in any case where there is difficulty in 
finding out relevant facts about the shares, for example no voting 
                                     
233 - Id at 337. 
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rights are exercisable in respect of the shares and any 
agreement to transfer the shares will be void unless approved by 
the court or the Secretary of state, acting within defined limits. 
There also provisions under which the court may order the 
restricted shares to be sold. 
  If the Secretary of States believes that there are good 
reasons to investigate the ownership of the company, but that it is 
unnecessary to appoint inspectors for the purpose, he may 
require any person whom he reasonably believes to have 
information to give such information to him. 
 
(4) Investigation of share dealings. 
  By s.323 of the (ECA) directors are prohibited from dealing in 
options to buy or sell the quoted securities of their company or 
associated companies. By s.324 directors of all companies are 
require to disclose to their companies their interest in its shares 
or debentures. 
(5) Inspection of documents. 
  It has been stated that the appointment of an inspector can 
attract adverse publicity of a company. In 1962 the Jenkins 
committee234 recommended that the Department should have 
further power to require the production of documents and be able 
to exercise this power with far less publicity. Such inspection of 
documents may be an end in itself or it may lead to the formal 
appointment of an inspector. The recommendations were 
implemented by the Companies Act 1967. 
  By s.447 of the (ECA) 1985, the Department, if it thinks there 
is good reason to do so may at any time give directors to any 
company a direction requiring it to produce any specified books 
or papers. A similar direction may be made to any person who 
appears to be in possession of those books or papers. Copies or 
extracts of them may be taken and any person in possession of 
them, or a past or present officer or employee of the company, 
may be required to provide an explanation of them. There are 
also provision enabling a search warrant to be obtained in 
respect of premises where the documents are believed to be, 
provision allowing the Secretary of State to authorize any other 
competent person (probably a lawyer or an accountant) to 
exercise his power to require the production of documents. The 
competent person will then report publication or excessive 
disclosure (s. 449 of 1985 Act as amended by s.65 1989 act). 
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(6) Investigation by the Registrar (in Sudan) 
 In Sudan there many powers conferred on the registrar of the 
companies 
By s. 130 of (SCA) 1925 where the Registrar, in perusal of 
any document which a company is required to submit to him 
under the provisions of the Act, is of opinion that any information 
is necessary in order that such document may afford full 
particulars of the matter to which it purports to relate, he may, by 
a written order call on the company submitting the document to 
furnish in writing such information or explanation within such time 
as he may specify in his order, and on the receipt of such order, it 
shall be the duty of any one of the officers of the company  to 
furnish such information or explanation. 
By s. 131 of (SCA) 1925 the Registrar may, on the 
application either of not less than one hundred members or of 
holding not less than one – tenth of the shares issued, appoint 
one or more competent inspectors to investigate the affairs of the 
company and to report thereon in such manner as the registrar 
may direct. The above application must be supported by such 
evidence as the registrar may require for purpose of showing that 
the applicant has good reasons for requiring the investigation. 
By s. 133 of (SCA) 1925 the Registrar (in cases other than 
the application of members) shall appoint one or more competent 
inspectors to investigate the affairs of the company and to report 
thereon in such manner as the registrar may direct, if requested 
by the company by special resolution, or ordered by the court. 
By s. 133 of (SCA) 1925 it shall be the duty of all officers and 
agents of a company whose affairs are investigated by virtue of 
ss. 131, 132 to preserve and produce to the inspectors all books 
and documents relating to the company which are in their 
custody or to a paper before the inspectors when required so to 
do, and otherwise to give to the inspectors all assistance in 
connection with the investigation which they reasonably able to 
give. An inspector may examine on the oath the officers and the 
agents of the company and may administer on oath accordingly. 
If any officer or agent of the company refuses to produce to any 
inspectors any book or documents which is his duty under this 
section so to procedure, or refuses to appear before the inspector 
personally when required to do so or refuses to answer any 
question which is put to him by the inspector with respect to the 
affairs of the company, he shall be liable to imprisonment. 
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By s. 134 of (SCA)1925 the inspector may and, if so directed 
by the registrar, shall furnish interim reports to the registrar and at 
the conclusion of the investigation, shall make a final report to the 
registrar. 
By s. 135 of (SCA) 1925 If from any report made under s. 
134, it appears to the registrar that 
(a) Any person has, in relation to the company, been guilty of an 
offence for which he is criminally liable, the registrar may 
prosecute such person for the offence; 
(b) Proceeding ought in the public interest to be taken by any 
company referred to in a report , for the recovery of damages 
in respect of any fraud, misfeasance or other misconduct in 
connection with the promotion or formation of the company or 
the management of its affairs or for the recovery of any 
property of the company which has been misapplied or 
wrongly retained, he may himself take such proceeding in the 
name of and on behalf of the company, and the company 
shall bear any costs or expenses incurred by it in or in 
connection with such proceeding. 
By s.135 B. of (SCA) 1925 In the case of company liable to 
liquidation by the court, if it appears to the Registrar from the 
facts of any report referred to in s. 134, that the liquidation of the 
company is necessary in the public interest, the Registrar, may, 
unless the company is liquidated by the court, submit a petition 
requiring the liquidation therefore according to justice and equity. 
By s. 136 (SCA) 1925 a copy of the report of any inspectors 
appointed under (SCA) 1925 authenticated by the seal of the 
company whose affairs they have investigated, shall be 
admissible in any legal proceeding as evidence of the opinion of 
the inspectors in relation to any matter contained in the report. 
 
Conclusion: 
Company's decisions are presumed to pass through lawful 
channels. The first channel is the general meeting which 
resembles the parliament of the company. The second channel is 
the board of directors. The board of directors is presumed to 
represent the majority opinions since those directors are elected 
by the majority of the shares. 
The absolute power of the majority is no longer represent the 
truth, since that the law in the England and consequently in 
Sudan recognizes some mechanisms to relief individual or 
minority shareholder's grievances against the majority. 
111 
 
The statutory relief has been created either to prevent the 
unfair prejudicial conduct of the company or to wind up the 
company whenever it is just and equitable to do so. The Common 
Law relief has been created to relief the individual or minority 
shareholder either by the derivative action or the personal action. 
The administrative mechanism has been created to inspect the 
documents and affairs of the company to protect the individual 
and minority shareholders.  
 
 
Chapter 4 
 
Conclusion 
 
All over the world companies have proved to be pioneering in 
the realm of the grand economical schemes. Companies' role 
seemed not to be confined to pioneer in projects but also they 
proved to be effective and influential in planning and 
commissioning of strategic and infrastructural projects. These 
facts proved to be rooted to the extent that it is nowadays 
understood that leading supreme powers in the contemporary 
world are substantially based on their companies. Moreover, 
companies have played a very important political and social role 
through providing jobs, charity funds, scholarships and other 
contributions. 
Sudan is a promising country, rich in different types of 
resources. On the other hand individual properties seem to be 
small for building a country like Sudan. Therefore, it seems to be 
more fruitful to entwine these small fortunes in big influential 
companies. Spread of company culture and providing legal 
protection for those who are willing to form companies will 
encourage them to do so. The contemporary situation of 
companies in the Sudan does not show that companies have 
achieved or they are on their way to achieve a significant 
contribution to the development of the country.  
If we are to analyze the factors that prevent companies from 
playing their different roles, we may attribute them to three main 
factors: 
Firstly, economical factors represented in the weakness of the 
Sudanese economy in general which casts its shadow on the 
Sudanese companies. 
112 
 
Secondly, social factors embodied in the weakness of 
company culture and tendency of individuals to lay their hand on 
their private properties and run them by themselves. This 
conception of individualism has been reinforced by the failure of 
almost all public companies formed during the last few decades. 
Thirdly, legal factors embodied in the obsoleteness of the 
Sudanese Companies Act 1925. 
 It is clear that Sudan is anticipating a new era of economic 
growth and prosperity; this is mainly attributable to discovery and 
production of oil. This economic growth demands a new company 
law which can digest all expected new variables. Nowadays, a bill 
to make a new Companies Act was presented to the Council of 
Ministers to approve it before it is sent to the National Assembly.   
Generally, we can conclude our thesis and recommend the 
followings: 
(1) The 1925 Act remained obsolete despite all the 
amendments underwent in it and all its sections are almost 
procedural ones, and that does not help in providing legal 
protection for the investors. We can note that the source of the 
Sudanese Companies Act (i.e. The English Companies Act 1908) 
has undergone many amendments and developments to cope 
with the variables of the economy, for example its sections have 
increased from about 200 in 1908 to 747 in 1985 in addition to 25 
schedules whilst the Sudanese Act is almost the same since 
1925, except for trivial changes. 
(2) Company law is affected by the economy and the 
development of such Act should cope with the developments of 
the economical facts on the ground. 
If we take banks in the Sudan as an example for the 
Sudanese companies, we will find that the main problem facing 
this type of companies lurk on the fact that the fixed assets of 
these companies have almost absorbed most of their capitals. 
Such absorbance resulted in a remarkable weakness in running 
their original activities. Hence, such companies have to create 
new means and ways to support their liquid capital available for 
their activities. Preference shares arise as a favorite option for 
such companies (to support their liquid capitals), but after the 
(islamization) of the Sudanese laws in 1983 and after passing the 
Civil Transactions Act 1984, the concept of the preference shares 
in the English and Sudanese Companies Acts contradicts with 
principles of Sharia Law (in Sharia, the fixed rate of interests is 
considered as a sort of usury). This resulted in depriving 
companies from granting one of the most attractive merits to 
113 
 
preference shareholders and, consequently, preference shares 
began to decline in Sudan. Therefore, the legislature should 
reconcile the concepts of Sharia Law and   Companies Act as 
regard the preference shares to encourage issuing of such 
indispensable shares. It is worth mentioning that experts in 
Sharia and Economic Laws are available in this country. 
(3) The prevailing concept that shareholders rights are mainly 
three , those are ; the right of a shareholder to attend company 
meetings and vote, shareholder right to company dividends and 
the right of a shareholder to return of capital after winding up the 
company . But after careful tracking in the Sudanese and English 
Acts, and through the Common Law; we found that the rights of 
the shareholder are much more than what is known to be. The 
nature of these rights varies according to the target which a 
certain right is expected to satisfy. 
Some rights are of economical nature like the right of a 
shareholder to the dividends of the company or the right of a 
shareholder to return of capital after winding up the company. 
Other rights are of controllative nature like the right of a 
shareholder to attend company meetings and vote or the right of 
a shareholder to have a reasonable opportunity to express views 
in the company's meetings and the right of a shareholder to 
propose amendments to the resolutions before passing them. 
Other rights are of preventive nature like the right of a 
shareholder not to find his obligations to the company increased 
without his consent or the right of a shareholder to prevent an 
irregular forfeiture of his shares or the right of the shareholder to 
prevent the ultra vires act.  
It is beyond the capacity of the Sudanese layman to come to 
know and understand the essence of such rights since that these 
rights are widely scattered  between the different contexts of the 
Sudanese and English Companies Acts and through the 
Common Law. 
In our humble view these rights are to be enlisted in a 
separate section in the Companies Act named (shareholders 
rights) that which enable lay people to have easy reference for 
their rights and to exercise them without need for legal aid. 
(4) In a country like the Sudan, where the tribal and 
geographical and even personal considerations, may influence 
decision making rather the abstract benefit of the company, and 
certainly in governmental public companies where the 
overwhelming governmental majority can dissipate the votes of 
the minority regardless where the benefit of the company lurks, 
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there is a real need for a new sections in the Act to make a 
balance between the different considerations.   
(5) The legislature must enact provisions for the relief of 
minority shareholders in the company despite the fact that 
protested resolutions might have been passed by sufficient 
majority, for example s. 459 of the English Companies Act 1985 
guarantees intervention of the court whenever unfairly prejudicial 
conduct is suspected to have occurred. This section has 
conferred the court wide authorities: 
(a) To make an order regulating the affairs of the company in 
the future whenever it is necessary to do so. 
(b) To make an order requiring the company to do or to refrain 
from doing certain acts. 
(c) To make an order providing for the purchase of any 
member's shares by other members or a purchase of such 
shares by the company itself. 
(d) To make an order provide the purchase of the majority 
shareholder's shares. 
 By the Common Law the matter may reach the extent of 
winding up the company if the court thinks that it is just and 
equitable that the company be wound up. 
(6) In Sudan the administrative protection exercised by the 
companies' registrar is almost confined to levying fees and 
routine information about the company. This protection should 
have gone deep to the core of running the company affairs , for 
example those companies which are compelled by law to hold 
annual meetings must be answerable to the registrar about 
whether these meetings have been held or not . Moreover, the 
registrar is to make sure that the notice of meeting have been 
properly delivered, and whether the opportunities to express the 
different views of shareholders have been evenly distributed. The 
Registrar must monitor the conduct of the chairman who is, in 
most of the events in the Sudan, a member of the board of 
directors. So we recommend the support the Registrar office by 
financial and proper personnel necessary to carry on its 
responsibilities. Also we recommend the mandating of the 
Registrar office with quasi judicial powers to penalize companies 
and to resolve some simple disputes the company.  
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